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A child born today will grow up with no conception of privacy
at all. They’ll never know what it means to have a private
moment to themselves, an unrecorded, unanalysed thought. And
that’s a problem because privacy matters, privacy is what
allows us to determine who we are and who we want to be.
Edward Joseph Snowden

Abstract
During the previous decades, the upcoming demand for security in the digital world, e.g., the In-
ternet, lead to numerous groundbreaking research topics in the ﬁeld of cryptography. This thesis
focuses on the design and analysis of cryptographic primitives and schemes to be used for authenti-
cation of data and communication endpoints, i.e., users. It is structured into three parts, where we
present the ﬁrst freely scalable multi-block-length block-cipher-based compression function (Coun-
ter-bDM) in the ﬁrst part. The presented design is accompanied by a thorough security analysis
regarding its preimage and collision security.
The second and major part is devoted to password hashing. It is motivated by the large amount
of leaked password during the last years and our discovery of side-channel attacks on scrypt – the
ﬁrst modern password scrambler that allowed to parameterize the amount of memory required to
compute a password hash. After summarizing which properties we expect from a modern pass-
word scrambler, we (1) describe a cache-timing attack on scrypt based on its password-dependent
memory-access pattern and (2) outline an additional attack vector – garbage-collector attacks – that
exploits optimization which may disregard to overwrite the internally used memory. Based on our
observations, we introduce Catena – the ﬁrst memory-demanding password-scrambling framework
that allows a password-independent memory-access pattern for resistance to the aforementioned at-
tacks. Catena was submitted to the Password Hashing Competition (PHC) and, after two years of
rigorous analysis, ended up as a ﬁnalist gaining special recognition for its agile framework approach
and side-channel resistance. We provide six instances of Catena suitable for a variety of appli-
cations. We close the second part of this thesis with an overview of modern password scramblers
regarding their functional, security, and general properties; supported by a brief analysis of their
resistance to garbage-collector attacks.
The third part of this thesis is dedicated to the integrity (authenticity of data) of nonce-based
authenticated encryption schemes (NAE). We introduce the so-called j-IV-Collision Attack, allow-
ing to obtain an upper bound for an adversary that is provided with a ﬁrst successful forgery and
tries to eﬃciently compute j additional forgeries for a particular NAE scheme (in short: reforge-
ability). Additionally, we introduce the corresponding security notion j-INT-CTXT and provide a
comparative analysis (regarding j-INT-CTXT security) of the third-round submission to the CAE-
SAR competition and the four classical and widely used NAE schemes CWC, CCM, EAX, and
GCM.

Zusammenfassung
Die fortschreitende Digitalisierung in den letzten Jahrzehnten hat dazu geführt, dass sich das
Forschungsfeld der Kryptographie bedeutsam weiterentwickelt hat. Diese, im Wesentlichen aus drei
Teilen bestehende Dissertation, widmet sich dem Design und der Analyse von kryptographischen
Primitiven und Modi zur Authentiﬁzierung von Daten und Kommunikationspartnern.
Der erste Teil beschäftigt sich dabei mit blockchiﬀrenbasierten Kompressionsfunktionen, die in
ressourcenbeschränkten Anwendungsbereichen eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit
präsentieren wir die erste frei skalierbare und sichere blockchiﬀrenbasierte Kompressionsfunktion
Counter-bDM und erweitern somit ﬂexibel die erreichbare Sicherheit solcher Konstruktionen.
Der zweite Teil und wichtigste Teil dieser Dissertation widmet sich Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren.
Zum einen ist dieser motiviert durch die große Anzahl von Angriﬀen auf Passwortdatenbanken
großer Internet-Unternehmen. Zum anderen bot die Password Hashing Competition (PHC) die
Möglichkeit, unter Aufmerksamkeit der Expertengemeinschaft die Sicherheit bestehender Verfahren
zu hinterfragen, sowie neue sichere Verfahren zu entwerfen. Im Rahmen des zweiten Teils entwar-
fen wir Anforderungen an moderne Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren und beschreiben drei Arten von
Seitenkanal-Angriﬀen (Cache-Timing-, Weak Garbage-Collector- und Garbage-Collector-Angriﬀe)
auf scrypt – das erste moderne Password-Hashing-Verfahren welches erlaubte, den benötigten Spei-
cheraufwand zur Berechnung eines Passworthashes frei zu wählen.
Basierend auf unseren Beobachtungen und Angriﬀen, stellen wir das erste moderne Password-
Hashing-Framework Catena vor, welches für gewählte Instanzen passwortunabhängige Speicherzu-
griﬀe und somit Sicherheit gegen oben genannte Angriﬀe garantiert. Catena erlangte im Rahmen
des PHC-Wettbewerbs besondere Anerkennung für seine Agilität und Resistenz gegen Seitenkanal-
Angriﬀe. Wir präsentieren sechs Instanzen des Frameworks, welche für eine Vielzahl von Anwendung-
en geeignet sind. Abgerundet wird der zweite Teil dieser Arbeit mit einem vergleichenden Überblick
von modernen Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren hinsichtlich ihrer funktionalen, sicherheitstechnischen
und allgemeinen Eigenschaften. Dieser Vergleich wird unterstützt durch eine kurze Analyse bezüglich
ihrer Resistenz gegen (Weak) Garbage-Collector-Angriﬀe.
Der dritte teil dieser Arbeit widmet sich der Integrität von Daten, genauer, der Sicherheit soge-
nannter Nonce-basierten authentisierten Verschlüsselungsverfahren (NAE-Verfahren), welche ebenso
wie Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren in der heutigen Sicherheitsinfrastruktur des Internets eine wichtige
Rolle spielen. Während Standard-Deﬁnitionen keine Sicherheit nach dem Fund einer ersten erfolg-
reich gefälschten Nachricht betrachten, erweitern wir die Sicherheitsanforderungen dahingehend wie
schwer es ist, weitere Fälschungen zu ermitteln. Wir abstrahieren die Funktionsweise von NAE-
Verfahren in Klassen, analysieren diese systematisch und klassiﬁzieren die Dritt-Runden-Kandidaten
des CAESAR-Wettbewerbs, sowie vier weit verbreitete NAE-Verfahren CWC, CCM, EAX und
GCM.
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Introduction
If you can’t fly, run; if you can’t run, walk; if
you can’t walk, crawl; but by all means keep
moving.
Martin Luther King, Jr.
A
uthentication and Authenticated Encryption (AE) are (or should be) used almost always
when people act in the digital world. Be that logging into an E-Mail or an online-banking
account, into a user account on a local Personal Computer (PC), or, in general, when there
happens to be communication between a sender and a receiver transmitting data over an insecure
channel, e.g., the Internet.
In this context, the possibility that the legit receiver is able to check whether a message sent to
him was sent by the actual intended party is ensured by authentication; to prohibit any adversary
from reading the actual content is ensured by encryption; and the assurance that a message was not
manipulated during the transmission is denoted by integrity. These three form the everlasting main
goals of Cryptology1, concerning the “communication in the presence of adversaries.” (Cryptology,
by Rivest in [169]). The history of cryptography dates back several thousand years, where people
encrypted letters using simple substitution of characters or words (secret writing). Nevertheless, the
ﬁeld of cryptography evolved over and over and yielded to the ﬁeld of Modern Cryptography back
in the 1970s, giving rise to mathematical deﬁnitions of security, precise mathematical assumptions,
and proofs of security.
Therefore, an increased rate of communication transmitting crucial data over the Internet uses
an encrypted (and authenticated) channel in-between. That is motivated by the existence of adver-
saries, which either try to passively eavesdrop and/or to actively manipulate that very data. As a
remedy, modern cryptography provides AE, a term referring to algorithms providing authentication,
encryption, and integrity.
1Cryptology itself splits into Cryptography and Cryptanalysis, where the former concerns the design and the
latter the analysis of cryptographic algorithms. Note that we usually use the term Cryptography when referring to
Cryptology.
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
While these security goals never changed, the technology to achieve or to break such algorithms
providing these goals did (e.g., Moore’s Law [190]). Therefore, cryptographers are always encouraged
to design algorithms utilizing the state-of-the-art technology to provide a reasonable security against
adversaries that are able to use the exact same technology.
This thesis tackles three areas of modern cryptography: block-cipher-based compression functions,
password hashing, and authenticated encryption, which are brieﬂy introduced next. Moreover, we
cover both the design and the analysis part of cryptography.
Block-Cipher-Based Compression Functions. Between 2007 and 2012, the cryptographic
community mainly focused on the design of cryptographic hash functions (SHA-3 Competition [204]).
While the SHA-3 Competition has encouraged many new interesting ideas for designing hash and
compression functions (e.g., the sponge framework [47]), one of the most popular approaches still is
to use a given block cipher and to turn it into a one-way function. While the roots to this simple
principle can be tracked back to Rabin [220] at the end of the 70s, the knowledge about it is still
highly relevant today. For instance, the standardized SHA-1 [206] and SHA-2 [207] hash function
families base on the SHACAL-1/2 ciphers [126]. But also submissions for the SHA-3 competition,
such as – MD6 [224], Skein [200], or SHAvite-3 [51] – are built on block ciphers. The advantages are
obvious: compression-function designers can proﬁt from the pseudorandomness of an Indistinguisha-
bility under Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA)-secure cipher and further, they also require only
a single primitive for both encryption and hashing – an important matter when designing hardware
for resource-constrained devices. So far, the community focused mainly on single-block- and Double-
Block-Length (DBL) (block-cipher-based) compression functions, e.g., [217, 232, 247, 185, 96, 133],
providing an n- or 2n-bit output, respectively, where n denotes the output size of the underlying
block cipher. While DBL hashing can oﬀer an acceptable collision security, a variety of applications
demand secure Multi-Block-Length (MBL) functions with a freely scalable output of the compres-
sion function. For instance, public-key signature schemes expect inputs of the exact length of the
signing key. Moreover, in the era of SHA-3, hash values with a length of more than 256 bits are stan-
dard; however, it is an open research question to create provably secure b-block-length compression
functions for b > 2, which we have addressed in this thesis.
Password Hashing. Today, in despite of numerous evolving technologies and techniques used for
authentication, passwords2 have been and continue to be the most widely used form of in the digital
world. We describe them as user-memorizable secrets that are commonly used for user authentication
and cryptographic key derivation. The former is straightforward. The latter is motivated by the
demand of all cryptographic (authenticated) encryption schemes for a pseudorandom secret key
that is usually required by the security proof of the underlying primitive, e.g., a block cipher. Such
a key can, for example, be derived from a password.
By now, it is common wisdom to store a one-way hash of a password instead of the password
itself.3 The reason for the latter is straightforward: if an adversary gets in possession of the ﬁle
containing the password hashes (usually assigned to their corresponding accounts), a password
stored in plain would grant that adversary already full access to those accounts.
Moreover, humans are weak password generators and tend to favor recognizability over security.
Therefore, user-chosen passwords usually suﬀer from low entropy and can be attacked by trying out
all possible candidates in order of likelihood until the right one has been found (so-called brute-
force/dictionary attack). Since it is unlikely that users will start to choose stronger passwords,
2In our context, “passphrases” and Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) are also “passwords”.
3Nevertheless, many large companies still do not follow that simple rule – see [75, 153, 125] for examples.
3the security must be provided by the algorithm processing a password, which we call a Password
Scrambler (PS). Although there are other approaches to enhance password-based authentication,
e.g., dedicated cryptographic protocols defeating “oﬀ-line” password guessing [43], we focus on
password scramblers (resp. Key-Derivation Functions (KDFs)) in this thesis.
The technology and the knowledge of adversaries trying to gather information about user pass-
words constantly evolved over time. Current password-cracking systems utilize the capabilities of
Graphical Processing Units (GPUs), Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), and Application-
Speciﬁc Integrated Circuits (ASICs), allowing for a massively parallel testing of password candi-
dates [250]. Therefore, in 2012, the community started the Password Hashing Competition (PHC) [31]
with the hope to obtain new designs thwarting state-of-the-art adversaries. The reason is an increas-
ing asymmetry between the computational devices the typical “defender” is using, and those devices
available for potential adversaries. Even without special-purpose hardware, GPUs with hundreds of
cores [202] have become a commodity. By making plenty of computational resources available, GPUs
are excellent tools for password cracking since each core can try another password candidate, and
all cores run at full speed. However, the amount of memory – and, especially that of fast “cache”
memory – of a common GPU is comparable to that of a typical Central Processing Unit (CPU)
as used by the defenders. Therefore, modern password scramblers focus not only on a reasonable
computational time, but also on a high memory consumption to thwart GPUs.
Besides GPU-based attacks, other threats to password scramblers exist: Cache-Timing At-
tacks (CTAs) [45, 108], Garbage-Collector Attacks (GCAs) [101], Weak Garbage-Collector At-
tacks (WGCAs) [101], and Time-Memory Tradeoﬀ (TMTO) attacks [52, 55], which will be tackled
in this thesis.
Authenticated Encryption. As mentioned above, the communication between two parties over
an insecure channel often not only requires encryption (conﬁdentiality), but also authentication and
integrity. The simultaneous supply of these goals is the objective of AE schemes (and Authenticated
Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) schemes). In 2000, Bellare and Namprempre considered
AE schemes from Generic Composition (GC) [39]. Schemes following this strategy require an en-
cryption scheme providing privacy and a secure Message Authentication Code (MAC) which are
combined under independent keys. In contrast, as a remedy to the usual eﬃciency disadvantage of
GC-based AE schemes, the evolution of dedicated AE schemes started with RPC [151], IAPM [147],
XCBC [116], and OCB [230]. This development has lead the cryptographic community to the ongoing
Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) [44],
which was started in 2013, giving rise to a large variety of diﬀerent design choices for dedicated AE
schemes. The standard security requirement for AE schemes is to prevent leakage of any informa-
tion about secured messages except for their respective lengths. However, stateless and deterministic
encryption schemes would enable adversaries to detect if the same associated data and message has
been encrypted before under the current key. Thus, Rogaway proposed nonce-based encryption [228],
where the user must provide an additional nonce for every message it wants to process – a number
used once (nonce). An AE scheme requiring a nonce as input is called a Nonce-Based Authenti-
cated Encryption (NAE) scheme. In general, most existing block-cipher based AE schemes, such as
EAX [42], GCM [180], or OCB3 [161], provide decent resistance to nonce-respecting adversaries, but
fail badly when nonces are reused (nonce misuse). Therefore, a modern AE scheme should provide
a second line of defense under nonce misuse, i.e., a decent level of security even when nonces repeat.
Additionally, the standard AE security notions assume that an adversary learns nothing about the
would-be message whenever a ciphertext fails the authenticity check (decryption misuse).
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In this thesis, we focus on the integrity of NAE schemes. More detailed, we elaborate on the
resistance of a given scheme to an adversary attempting to ﬁnd multiple forgeries provided one single
forgery was already found and called it resistance to Reforgeability. By considering all third-round
CAESAR candidates and widely used NAE schemes, e.g., EAX and GCM, we provide a decent
contribution to the cryptanalytical understanding and progress of designing modern NAE schemes.
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Outline
This thesis consists of ﬁve parts, where Part I (Chapters 2 - 4) introduces the foundations (deﬁnition
concepts, and security deﬁnitions) required for understanding the remainder. Part II to Part IV form
the core of this work, where we also mention which publication from the list above was used as a
basis for the respective chapter:
Part II (Chapter 5) To increase the ﬂexibility of a block-cipher-based compression function, we
introduce the Counter-bDM family of MBL compression functions [8] in Chapter 5, which
supports a scalable output size making it suitable for a wide range of applications. Part II is
adopted almost literally from [8].
Part III (Chapters 6 - 11)We start the third part with a brief survey on the history of password
hashing, discuss several properties which should be provided by modern password scramblers,
and show that the PS is vulnerable to CTAs, GCAs, and WGCAs, in Chapter 6, where the
both latter are attack types introduced by us. That chapter builds the basis for introducing
Catena in Chapter 7, a highly ﬂexible and memory-demanding modern Password-Scrambling
Framework (PSF), for which we also provide a security analysis in Chapter 8. We proceed
with presenting and discussing several instances of the underlying functions of Catena in
Chapter 9. In Chapter 10, we provide instances of Catena for a variety of applications. We
close Part III by providing a comparison of modern password scramblers in Chapter 11.
Part IV (Chapter 12) In Chapter 12, we analyze AE schemes which are either widely used
and/or were submitted to the CAESAR regarding to their resistance to reforgeability attacks.
Part IV is adopted almost literally from [105].
In Part V (Chapter 13), this thesis is concluded by providing a summary and a discussion about
possible future work.
Part I
Foundations
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Block Ciphers and Block-Cipher-Based Compression Functions
The lesson here is that it is insufficient to
protect ourselves with laws; we need to protect
ourselves with mathematics. Encryption is too
important to be left solely to governments.
Bruce Schneier
Block Ciphers
A block cipher is a key-dependent function E mapping a ﬁxed-length input of n bit to a ﬁxed-length
output of the same size. It is used in many cryptographic algorithms as a building block and we
deﬁne it formally in Deﬁnition 2.1.
Definition 2.1 (Block Cipher). We define a (k, n)-bit block cipher as a keyed family of
permutations, which consists of an encryption function E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and
its inverse (decryption) function D = E−1 : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. Both take a k-bit key
K and an n-bit input block X, and produce an n-bit output Y , where DK(EK(X)) = X, for
all X ∈ {0, 1}n,K ∈ {0, 1}k. For positive k and n, we denote by Block(k, n) the set of all
(k, n)-bit block ciphers.
Security Notions and Adversaries
In cryptography, the security of an algorithm is almost always proven under some speciﬁc assump-
tion applying to the underlying primitives. For block ciphers, we consider two security models
which can be applied, namely, the Ideal-Cipher Model and the (Strong) Pseudorandom Permutation
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(SPRP/PRP) Model. The Ideal-Cipher Model is an idealized model describing a block cipher as fam-
ily of 2k random permutation P. To prove security in that model, one must show that a block cipher
EK is indistinguishable from a randomly chosen element of P, i.e., Pi և P (see [59, 166, 168, 249]
for examples). Note that there exist cryptographic schemes which provide security in the artifi-
cial Ideal-Cipher Model but fail badly if instantiated with any existing block cipher [56], e.g., the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [197] or the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [205].
On the other hand, one could determine the security of a block cipher EK by showing that
it is computationally indistinguishable from an n-bit permutation, rendering it a Pseudorandom
Permutation (PRP) or a Strong Pseudorandom Permutation (SPRP). Before we introduce the two
latter in Deﬁnition 2.2 and 2.3, we show how we model an adversary A.
An adversary A is an algorithm that interacts with a given set of oracles that appear as black
boxes to A. We denote by AO the output of A after interacting with some oracle O. We write
AdvXF (A) for the advantage of an adversary A against a security notion X on a function/scheme
F . All probabilities are deﬁned over the random coins of the oracles and those of the adversary, if any.
We write AdvXF (q) = maxA{AdvXF (A)} to refer to the maximal advantage over all X-adversaries
A on a given scheme/function F which are only bounded by the number of oracle queries q they
are allowed to ask to the given oracles. WLOG, we assume that an adversary A never asks queries
to which it already knows the answer, and by O1 →֒/ O2 we denote that A never queries O2 with
the output of O1.
During the query phase, we say that an adversary A maintains a query history Q collecting
all requests together with their corresponding answer. We write Q|x, if we refer only to all entries
of value type x, e.g., message, ciphertext, or a tag, in the query history. For example, Ni /∈ Q|N
denotes that the nonce1 Ni is not contained in the set of nonces already in the query history Q.
In terms of block ciphers, an adversary A is allowed to ask either a forward (encryption) query
EK(X) = Y , or a backward (decryption) query X = DK(Y ), where X,Y ∈ {0, 1}n and ∀X :
DK(EK(X)) = X. Each query Qi is stored as a tuple (Xi, Yi,Ki) in Q, where we denote by Qi the
state of the Q after i queries have been asked by the adversary, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
Definition 2.2 (PRP Security). Let E ∈ Block(k, n) denote a block cipher. Let Permn be
the set of all n-bit permutations. The PRP advantage of A against E is then defined by
AdvPRPE (A) ≤
∣∣∣Pr [AE(·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [Aπ(·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
where the probabilities are taken over K և {0, 1}k and π և Permn. We define AdvPRPE (q) as
the maximum advantage over all PRP-adversaries A on E that ask at most q queries to the
given oracles.
Definition 2.3 (SPRP Security). Let E ∈ Block(k, n) denote a block cipher and D its in-
verse. Let Permn be the set of all n-bit permutations. The SPRP advantage of A against E is
then defined by
AdvSPRPE,D (A) ≤
∣∣∣Pr [AE(·),D(·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [Aπ(·),π−1(·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
1A nonce (number used once) is a value which must never repeat in a given context.
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where the probabilities are taken over K և {0, 1}k and π և Permn. We define AdvSPRPE,D (q)
as the maximum advantage over all SPRP-adversaries A on E that ask at most q queries to
the given oracles.
Block-Cipher-Based Compression Functions
One use case for applying a block cipher as a building block is given by so-called block-cipher-
based compression functions, which take two ﬁxed-length inputs of n bit each, and output one n-bit
output. A formal description is given in Deﬁnition 2.42
Definition 2.4 (SBL Compression Function). A Single-Block-Length (SBL) block-
cipher-based compression function is a mapping
HSBL : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n,
which uses a block cipher from Block(n, n).
The idea of a block-cipher-based compression function was ﬁrst discussed in the literature by Rabin
[220]. Most SBL functions use a block cipher from Block(n, n) and compress a 2n-bit string to an
n-bit string. A popular example is the Davies-Meyer (DM) [262] mode:
HDM(M,U) = EM (U)⊕ U,
which is, for example, used twice inside Hirose-DM [134]. A more generalized form of a single-
block-length compression function can be described by a function compressing a (b+1)n-bit input to
a ﬁxed-length bn-bit output. That construction is called MBL compression function and is formally
deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2.5.
Definition 2.5 (MBL Compression Function). A Multi-Block-Length (MBL) block-
cipher-based compression function is a mapping
HMBL : {0, 1}bn × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}bn,
which takes a bn-bit chaining value and an n-bit message, and outputs a new bn-bit chaining
value. It internally employs a block cipher from Block(bn, n).
For our security analysis, we assume the underlying block cipher to be secure, e.g.,, it behaves like
an ideal block cipher. Therefore, we show the security of a block-cipher-based compression function
by analyzing the construction itself and any security architect should be aware of choosing a secure
2Note that, in comparison to common literature, e.g., [216], we refer to a more restrictive definition of a block
cipher by fixing the size of the key.
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block cipher. It follows that we usually consider the ideal-cipher model, wherein a block cipher is
modeled as a family of random permutations {EK} and the permutation E that is used in the
compression function is chosen at random from Block(k, n): E և Block(k, n).We borrow two usual
assumptions about A from [98]:
1. If A has successfully found a collision or a preimage for HMBL, it has obtained the necessary
encryption or decryption results to E only by making queries to the oracle E.
2. A does not make queries to which it already knows the answer, e.g., if A already knows the
answer to a forward query Y = EK(X), it will not request the answer to the corresponding
backward query DK(Y ) – which will necessarily return X – and vice versa.
Collision Security. We deﬁne the collision security of our compression function HCbDM by the
advantage of an adversary A to win Experiment 2.6, which is described in the following.
Experiment 2.6 (Collision-Finding Experiment).
1. An adversary A is given oracle access to a block cipher E և Block(bn, n).
2. After asking at most q forward (encryption) or backward (decryption) queries (Xi,Ki)
or (Yi,Ki), where Yi = EKi(Xi) and Xi = DKi(Yi) , respectively, collecting q tu-
ples (Xi, Yi,Ki) for 1 ≤ i ≤ q, it outputs a pair (M,U1, . . . , Ub), (M ′, U ′1, . . . , U ′b)
∈ {0, 1}(b+1)n × {0, 1}(b+1)n.
3. The adversary wins the experiment iff its output is a valid collision for HCbDM, i.e.,
HCbDM(M,U1, . . . , Ub) = H
CbDM(M ′, U ′1, . . . , U
′
b) and
(M,U1, . . . , Ub) 6= (M ′, U ′1, . . . , U ′b).
Otherwise, A loses the experiment.
The advantage of A for ﬁnding a collision is deﬁned by the maximal advantage taken from all
possible adversaries that request at most q queries, or formally written:
AdvCOLL
HMBL
(q) := max
{
AdvCOLL
HMBL
(A)
}
.
Preimage Security. There are various notions considering preimage security (see [231] for exam-
ple). We adapt that of Everywhere-Preimage Security (EPRE), which was introduced by Rogaway
and Shrimpton in [231]. There, the adversary commits to a hash value before it makes any queries to
the oracle. The preimage security of HMBL is therefore deﬁned by the advantage that an adversary
A wins Experiment 2.7.
Experiment 2.7 (Preimage-Finding Experiment).
1. An adversary A is given oracle access to a block cipher E և Block(bn, n). Before it
makes any queries, it announces a hash value (V1, . . . , Vb) ∈ {0, 1}bn.
13
2. After asking at most q forward (encryption) or backward (decryption) queries (Xi,Ki)
or (Yi,Ki), where Yi = EKi(Xi) and Xi = DKi(Yi) , respectively, collecting q tuples
(Xi, Yi,Ki) for 1 ≤ i ≤ q, it outputs a (b+ 1)-tuple (M,U1, . . . , Ub) ∈ {0, 1}(b+1)n.
3. The adversary wins the experiment iff its output is a valid preimage for (V1, . . . , Vb) and
HCbDM, i.e.,
HCbDM(M,U1, . . . , Ub) = (V1, . . . , Vb).
Otherwise, A loses the experiment.
The advantage of A for ﬁnding a preimage is deﬁned by the maximal advantage taken from all
possible adversaries that ask at most q queries:
AdvEPRE
HMBL
(q) := max
{
AdvEPRE
HMBL
(A)
}
.
In the above deﬁned Preimage-Finding Experiment, an adversary A is forced to commit itself to a
hash value (V1, . . . , Vb) for which it has to ﬁnd a preimage. In contrast, we denote by
AdvPRE
HMBL
(q) := max
{
AdvPRE
HMBL
(A)
}
the advantage of an adversary A trying to ﬁnd a preimage for an arbitrarily chosen hash value.
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Hash Functions and Password Hashing
Knowledge is power. Information is liberating.
Education is the premise of progress. In every
society, in every family.
Kofi Atta Annan
Hash Functions
The concept of a hash function was introduced by Knuth in the 1950s [157] and informally describes
a function which compresses an arbitrarily large input to an output of ﬁxed length (hash, hash value,
or digest). For this thesis, we borrow and slightly adapt the deﬁnition of an unkeyed hash function
by Rogaway [229].
Definition 3.1 (Hash Function). An n-bit hash function H is a function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, n ∈ N+,
where N+ denotes the set of positive integers.
Security Models. An idealized model for proving the security of a hash function is described by
the Random-Oracle Model as introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [40]. To be considered as security,
the hash function must be indistinguishable from a so-called random function (random oracle), which
is an abstract primitive returning a randomly chosen ﬁxed-length bitstring for each new input. That
model could for example be applied in the case when considering the inner functionality of the
hash function, e.g., SHA-1 [206] or SHA-2 [207], would make a security analysis too complex. Note
that similar to the Ideal-Cipher Model discussed in Chapter 2, there exist schemes which provide
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security in the Random-Oracle Model but are insecure when considering any particular instance
(see [35, 118] for example).
Given a random oracle $ : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, we say that a hash function HK with H : {0, 1}∗ ×
{0, 1}k → {0, 1}n is Pseudorandom Function (PRF)-secure if it is indistinguishable from $, where
K և K denotes a uniformly distributed secret chosen at random (see Deﬁnition 3.2 for a formal
deﬁnition).
Definition 3.2 (PRF Security). Let H : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n be a function with a
secret K և {0, 1}k. Let A be an adversary that is allowed to ask at most q queries to an oracle.
Further, let $ : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a random function. Then, the PRF Advantage of A wrt.
to H is defined by
AdvPRFH (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [AH(K,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [A$(·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ .
Furthermore, by AdvPRFH (q) we denote the maximum advantage taken over all adversaries that
ask at most q queries to the given oracle.
In contrast to the idealized model described above, the security of a hash function can be measured
by considering three assumption provided by the so-called Standard Model, i.e., Collision Resistance,
Preimage Resistance, and 2nd-Preimage Resistance. A hash function fulﬁlling those requirements is
called a cryptographic hash function (see Deﬁnition 3.3).
Definition 3.3 (Cryptographic Hash Function). Let H be as defined in Definition 3.1.
We call H a cryptographic hash function if it fulfills the following three properties:
• Collision Resistance: It is practically infeasible to find two distinct inputs x 6= x′ ∈
{0, 1}∗ which lead to H(x) = H(x′).
• Preimage Resistance: Given a hash value h← H(x) with x ∈ {0, 1}∗, it is practically
infeasible to find x.
• Second-Preimage Resistance: Given a hash value h ← H(x) and its corresponding
input x with x ∈ {0, 1}∗, it is practically infeasible to find a value x′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ with x′ 6= x
so that H(x′) = H(x) holds.
Password Hashing
We start this section by providing a generic deﬁnition (see Deﬁnition 3.4) of a password scrambler
(PS). The reason for that rather loose deﬁnition is caused by the large variety of existing password-
hashing designs, which makes a more strict deﬁnition impossible.
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Definition 3.4 (Password Scrambler). Let S ⊂ {0, 1}∗ and PWD ⊂ {0, 1}∗ define the set
of all possible salts and passwords. Further, let T ⊂ {0, 1}∗ denote an arbitrarily large set of
additional (optional) information and parameters. Then, a Password Scrambler (PS) P is a
mapping
P : S × PWD × T → {0, 1}n.
The optional set T could, for example, contain parameters regarding the time and memory con-
sumption as well as a tweak, a header AD (associated data), or other additional information and
parameters – always depending on the particular algorithm which is considered.
Note that we assume the salt value s ∈ S and the password pwd ∈ PWD to be compulsory inputs
to P (even if s, pwd ∈ {0, 1}∗ allows for the empty string). The reason for the password is obvious,
whereas the reason for the salt value is based on the fact that it has become a commonly used (and
also a mandatory) input since the ﬁrst password scrambler crypt was introduced in UNIX-based
systems [191] resting upon the ideas of Wilkes et al. [261]. The value s refers to a publicly known
value which is processed together with the password. The basic idea is to employ a fresh value of s for
each password pwd: assume pwd1 = pwd2 to be two user-given passwords. Further, let s1 6= s2 de-
note two distinct salts. Then, it is highly likely that P (s1, pwd1, ·) 6= P (s2, pwd2, ·). This technique,
eﬀectively thwarting “oﬀ-line” password-guessing adversaries, was introduced to reduce the impact
of so-called dictionary attacks that base on a large number of precomputed password candidates.
The currently most advanced member of that kind of attacks is given by rainbow tables published
by Oechslin in 2003 [203]. To make such attacks even more complicated, Manber suggested to hold
some bits of the salt secret to the adversary, turning then into pepper [177].
We go on with describing and deﬁning the desired properties a modern PS should achieve. Apart
from the introduction of scrypt [211] – the ﬁrst memory-demanding PS – the topic of a ﬂexible
memory requirement of a PS come to the fore during the PHC. To make it more tangible, we
introduce the parameter garlic (g, see Deﬁnition 3.4). In general, the parameter g denotes that one
invocation of the PS requires about G = 2g · n bits of memory, where n usually denotes the output
size in bits of the underlying primitive, e.g., n = 512 for SHA-512 [196].1
Even if the basic idea behind a cryptographic hash function and a PS seems to be quite similar,
a PS has greater demands. Therefore, we introduce seven properties which should be fulﬁlled by
every modern PS: Memory Hardness, Preimage Security, Client-Independent Update (CIU), Server
Relief (SR), Resistance to Cache-Timing Attacks (CTAs), being a Key-Derivation Function (KDF),
and Resistance to GCAs and WGCAs.
Memory Hardness. To describe memory requirements, we adopt and slightly change the notion
from [211]. The intuition is that for any parallelized attack, using b cores, the required memory per
core is decreased by a factor of 1/b, and vice versa.
1Note that the output size of n bits of the underlying primitive is also almost always the same as that of the
resulting hash value.
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Definition 3.5 (Memory-Hard Function [211]). Let g denote the memory-cost factor.
For all α > 0, a memory-hard function f can be computed on a Random-Access Machine
using S(g) space and T (g) operations, where S(g) ∈ Ω(T (g)1−α).
Loosely speaking, a memory-hard algorithm requires a certain number of memory units to be stored
when computing an output. A closely linked approach is given by a so-called Time-Memory Tradeoﬀ
(TMTO) introduced by Hellman in [131], which describes an approach to trade memory/space S
against time T when considering generic attacks on cryptographic algorithms. Thereby, an adversary
with access to that algorithm aims at a sweet spot for minimizing S · T . Thus, the running time
T of a function f designed to allocate G = 2g units of memory is signiﬁcantly increased whenever
S < G units of memory are available. For example, let S denote the available memory and T the
required time, then, the quadratic TMTO S · T = G2, when using b cores, implies(
1
b
· S
)
· (b · T ) = G2.
Further, we introduce a formal generalization of this notion as shown in Deﬁnition 3.6.
Definition 3.6 (λ-Memory-Hard Function). Let g denote the memory cost factor. For a
λ-memory-hard function f , which is computed on a Random-Access Machine using S(g) space
and T (g) operations with G = 2g, it holds that
T (g) = Ω
(
Gλ+1
Sλ(g)
)
.
Therefore, for a λ-memory-hard function f , the relation S(g) · T (g) is always in Ω(Gλ+1). Further-
more, when considering b cores, we can state that(
1
b
· Sλ
)
· (b · T ) = Gλ+1.
An slightly diﬀerent requirement is given by Sequential Memory Hardness (SMH) that is described
in Deﬁnition 3.7 (adapted version of Deﬁnition 2 in [211]).
Definition 3.7 (Sequential Memory-Hard Function (adapted from [211])). Let g
denote the memory-cost factor. Let f be a memory-hard function as defined in Definition 3.5.
Then, f is sequential memory-hard if it cannot be computed on a Parallel Random-Access
Machine with S(g) space with expected number of T (g) operations, where S(g) ∈ O(T (g)1−α)
for any α > 0.
That deﬁnition says that providing parallelism does neither decrease the computational time nor
the required memory of a function satisfying sequential-memory-hardness.
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Password Recovery (Preimage Security). For a modern password scrambler, it should hold
that the advantage of an adversary (modeled as a computationally unbounded but always-halting
algorithm) for guessing a valid password should be reasonably small, i.e., not higher than for trying
out all possible candidates. Therefore, given a password scrambler P , we deﬁne the password-
recovery advantage of an adversary A as in Deﬁnition 3.8.
Definition 3.8 (Password-Recovery Advantage). Let s ∈ {0, 1}∗ denote a randomly cho-
sen salt value, Q be an entropy source, and pwd be a password chosen at random from Q. Then,
we define the password-recovery advantage of an adversary A against a password scrambler P
as
AdvRECP (A) = Pr
[
pwdև Q, h← P (s, pwd, ·) : xև AP,s,h : P (s, x, ·) ?= h
]
.
Furthermore, we denote by AdvRECP (q) the maximum advantage taken over all adversaries
asking at most q queries to P .
Client-Independent Update. According to Moore’s Law [189], the available resources of an
adversary increase continually over time – and so do the legitimate user’s resources. Thus, a security
parameter chosen once may be too weak after some time and needs to be updated. This can easily
be done immediately after the user has entered its password the next time. However, in many
cases, a signiﬁcant number of user accounts are inactive or rarely used, e.g., 70.1% of all Facebook
accounts experience zero updates per month [198] and 73% of all Twitter accounts do not have at
least one tweet per month [235]. It is desirable to be able to compute a new password hash (with a
higher security parameter) from the old one (with the old and weaker security parameter), without
requiring user interaction, i.e., without having to know the password. We call this feature a Client-
Independent Update (CIU) of the password hash. When key stretching is realized by iterating an
operation, CIUs may or may not be possible, depending on the details of the operation. For instance,
when the original password is one of the inputs for every iteration, CIUs are impossible.
Server Relief. A slow and – even worse – memory-demanding password-based log-in process may
be too much of a burden for many service providers. A way to overcome this problem is to shift
the eﬀort from the side of the server to the side of the client, which is described in [199] and more
recently in [79]. We realized this idea by splitting the Password Scrambler (PS) into two parts: (1)
a slow (and possibly memory-demanding) one-way function F and (2) an eﬃcient one-way function
H. By default, the server computes the password hash h = H(F (s, pwd, ·)) from a salt s and a
password pwd. Alternatively, the server sends s to the client who responds with y = F (s, pwd, ·).
Finally, the server just computes h = H(y). While it is probably easy to write a generic Server
Relief (SR) protocol, only a small amount of the existing password scramblers has been designed
to naturally support this property, e.g., Argon2 [52]. Note that this property is optional, e.g., the
idea of SR makes no sense for the proof-of-work scenario2 since the whole eﬀort should be already
on the side of the client.
2In such a scenario, the client (prover) has to solve a challenging task, e.g., to find a preimage pwd for a Password
Scrambler (PS) P provided only with P (pwd), to get access to the server.
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Resistance to Cache-Timing Attacks. Consider the implementation of a PS, where data is
read from or written to a password-dependent address a = f(pwd). If, for another password pwd′,
we would get f(pwd′) 6= a and the adversary could observe whether we access the data at address a
or not, then it could use this information to ﬁlter password candidates. Under certain circumstances,
timing information related to a given machine’s cache behavior may enable the adversary to observe
which addresses have been accessed. Thus, we provide a formal deﬁnition for resistance of a PS P
to Cache-Timing Attacks (CTAs).
Definition 3.9 (Resistance against Cache-Timing Attacks). Let P be a PS as defined
in Definition 3.4 and pwd ∈ {0, 1}∗ be a secret input to P . We call P resistant to cache-timing
attacks iff neither its control nor its data flow depend on pwd.
Note that CTAs are not only applicable to password scramblers (that restriction is only given for
that very thesis). See [45, 210, 256] for more examples.
Key Derivation. Beyond authentication, passwords are used also to derive symmetric keys. Ob-
viously, one can just use the output of a PS as a symmetric key – perhaps after truncating it to
the required key size. This is a disadvantage if one needs either a key longer than the password
hash or multiple keys. Therefore, it is prudent to consider a Key-Derivation Function (KDF) as a
tool of its own right – with the option to derive more than one key and with the security require-
ment that compromising some keys does not endanger the other ones. Note that it is required for a
KDF that its outputs cannot be distinguished from that of a random function (random oracle) (see
Deﬁnition 3.2).
Resistance to (Weak) Garbage-Collector Attacks. The basic idea of this attack type is to
exploit that a PS leaves the internal state or (eﬃciently computable) password-dependent values in
memory for a long time during their computation. More detailed, the goal of an adversary is to ﬁnd
a password ﬁlter for password candidates from observing the memory used by an algorithm, where
the password ﬁlter requires signiﬁcantly less time/memory in comparison to the original algorithm.
Next, we formally deﬁne the term GCA.
Definition 3.10 (Garbage-Collector Attack). Let P be as defined in Definition 3.4 de-
pending on a memory-cost parameter g and let c be a positive constant. Furthermore, let v de-
note the memory units which were allocated by P and remain in memory after its termination.
Let A be a computationally unbounded adversary. We say that A is successful in conducting
a Garbage-Collector Attack (GCA) if some knowledge about v reduces the runtime of A for
testing a password candidate x from O(tP ) to O(tf ) with O(tf )≪ O(tP )/c and ∀x ∈ {0, 1}∗,
where O(tf ) denotes the runtime of the password-testing function f(x) of A and O(tP ) the
runtime of P (·, x, ·).
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In the following, we deﬁne the Weak Garbage-Collector Attack (WGCA).
Definition 3.11 (Weak Garbage-Collector Attack). Let P be as defined in Defini-
tion 3.4 depending on a memory-cost parameter g, and let R(·) be an underlying function
of P that can be computed significantly more efficient than P itself. We say P is vulnerable to
a Weak Garbage-Collector Attack (WGCA) if a value y = R(pwd) remains in memory during
(almost) the entire runtime of P (·, pwd, ·), where pwd denotes the secret input.
An adversary that is capable of reading the internal memory of a password scrambler during its
invocation gains knowledge about y. Thus, it can reduce the eﬀort for ﬁltering invalid password
candidates by just computing y′ = R(x) and checking whether y = y′, where x denotes the current
password candidate. Note that the function R can also be the identity function. Then, the plain
password remains in memory, rendering WGCAs trivial.
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Authenticated Encryption
If you are the smartest person in the room, you
are in the wrong room.
Anonymous
Nonce-Based AE Schemes. A formal description of a Nonce-Based Authenticated Encryption
(NAE) scheme (with associated data) [226] is provided in Deﬁnition 4.1, where the associated data
denotes additional data which is only authenticated but not encrypted, e.g., a header of a package
containing routing information and the size of the payload.
Definition 4.1 (NAE Scheme with Associated Data [226]). A Nonce-Based Authenti-
cated Encryption (NAE) scheme (with associated data) is a tuple Π = (E ,D) of a deterministic
encryption algorithm E : K×A×N ×M→ C × T , and a deterministic decryption algorithm
D : K × A × N × C × T → M ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ denotes the invalid symbol, K the associated
non-empty key space, A ⊆ {0, 1}∗ the associated-data space, N the non-empty nonce space,
T = {0, 1}τ the non-empty tag space for a security parameter τ , and M, C ⊆ {0, 1}∗ denote
the message and ciphertext space, respectively. We write
(AD,N,C, T )← E(K,AD,N,M) and
M ∨ ⊥ ← D(K,AD,N,C, T )
to state that E always outputs a ciphertext C and the authentication tag T for the tuple
(AD,N,M), and D outputs the decryption of (AD,N,C) if the given tag is valid or ⊥ other-
wise.
We assume that for all K ∈ K, A ∈ A, N ∈ N , C ∈ C, T ∈ T , and M ∈M, Π preserves:
Stretch-Preservation: If EA,NK (M) = (C, T ), then |C| = |M | and |T | = τ ,
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Correctness: If EA,NK (M) = (C, T ), then D
A,N
K (C, T ) =M .
Tidiness: If DA,NK (C, T ) =M 6= ⊥, then EA,NK (M) = (C, T ).
Further, we will often use EAD,NK (M) and D
AD,N
K (C, T ) as short forms of E(K,AD,N,M) and
D(K,AD,N,C, T ), respectively.
Security Notion for Integrity. Now, we introduce the Integrity of Ciphertext (INT-CTXT)
experiment (see Experiment 4.2, based on the INT-CTXT deﬁnitions given in [39, 41, 151]) that
builds the basis for the Integrity of Ciphertext for j valid Forgeries (j-INT-CTXT) experiment
introduced next (see Experiment 4.4). The INT-CTXT advantage of an adversary A is given in
Deﬁnition 4.3.
Experiment 4.2 (INT-CTXT Experiment).
1. An adversary A is given oracle access to an encryption function E and a decryption
function D, where key KևK.
2. It asks at most q forward (encryption) or backward (decryption) queries (Ai, Ni,Mi) or
(Ai, Ni, Ci, Ti), where (Ci, Ti) = EK(Ai, Ni,Mi) and (M∨⊥) = DK(Ai, Ni, Ci, Ti), where
A never queries E →֒ D.
3. A wins the experiment iff it outputs a decryption query (A,N,C, T ) such that
DK(A,N,C, T ) 6= ⊥. Otherwise, A loses the experiment.
Definition 4.3 (INT-CTXT Advantage). Let Π = (E ,D) be a nonce-based AE scheme,
K և K, and A be a computationally bounded adversary on Π with access to two oracles
E and D such that A never queries E →֒ D. Then, the INT-CTXT advantage of A on Π is
defined as
AdvINT-CTXTΠ (A) := Pr
[
AE,D forges
]
,
where “forges” means that DK returns anything other than ⊥ for a query of A.
Experiment 4.4 (j-INT-CTXT Experiment).
1. An adversary A is given oracle access to an encryption function E and a decryption
function D, where key KևK.
2. It asks at most q forward (encryption) or backward (decryption) queries (Ai, Ni,Mi) or
(Ai, Ni, Ci, Ti), where (Ci, Ti) = EK(Ai, Ni,Mi) and (M∨⊥) = DK(Ai, Ni, Ci, Ti), where
A never queries E →֒ D.
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3. A wins the experiment iff it outputs j a decryption queries (Aℓ, Nℓ, Cℓ, Tℓ), with 1 ≤ ℓ ≤
j, such that for all ℓ it holds DK(Aℓ, Nℓ, Cℓ, Tℓ) 6= ⊥. Otherwise, A loses the experiment.
Security Notion for Reforgeability. In 2004, Bellare et al. introduced the two security notions
Integrity of Plaintext under Multiple Forgery Attempts (INT-PTXT-M) and Integrity of Ciphertext
under Multiple Forgery Attempts (INT-CTXT-M) [37]; however, these notions capture the setting
that an adversary can pose multiple veriﬁcation queries for a single forgery. In contrast, we are
interested in ﬁnding multiple (in general j ≥ 1) forgeries based on multiple veriﬁcation queries. In
the scenario of INT-CTXT (see Experiment 4.2), an adversary wins if it can ﬁnd any valid forgery,
that is a tuple (A,N,C, T ) for which the decryption returns anything diﬀerent from the invalid
symbol ⊥ and which has not been previously obtained by A as response of the encryption oracle.
The j-INT-CTXT security notion, as shown in Experiment 4.4, is derived from INT-CTXT in the
sense that A now has to provide j distinct valid forgeries that all have not been obtained from the
encryption oracle. In the following, we deﬁne the j-INT-CTXT Advantage of an adversary.
Definition 4.5 (j-INT-CTXT Advantage). Let Π = (E ,D) be a nonce-based AE scheme,
K և K, and A be a computationally bounded adversary on Π with access to two oracles E and
D such that A never queries E →֒ D. Then, the j-INT-CTXT advantage of A on Π is defined
as
Advj-INT-CTXTΠ (A) := Pr
[
AE,D forges j times
]
,
where “forges” means that DK returns anything other than ⊥ for a query of A, and “forges
j times” means that A provides j distinct decryption queries (Ai, Ni, Ci, Ti), 1 ≤ i ≤ j, such
that DK(Ai, Ni, Ci, Ti) 6= ⊥ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j.

Part II
Multi-Block-Length Hash Functions
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Counter-bDM
Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be
achieved by understanding.
Albert Einstein
A Provably Secure Family of MBL Compression Functions
B
lock-cipher-based compression functions serve an important purpose in cryptography since
they allow to turn a given block cipher into a one-way hash function. The best understood
principle are so-called Single-Block-Length (SBL) constructions, which compress a 2n-bit
input to an n-bit output, with n being the state size of the cipher. However, the output length of,
e.g., the AES [76] (one of the currently most widely used block ciphers) is only 128 bits, which
is too small for an acceptable collision security for most applications. As a consequence, one is
usually interested in Double-Block-Length (DBL) constructions or, more generally, Multi-Block-
Length (MBL) block-cipher-based hash functions1, which take an (b+ 1)n-bit input and produce a
bn-bit output, for b ≥ 2.
While there are a large number of secure DBL compression functions, there is little research on
generalized constructions. As a remedy, this chapter ﬁrst introduces the class MBLbn for MBL com-
pression functions that employ a (bn, n)-bit keyed block cipher E : {0, 1}bn×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and
produce a bn-bit chaining value. Based on MBLbn, we designed an MBL compression function, called
Counter-bDM, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the ﬁrst provably secure MBL compression
function with freely scalable output size, i.e., it allows to choose b > 2. It is a generalization of the
DBL compression function Hirose-DM [134]. Our description of Counter-bDM is accompanied
by a thorough security analysis regarding its collision and preimage security, which employs the
idea of super queries [28] for proofs of collision and preimage security. Similar approaches were pre-
sented by Mennink [184] and Lee [164]. For b = 2, our resulting collision-security bound shows that
every adversary that wants to ﬁnd a collision with advantage 1/2 requires 2125.18 queries, which is
1Note that one can build an MBL block-cipher-based hash function by simply iterating an MBL block-cipher-
based compression function over the message, where each call to the compression function processes one n-bit message
block.
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Compr. Function Collision Bound Preimage Bound
Weimar-DM [98] 2126.73 [94] 2251 [98]
Hirose-DM [133] 2125.23 [99] 2251 [28]
Counter-2DM [Sec. 5.2] 2125.18 [Sec. 5.3] 2251 [Sec. 5.4]
Abreast-DM [163] 2124.42 [100, 165] 2246 [28]
Tandem-DM [163] 2120.87 [168] 2246 [28]
Add-k-DM [100] 2127−k
′
[100] ≈ 2128 [100, 165]
Cube-DM [100] 2125.41 [100] ≈ 2128 [100, 165]
Cyclic-DM (k > 2) [100] 2127−k [100] ≈ 2128 [100, 165]
Cyclic-DM (k = 2) [100] 2124.55 [100] ≈ 2128 [100, 165]
Lee/Kwon [166] 2125.0 [165] ≈ 2128 [100, 165]
Table 5.1: Comparison of security results on DBL compression (Compr.) functions, evaluated for n = 128
bits and a success probability of 1/2. The value k for Cyclic-DM refers to the given cycle length.
comparable to the currently best collision-security bound of Weimar-DM [98]. Concerning preim-
age security, we obtain a near-optimal bound of 2251 queries, which is equivalent to the currently
best bound of Weimar-DM and Hirose-DM. Table 5.1 compares our results with previous DBL
compression functions.
5.1 Related Work
Single-Block-Length Schemes. One of the most noteworthy works concerning SBL hash func-
tions is that by Preneel, Govaerts, and Vandewalle [217] from CRYPTO’93. In their paper, the
authors analyzed the security of SBL compression functions of the form Hi = EX(Y ) ⊕ Z, where
X,Y,Z ∈ {Mi,Hi−1,Mi ⊕ Hi−1, const}, Mi denotes the currently processed message block, and
Hi−1 the previous chaining value. The authors identiﬁed twelve secure constructions among the 43
possibilities, which were resistant to relevant attacks. Though, formal proofs were shown ﬁrst at
CRYPTO’02 by Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton [60], who concluded that 20 constructions, includ-
ing the twelve identiﬁed by Preneel et al., provided optimal collision- and preimage-resistance. At
FSE’04, Rogaway and Shrimpton discussed in detail the security notions for cryptographic hash
functions and relationships among them [231]. One year later, Black, Cochran, and Shrimpton [58]
showed that no rate-1 hash function, which makes only a single call for every message block to a
ﬁxed-key cipher, can achieve an optimal collision-resistance. At CRYPTO’08, Rogaway and Stein-
berger [232] presented the LPmkr family of compression functions compressing an m ·n-bit input to
an r · n-bit input by using a sequence of k calls to a ﬁxed-key block cipher. At FSE’09, Stam [247]
generalized the considerations of Preneel et al., where he wrapped the block-cipher call with pre-
and post-processing functions, considered chopped, overloaded, and supercharged versions of com-
pression functions, and showed proofs for the collision- and preimage-security.
Double-Block-Length Schemes. The essentially ﬁrst DBL hash functions were presented by
Merkle [185], who proposed three constructions based on the DES. Today, there are four so-
called “classical” DBL constructions, which were introduced in the early 1990s: MDC-2, MDC-4,
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Abreast-DM, and Tandem-DM. MDC-2 and MDC-4 [72, 140] are (n, n)-bit DBL hash func-
tions with rates 1/2 and 1/4, respectively. For MDC-2, Steinberger [248] proved in 2006 that no
adversary asking less than 274.9 queries will obtain a signiﬁcant advantage at ﬁnding a collision. In a
sophisticated proof, it was shown by Fleischmann, Forler, and Lucks [96] in 2012, that for MDC-4,
an adversary requires at least 274.7 queries to ﬁnd a collision with an advantage of 1/2.
Concerning rate-1 DBL hash functions, Lucks [173] presented a ﬁrst construction at Dagstuhl’07.
Stam [247] also proposed a rate-1 single-call DBL function, for which he showed an almost-optimal
collision-resistance, up to a logarithmic factor. However, while Lucks and Stam claimed a rate-1
property for their constructions, those are actually much slower, as pointed out by Luo and Lai [175].
At CRYPTO’93, Hohl et al. [136] analyzed the security of compression functions of rate-1/2 DBL
hash functions. In 1998, Knudsen, Lai, and Preneel [155] discussed the security of rate-1 DBL hash
functions. In 1999, Satoh, Haga, and Kurosawa [236] as well as Hattori, Hirose, and Yoshida [129]
in 2003 attacked rate-1 DBL hash functions. At FSE’05, Nandi et al. [195] presented a rate-2/3
compression function, which was later analyzed by Knudsen and Muller at ASIACRYPT’05 [156].
At CT-RSA’11, Lee and Stam [167] presented a faster alternative to MDC-2, called MJH.
Double-Block-Length Schemes with Birthday-Type Collision Security. Abreast-DM
and Tandem-DM base on the famous Davies-Meyer scheme, and have been presented by Lai and
Massey [163] at EUROCRYPT’92. In 2004, Hirose added a large class of rate-1/2 DBL hash func-
tions, composed of two independent (2n, n)-bit block ciphers, with 2n being the key and n the
block size [132] . At FSE’06, he proposed a new scheme called Hirose-DM [133], which dropped
the requirement of independent ciphers, and for which he provided a collision-security proof in the
ideal-cipher model, stating that no adversary asking less than 2124.55 queries can ﬁnd a collision
with probability ≥ 1/2.
In [213], Peyrin et al. analyzed techniques to construct larger compression functions by combining
smaller ones. The authors proposed 3n-to-2n-bit and 4n-to-2n-bit constructions composed of ﬁve
public functions, yet they did not show proofs for their concepts.
In 2008, Chang et al. introduced a generic framework for purf-based MBL constructions [68],
where purf denotes a public random function.
Considering Tandem-DM, Fleischmann, Gorski, and Lucks [99] gave a collision-security proof
at FSE’09, showing that no adversary can obtain a signiﬁcant advantage without making at least
2120.4 queries. In 2010, Lee, Stam, and Steinberger [168] showed that the proof of Fleischmann et
al. had several non-trivial ﬂaws. Further, they provided a bound of 2120.87 queries for a collision
adversary.
For Abreast-DM, Fleischmann et al. [100] as well as Lee and Kwon [165] presented, independent
from each other, a collision-security bound of 2124.42 queries. More general, [100] introduced the class
notion of Cyclic-DL, which included the constructions Abreast-DM, Cyclic-DM, Add-k-DM,
and Cube-DM, and applied similar proofs for these. At IMA’09, Özen and Stam [208] proposed a
framework for DBL hash functions by extending the generalized framework by Stam at FSE’09 for
single-call hash functions. Still, their framework based on the usage of two independent block ciphers.
At ProvSec’10, Fleischmann et al. [95] extended their general classiﬁcation of DBL hash functions by
the classes Generic-DL, Serial-DL, and Parallel-DL. For the framework by Özen and Stam,
they relaxed the requirement of distinct independent block ciphers and gave collision bounds for
Tandem-DM and Cyclic-DM. In [159], Krause, Armknecht, and Fleischmann provided techniques
for proving asymptotically optimal preimage-resistance bounds for block-cipher-based double-length,
double-call hash functions. They introduced a new Davies-Meyer DBL hash function for which they
proved that no adversary asking less than 22n−5 queries can ﬁnd a preimage with probability ≥ 1/2.
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At ACISP’12, Fleischmann et al. [98] showed a very similar Davies-Meyer construction – called
Weimar-DM – for which they could prove the currently best collision-security bound of 2126.23
queries, and the currently best preimage-security bound among the previously known DBL hash
functions.
5.2 Specification of Counter-bDM
The design of a cryptographic algorithm, besides aspects of, e.g., performance and its cryptographic
footprint, almost always aims at achieving the maximum possible security while maintaining an easy-
to-grasp structure. For an MBL compression function, providing a security proof can be simpliﬁed
greatly if one can ensure that the b outputs of the individual block-cipher calls in one invocation of
the compression function are independent and distinct from each other. Previous DBL constructions
achieve this requirement by the use of one of the following approaches:
Distinct Permutations. By using b independent permutations in the compression function. This
approach is used, e.g., by the early construction of Hirose [132] or those by Rogaway and
Steinberger [232].
Distinct Keys. By guaranteeing that all keys Ki used for the block-cipher calls inside one compres-
sion-function call are diﬀerent: Ki 6= Kj , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ b, which results de facto in having
diﬀerent permutations. This approach is used, e.g., by Weimar-DM [98].
Distinct Plaintexts. By guaranteeing that all b plaintext inputs Xi used within the block-cipher
calls in one compression function call are diﬀerent: Xi 6= Xj , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ b. This approach is
used, e.g., by Cube-DM [100] or Hirose-DM [134].
It is easy to see that the ﬁrst approach is unpractical since it requires multiple permutation im-
plementations of the class MBLbn. The further two approaches are very similar. However, using a
diﬀerent key in every block-cipher call implies the potential need of running the key schedule of
the underlying block cipher multiple times, which can become quite costly when providing a freely
scalable output. Therefore, for the compression function Counter-bDM (short: HCbDM), which
is deﬁned in this section, we employ the latter strategy ensuring that all plaintext inputs to the
block-cipher calls are diﬀerent (see Deﬁnition 5.1).
Definition 5.1 (Counter-bDM). Let E be a block cipher from Block(bn, n). The compres-
sion function HCbDM : {0, 1}bn × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}bn is defined as
HCbDM(M,U1, . . . , Ub) = (V1, . . . , Vb),
where the outputs Vi result from Vi = EK(U1 ⊕ (i− 1)) ⊕ U1, with K = U2 || . . . || Ub || M .
Two concrete examples of our MBL compression-function family, Counter-3DM (left) and Coun-
ter-4DM (right), are illustrated in Figure 5.1. However, in our security analysis in Sections 5.3
and 5.4, we consider the generic Counter-bDM (HCbDM).
It is easy to see that, due to the XOR with the counter i− 1, all plaintext inputs Xi to the block-
cipher calls are pair-wise distinct. Additionally, since all values i−1 are in the range of [0, . . . , b−1],
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Figure 5.1: Two exemplary compression functions HC3DM (left) and HC4DM (right) from the family of
compression functions HCbDM.
the counter values aﬀect only the least signiﬁcant ⌈log2(b)⌉ bits of the plaintexts. Based on that, we
denote the most signiﬁcant n − ⌈log2(b)⌉ bits of each plaintext processed within one compression
function as common prefix (see Deﬁnition 5.2).
Definition 5.2 (Common-Prefix Property). Let X = Xpre || Xpost, X ∈ {0, 1}n be an
n-bit integer, where Xpre denotes the n − ⌈log2(b)⌉ most significant, and Xpost the ⌈log2(b)⌉
least significant bits of X. Further, let Xi = X ⊕ (i − 1) (with 1 ≤ i ≤ b) denote the values
which are used as plaintext inputs to the block-cipher calls in one invocation of HCbDM. Then,
all values Xi share the same common prefix Xpre ∈ {0, 1}n−⌈log2(b)⌉.
Remark 5.3. Throughout the remainder of this paper, we denote by c = 2⌈log2(b)⌉ ≥ b the
maximal number of plaintexts X = Xpre || Xpost which can share the same prefix Xpre.
Later, we will see that both the pair-wise distinct plaintexts and the common-preﬁx property will
be beneﬁcial for an easy-to-grasp security analysis of Counter-bDM.
5.3 Collision-Security Analysis of Counter-bDM
We start with an adversary A that tries to ﬁnd a collision provided with oracle access to a block
cipher E և Block(bn, n) (see Experiment 2.6, Section 2). In between the communication of A
and E, we construct another adversary A′ which simulates A, but is sometimes allowed to make
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additional queries to E that are not taken into account. Since A′ is more powerful than A, it
suﬃces to upper bound the success probability of A′. Thereby, we say that an adversary A or A′
is successful if its query history contains the means of computing a collision for HCbDM.
Attack Setting. During the attack, A maintains a query history Q wherein it stores all queries
it poses to E. An entry in the query history of A is a tuple (K,X, Y ), where Y = EK(X). In the
meantime, A′ maintains a query list L which contains all input/output pairs to the compression
function HCbDM that can be computed by A. An entry L ∈ L is a tuple (K,X, Y1, . . . , Yc) ∈
{0, 1}(b+1+c)n, where K ∈ {0, 1}bn, X ∈ {0, 1}n is the input to the compression function HCbDM,
and c = 2⌈log2(b)⌉ (see Remark 5.3). The values Yi ∈ {0, 1}n are given as the results of the forward
queries Yi = EK(X ⊕ (i− 1)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ c.
Collision Events. When E is modeled as an ideal cipher, we run into problems whenA is allowed
to ask close to or even more than q = 2n queries. In the case when A asks q queries under the same
key to E and q reaches 2n − 1, E loses its randomness. As a remedy to this problem, Armknecht et
al. proposed the idea of super queries [28]; given some key K, A′ can pose regular queries to E or
D until N/2 queries with the same key K have been added to its query list L, where N = 2n.
If L contains N/2 queries for a key K and A requests another query for the key K from A′,
then, A′ poses all remaining queries (K, ∗, ∗) under this key to E at once. In this case, we say that
a super query occurred. All queries that are part of a super query are not taken into account, i.e.,
they do not add to q, the number of queries A is allowed to ask. Since these free queries are asked
at once, one no longer has to consider the success probability of a single query; instead, one can
consider the event that A′ is successful with any of the contained queries. Thus, E does not lose its
randomness.
Remark 5.4. Note that a tuple L ∈ L consists of c = 2⌈log2(b)⌉ query results. Since c always
divides N/2, i.e., c |N/2, each tuple L is either part of a normal query or a super query, but
never both.
In the following, we distinguish between three events for the case when A′ is successful.
NormalQueryWin(L): This describes the case when A′ ﬁnds a collision from its current query Lj
and a query Lr that was already in its list, where Lj was a normal query.
SuperQueryWin(L): This describes the case when A′ ﬁnds a collision with its current query Lj
and a query Lr that was already in its list, where Lj was part of a super
query.
SameQueryWin(L): This describes the case when A′ ﬁnds a collision within one entry of the
query history.
Since the adversary can only win if it ﬁnds a collision using either one of the mentioned events, it
is suﬃcient for us to upper bound the sum of the probabilities. Thus, it holds that
AdvCOLL
HCbDM
(q) ≤ Pr[NormalQueryWin(L)] + Pr[SuperQueryWin(L)](5.1)
+ Pr[SameQueryWin(L)].
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Before we present our bound, we describe more precisely what we mean byA′ has found a collision for
HCbDM. Let Lr = (Kr,Xr, Y r1 , . . . , Y
r
c ) represent the r-th entry in L, and L
j = (Kj ,Xj ,Y j1 , . . . , Y
j
c )
the j-th entry in L, where 1 ≤ r < j. We say that Lr and Lj provide the means for computing a
collision if ∃ ℓ,m ∈ {0, . . . , c− 1} so that b equations of the following form hold:
EKr (X
r ⊕m⊕ 0)⊕Xr = EKj (Xj ⊕ ℓ⊕ 0)⊕Xj ,
EKr (X
r ⊕m⊕ 1)⊕Xr = EKj (Xj ⊕ ℓ⊕ 1)⊕Xj ,
...
EKr (X
r ⊕m⊕ (b− 1))⊕Xr = EKj (Xj ⊕ ℓ⊕ (b− 1))⊕Xj .
Theorem 5.5 (Collision Security of HCbDM). Let N = 2n and let A be an adversary as
defined in Experiment 2.6 with oracle access to a block cipher E և Block(bn, n), so that A
tries to find a collision for HCbDM as given in Definition 5.1. Then, it applies that
AdvCOLL
HCbDM
(q) ≤ c
2 · 2b · q2
N b
+
c3 · 2b+2 · q2
N b+1
,
where q is the maximum number of queries A is allowed to ask to E.
Proof. After A has mounted a (normal) forward query Y = EK(X) or a (normal) backward query
X = DK(Y ), A′ checks if Lj−1 already contains an entry L = (K,Xpre || ∗, ∗, . . . , ∗), where Xpre
denotes the preﬁx of X (see Deﬁnition 5.2) and ∗ denotes arbitrary values. In the following, we
analyze the possible cases that A′ can be confronted with and upper bound their individual success
probabilities.
Case 1: L is not in Lj−1. In this case, A′ labels Y as Y1 and asks (c− 1) further queries to E
that are not taken into account:
∀i ∈ {2, . . . , c} : Yi = EK(X ⊕ (i− 1)).
A′ creates the tuple Lj = (K,X, Y1, . . . , Yc) and appends it to its query list, i.e., Lj = Lj−1 ∪{Lj}.
Now, we have to upper bound the success probability of A′ to ﬁnd a collision for HCbDM, i.e., the
success probabilities for the events mentioned above.
Subcase 1.1: NormalQueryWin(L). In this case, the adversary ﬁnds a collision using a normal
query Lj and a query Lr that was already contained in L. While super queries may have occurred
for diﬀerent keys before, the query history of A′ may contain at most N/2− c plaintext-ciphertext
pairs for the current key Kj . So, our random permutation E samples the query responses Y j1 , . . . , Y
j
c
for the current query at random from a set of size of at least N/2 + c ≥ N/2 elements. Hence, the
probability that one equation from above holds for some ﬁxed ℓ and m can be upper bounded by
1/(N/2); and the probability for b equations to hold is then given by
1
(N/2)b
=
2b
N b
.
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There are c2 possible combinations for ℓ and m, s.t. b values V ji can form a valid collision with
b values V ri , with i ∈ {0, . . . , b − 1}. Thus, A′ has a success probability for ﬁnding a collision for
HCbDM with the j-th query and one speciﬁc previous query of
c2
(N/2)b
=
c2 · 2b
N b
.
The j-th query can form a collision with any of the previous entries in Lj−1. So, we have to determine
the maximum number of queries in Lj−1. If A′ obtained a super query for each key it queried before,
Lj−1 may contain up to 2(j− 1) entries. For q total queries, there may be at most q normal queries
and up to q − 1 queries (without the current one) resulting from super queries in the history. This
would imply that one had to sum up the probabilities up to 2q − 1:
2q−1∑
j=1
2(j − 1) · c2 · 2b
N b
.
However, we can do better. In the NormalQueryWin(L) case, A′ will not win when its last (winning)
query was part of a super query. Hence, we do not need to test if any of the super queries will
produce a collision with any of their respective previous queries, and we have to test only the q
normal queries. Nevertheless, A′ still has to test each of the q normal queries if they collide with
any of the at most 2q previous queries (including those which were part of a super query). Therefore,
the success probability of A′ to ﬁnd a collision for HCbDM can be upper bounded by
(5.2) Pr[NormalQueryWin(L)] ≤
q∑
j=1
2(j − 1) · c2 · 2b
N b
≤ q
2 · c2 · 2b
N b
.
Subcase 1.2: SuperQueryWin(L). In this case, A′ wins with a super query, i.e., it has asked
the (N/2 + 1)-th query for Kj , triggering a super query to occur. We can reuse the argument from
Subcase 1.1 that the success probability for b colliding equations from above is given by
c2
(N/2)b
=
c2 · 2b
N b
.
Here, the query history Lj contains at most 2q queries. However, this time we do not have to test if
any of the q normal queries produce a collision with any of their respective predecessors. Hence, we
can upper bound the success probability of A′ to ﬁnd a collision for HCbDM with one super query
by
2q · c2 · 2b
N b
.
For a super query to occur, A has to pose at least N/(2c) regular queries. Thus, there can be at
most q/(N/2c) super queries and we obtain
(5.3) Pr[SuperQueryWin(L)] ≤ 2q · c
2 · 2b
N b
· q
N/2c
=
c3 · 2b+2 · q2
N b+1
.
Subcase 1.3: SameQueryWin(L). In this case,A′ wins if it ﬁnds some integers ℓ,m ∈ {0, . . . , c−1}
with ℓ 6= m s.t.:
EKj (X
j ⊕m⊕ 0)⊕Xj = EKj (Xj ⊕ ℓ⊕ 0)⊕Xj ,
EKj (X
j ⊕m⊕ 1)⊕Xj = EKj (Xj ⊕ ℓ⊕ 1)⊕Xj ,
...
EKj (X
r ⊕m⊕ (b− 1))⊕Xj = EKj (Xj ⊕ ℓ⊕ (b− 1))⊕Xj .
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n = 64 n = 128
#blocks #queries optimal bound #blocks #queries optimal bound
b q 2bn/2 b q 2bn/2
2 261.50 264 2 2125.50 2128
3 292.00 296 3 2188.00 2192
4 2123.50 2128 4 2251.50 2256
5 2154.00 2160 5 2314.00 2320
6 2185.50 2192 6 2377.50 2384
7 2217.00 2224 7 2441.00 2448
8 2248.50 2256 8 2504.50 2512
Table 5.2: Minimum number of queries q which an adversary is required to ask to an oracle E in order to
find a collision for HCbDM with advantage 1/2, depending on the choice of b and n.
However, due to the XOR with the distinct values i − 1, all plaintext inputs Xj ⊕ (i − 1) in
one compression-function call diﬀer from each other. Furthermore, since all plaintext inputs are
encrypted under the same key Kj , their corresponding outputs Yi are all diﬀerent and uniformly
distributed, and so are the values Yi ⊕X after the feed-forward operation. Hence, it is not possible
for A′ to ﬁnd a collision for HCbDM among the values Yi ⊕X:
(5.4) Pr[SameQueryWin(L)] = 0.
Case 2: L is in Lj−1. In this case, the key K and the plaintext preﬁx Xpre of A’s cur-
rent query (K,Xpre || Xpost′) are already stored in some entry L ∈ Lj−1, where L is given by
(K,Xpre || Xpost, Y1, . . . , Yc). A′ just extracts Y(Xpost⊕Xpost′ )+1 from L, and passes it to A. This
implies that A can learn only information which A′ already possesses.
Based on Equation (5.1), our claim is given by summing up Equations (5.2), (5.3), and (5.4). 
In Table 5.2, we show the minimal number of queries q an adversary has to ask in order to obtain an
advantage of AdvCOLL
HCbDM
(q) = 1/2 for the most practical block lengths n ∈ {64, 128} and depending
on b.
5.4 Preimage-Security Analysis of Counter-bDM
Attack Setting. Let (V1, . . . , Vb) ∈ {0, 1}bn be the point to invert (see Deﬁnition 5.1), chosen by
an adversary A before it makes any query to E. We deﬁne that A has the goal to ﬁnd a preimage
for the point (V1, . . . , Vb) as described in Experiment 2.7 (see Section 2). For our preimage-security
analysis, we adapt the procedure from our collision analysis, i.e., we construct another adversary
A′, which simulates A, but sometimes is allowed to make additional queries to E that are not
taken into account. Again, since A′ is more powerful than A, it suﬃces to upper bound the success
probability of A′. Here, we say that an adversary is successful if its query history Q contains the
means of computing a preimage.
The procedures of A and A′ asking queries to the oracle E and building the query histories
Q and L are the same as that described in our collision-security proof. Furthermore, we adopt
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the events NormalQueryWin(L) and SuperQueryWin(L) from there, which in this context, cover all
possible winning events for A′. Thus, it holds that
(5.5) AdvEPRE
HCbDM
(q) ≤ Pr[NormalQueryWin(L)] + Pr[SuperQueryWin(L)].
Before we present our bound, we describe more precisely what is meant by A′ has found a preimage
for HCbDM. Let Lj = (Kj ,Xj , Y j1 , . . . , Y
j
c ) represent the j-th entry in L. We say that L
j contains
the means of computing a preimage if ∃ ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , c− 1}, so that the following b equations hold:
EKj (X
j ⊕ ℓ)⊕Xj = V1
EKj (X
j ⊕ ℓ⊕ 1)⊕Xj = V2
...
EKj (X
j ⊕ ℓ⊕ (b− 1))⊕Xj = Vb.
Theorem 5.6 (Preimage Security of HCbDM). Let N = 2n and let A be an adversary as
defined in Experiment 2.7 with oracle access to a block cipher E և Block(bn, n), where A tries
to find a collision for HCbDM as given in Definition 5.1. Then, it applies that
AdvEPRE
HCbDM
(q) ≤ c · 2
b+1 · q
N b
.
Proof. After A has mounted a (normal) forward query Y = EK(X) or a (normal) backward query
X = DK(Y ), A′ checks if Lj−1 already contains an entry L = (K,Xpre || ∗, ∗, . . . , ∗), where Xpre
denotes the preﬁx of X. In the following, we analyze the possible cases and upper bound their
success probabilities separately.
Case 1: L is not in Lj−1. In this case, A′ labels Y as Y1 and asks c − 1 further queries to E
that are not taken into account:
∀i ∈ {2, . . . , c} : Yi = EK(X ⊕ (i− 1)).
Then, A′ creates the tuple Lj = (K,X, Y1, . . . , Yc) and appends it to its query list, i.e., Lj =
Lj−1 ∪ {Lj}. Note that due to the XOR with i − 1, all plaintexts Xi are diﬀerent and thus, all
ciphertexts Yi and the results of all feed-forward operations Yi⊕X are always uniformly distributed.
Now, we have to upper bound the success probability of A′ to ﬁnd a preimage for HCbDM using
either a normal query or a super query.
Subcase 1.1: NormalQueryWin(L). Since we assume that the winning query is a normal one,
A′ can have collected at most N/2 − c queries for the current key Kj . Thus, E samples the query
responses Y j1 , . . . , Y
j
c at random from a set of size of at least N/2 + c ≥ N/2 elements. From the c
values Yi of Lj , the probability that one equation EKj (X
j ⊕ ℓ)⊕ (Xj ⊕ ℓ) = Vi from above holds
for some ﬁxed value of ℓ, can therefore be upper bounded by 1/(N/2) – and the probability that b
equations from above hold for a ﬁxed ℓ by 1/(N/2)b. Since there are now c possible values for ℓ, the
probability to obtain a preimage with the j-th query is given by
c
(N/2)b
=
c · 2b
N b
.
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n = 64 n = 128
#blocks #queries optimal bound #blocks #queries optimal bound
b q 2bn b q 2bn
2 2123 2128 2 2251 2256
3 2185 2192 3 2377 2384
4 2248 2256 4 2504 2512
5 2310 2320 5 2630 2640
6 2373 2384 6 2757 2768
7 2436 2448 7 2884 2896
8 2499 2512 8 21011 21024
Table 5.3: Minimum number of queries q, which an adversary is required to ask to an oracle E in order to
find a preimage for HCbDM with advantage 1/2, depending on the choice of b and n.
Since A′ is allowed to ask at most q queries, it applies that
(5.6) Pr[NormalQueryWin(L)] ≤ c · 2
b · q
N b
.
Subcase 1.2: SuperQueryWin(L). In this case, A′ has already posed and stored N/2c queries for
the key Kj of its winning query. From the super query, it obtains the remaining N/2c queries for
Kj . We denote the latter set of queries by SQ. From above, we already know that the probability
that one point Lj ∈ SQ satisﬁes the preimage property can be upper bounded by
c
(N/2)b
=
c · 2b
N b
.
Since the adversary obtains N/2c points from the super query, the success probability is given by
N
2c
· c · 2
b
N b
=
2b−1
N b−1
.
For every super query to occur, A′ has to collect N/2c queries in advance. Thus, there are at most
q/(N/2c) super queries and we obtain
(5.7) Pr[SuperQueryWin(L)] ≤ q
N/2c
· 2
b−1
N b−1
=
c · 2b · q
N b
.
Case 2: L is in Lj−1. Like in the Case 2 of our collision-security proof, the key K and the
plaintext preﬁx Xpre of A’s current query (K,Xpre || Xpost′) are already stored in some entry
L ∈ Lj−1, where L = (K,Xpre || Xpost, Y1, . . . , Yc). Again, A′ extracts Y(Xpost⊕Xpost′ )+1 from L,
and passes it to A, so that A can learn only information which A′ already possesses.
Based on Equation (5.5), our claim is given by summing up Equations (5.6) and (5.7). 
For n = 128 and AdvEPRE
HCbDM
(q) = 1/2, we list in Table 5.3 the amounts of queries q an adversary
has to make, depending on the value of b.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter introduced Counter-bDM – the ﬁrst provably secure family of MBL compression
function, that maps (b+1)n-bit inputs to bn-bit outputs for arbitrary b ≥ 2. With Counter-bDM,
we propose a simple, though, very neat design, that not only avoids costly requirements such as
the need of having independent ciphers, or having to run the key schedule multiple times, but also
simpliﬁes the analysis greatly. In our collision- and preimage-security analysis, we provided proofs
for arbitrary block lengths b ≥ 2. Moreover, to prove collision and preimage resistance beyond the
birthday bound, we employed the idea of super queries by Armknecht et al. [28].
Part III
Password Hashing
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Password Scramblers and Attacks on scrypt
Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for
tomorrow. The important thing is not to stop
questioning.
Albert Einstein
W
ithin this chapter, we ﬁrst provide a survey of the history of password hashing. Afterwards,
we elaborate on the desired properties for a modern Password Scrambler (PS). This can
be seen as an extension of the properties presented already in Chapter 3. Subsequently, we
introduce three attacks on the widely used PS scrypt [211]), namely, Cache-Timing Attack (CTA),
Garbage-Collector Attack (GCA), and Weak Garbage-Collector Attack (WGCA), that – among
other things – built the basic motivation for designing Catena and its instances presented in the
remainder of this part. Note that Sections 6.3 to 6.5 are adopted almost literally from [108] and
[101], respectively.
6.1 A Short History of Password Hashing
Long before PCs became popular in everyone’s home, Wilkes realized in the late 1960s that storing
an authentication password in plaintext form is insecure [261]. About 10 years later, UNIX systems
integrated some of Wilkes ideas [191] by deploying the DES-based [78] one-way encryption func-
tion [117] crypt which hashes a user-given password. The function crypt already fulﬁlled three of
the main goals of a well-designed PS:
• crypt makes use of a salt value s which is a uniformly at random chosen public input stored
alongside of the password pwd and is used to thwart adversaries which are in the possession
of password-hash values from many diﬀerent users. For example, they protect well against the
usage of rainbow tables [203].
• crypt is a one-way function, i.e., there is no eﬃcient way to recover the password pwd from
the given hash h ← crypt(pwd, s), where s is distinct for each user, thus, providing unique
44 CHAPTER 6. PASSWORD SCRAMBLERS AND ATTACKS ON SCRYPT
password hashes h.1
• crypt provides key stretching. Brieﬂy explained, by iterating the underlying (cryptographic)
primitive many times, it protects low-entropy passwords by increasing the computational time
to obtain its corresponding hash. On the one hand, the impact on the defender is given by only
slightly increase costs while, on the other hand, a typical brute-force attack of all password
candidates experiences a strong slow-down (see Section 6.2 for more details). In 1997, Kelsey
et al. [152] discussed the approach of hiding the iteration count r, which has to be guessed by
an adversary. A user-speciﬁc count r was proposed by Boyen in 2007 [63]. There, the algorithm
would run until the user stops it by hand (pressing a button on the keyboard).
Now, we discuss frequently used password scramblers which build the basis for the modern password
scramblers discussed in the next section. Table 6.1 provides an overview of password scramblers that
are or have been in frequent use. It indicates the amount of memory used, the cost factor to generate
a password hash, and issues from which the considered PS suﬀered.
Hash-Function-Based Password Scramblers. After the introduction of crypt, which was
based on the block cipher DES, almost all password scramblers started to utilize cryptographic
hash functions as the underlying primitive. The PS that started that development in 1995 was
md5crypt [149] by Kamp, which is based on the hash function MD5 [223] and performs key stretch-
ing with 1000 runs. It was the common PS used in Free-BSD and Linux-based systems until its
own author did not consider it secure anymore [149]. The decision was mainly motivated by its
performance.2 Therefore, it was superseded by sha512crypt [82], which employs the cryptographic
hash function SHA-512 [207] and allows to freely choose the iteration count r (default: r = 5000)
to render it more secure and ﬂexible than md5crypt.
In contrast to Linux- and UNIX-based systems, the operating system Windows hashed their
passwords with algorithms from the NT LAN Manager (NTLM) suite of security protocols, i.e.,
NTLMv1 and NTLMv2 [115].3 Due to their high performance [30], even in comparison to md5crypt or
sha512crypt, we do not recommend its usage.
In 2000, the design Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) [148] was published
and later, in 2010, standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [258].
It is widely used either as a Key-Derivation Function (KDF) (e.g., in WPA, WPA2, OpenOﬃce, or
WinZip) or as a PS (e.g., in Mac OS X, LastPass). The security of PBKDF2 relies on c iterations
of HMAC-SHA-1 [160], where c is set to 1000 for default.
Next, we have a brief look at the ﬁrst two password scramblers which actually require a certain
amount of memory for computing the password hash, i.e., bcrypt [219] and scrypt. Note that we
consider bcrypt not as a modern PS since it does not consider the memory to be of variable size,
whereas scrypt does.
In contract to the aforementioned, bcrypt [219] is not based on a (cryptographic) hash function
but on the block cipher Blowﬁsh [240]. The PS bcrypt maintains an internal state of 4,168 bytes
which is generated by employing the Blowﬁsh key schedule. Thus, even if it does not allow user-
chosen values for the size of that state, bcrypt provides some resistance to adversaries utilizing
GPUs, e.g., an AMD HD 7970 can only compute about 4,000 password hashes per second [250].
1Although, crypt offers a mechanism to avoid storing plain passwords, many companies do not seem to have inter-
est in protecting confidential data of their users, e.g., Yahoo, RockYou, CSDN (China Software Developer Network),
and many others, which used to store the passwords of their users in plain [176].
2For example, it is possible to compute about five million password hashes per second on an AMD HD 6990 [250].
3NTLMv1 was used until Windows 2000 included the native support for NTLMv2. Today, Microsoft recommends not to
use the latter anymore since it “does not support any recent cryptographic methods, such as AES or SHA-256.” [187].
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Algorithm Time Memory Issues
crypt 25 small “too fast”
md5crypt 1,000 small “too fast”
sha512crypt 1,000–999,999 (5,000) small small memory
NTLMv1/NTLMv2 1 small “too fast”
PBKDF2 1–∞ (1,000) small small memory
bcrypt 24–299 (26, 28) 4,168 bytes constant memory
scrypt 1–∞ (214, 220) ﬂexible, big CTA, GCA, WGCA
Table 6.1: Comparison of state-of-the-art password scramblers. Note that all of the mentioned algorithms
support salt values. The term 1−∞ denotes that the cost factor can be chosen arbitrarily large. A comparison
ofmodern password scramblers can be found in Chapter 11. Furthermore, neither of the above provide Server
Relief (SR) or Client-Independent Updates (CIUs).
However, due to the inexorable growth of fast cache memory in upcoming CPUs and GPUs, bcrypt
will be eﬃciently computable in the future. For key stretching, bcrypt invokes the Blowﬁsh key
schedule 2c times, e.g., OpenBSD uses c = 6 for users and c = 8 for the superuser [219].
It is easy to see that occupying a lot of memory hinders attacks using special-purpose hardware
(memory is expensive) and GPUs. Due to the provision of (sequential) memory hardness (see Deﬁ-
nitions 3.5 and 3.7) and the possibility to adjust the required memory, the PS scrypt [211] can be
seen as the ﬁrst modern PS.4 A description of scrypt and attacks exploiting its memory handling
are provided in Section 6.3.
6.2 Properties of Modern Password Scramblers
Before the publication of scrypt, the most extensive form of protection one could guarantee for
securing a password was given by performing key stretching (see Section 6.1), i.e., the iterative
invocation of a (cryptographic) hash function processing the password to obtain the password
hash. That technique is employed in widely used password scramblers, such as md5crypt [149]
and sha512crypt [82].
Key Stretching. In general, we assume so-called “oﬀ-line” adversaries which are in the possession
of the password hash of the original password. Let x be the original password with b bits of entropy,
and let H be a cryptographic hash function. An adversary who knows the password hash y1 = H(x)
can expect to ﬁnd x by trying out about 2b−1 password candidates in average. To slow down the
adversary by a factor of 2c, one iterates the hash function 2c times by computing yi = H(yi−1) for
i ∈ {2, . . . , 2c} and uses y2c as the ﬁnal password hash. This forces the adversary to call the hash
function 2c+b, rather than 2b times. But, the defender is also slowed down by 2c. Note that the
computational time for scrambling a password is bounded by the tolerance of the user, and so is
the choice of the parameter c. Thus, there is no protection against password-cracking adversaries
for users with low-entropy passwords5. Furthermore, in the rare case that a user has a high-entropy
password (say, c > 100), key stretching is unnecessary. But, for users with mid-entropy passwords,
4There was HEKS [221], but it was broken by the author of scrypt.
5A study from 2012 reports a min-entropy of c < 7 bits for typical user groups [62]. For any such group, an
adversary trying the group’s most frequent password succeeds for ≈ 1% of the users.
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key stretching can provide a decent protection. Thus, we deﬁne the basic conditions for any password
scrambler PS as follows6
(1) Given a password pwd, computing P (pwd) should be “fast enough” for the user.
(2) Computing P (pwd) should be “as slow as possible” without contradicting (1).
(3) Given y ← P (pwd), there must be no signiﬁcantly faster way to test q password candidates
x1, . . . , xq for P (xi) = y than by actually computing P (xi) for each candidate xi.
Memory-Demanding Key Stretching. Due to the fact that the quality of passwords did not
increase signiﬁcantly over the last years [62], and due to the vast number of leaked password
hashes [176], the established approach of performing key stretching by iterating a conventional
primitive many times has become less useful. The reason is an increasing asymmetry between the
computational devices the typical “defender” is using, and those devices available for potential ad-
versaries. Even without special-purpose hardware, GPUs with hundreds of cores [202] have become
a commodity. By making plenty of computational resources available, GPUs are excellent tools for
password cracking since each core can try another password candidate, and all cores can run at full
speed. However, the memory – and, especially, fast (“cache”) memory – on a typical GPU is about
as large (at least by the order of magnitude) as the memory and cache on a typical CPU as used by
typical defenders. So, the idea behind a memory-demanding PS is to perform key stretching with
the following requirements:
(4) Scrambling a password in time T needs S units of memory (and causes a strong slow-down
when given less than S units of memory).
(5) Scrambling p passwords in parallel needs p · S units of memory (or causes a strong slow-down
accordingly with less memory).
(6) Scrambling a password on p parallel cores is not (much) faster than on a single core, even if
S units of memory are available.
Note that a defender can determine S and T by selecting appropriate parameters.
Simplicity and Resilience. The ﬁrst published memory-demanding password scrambler (im-
plicitly based on the six conditions above) is scrypt [211]. However, we considered two aspects of
scrypt as critical issues: ﬁrst, scrypt is complex since it combines two independent cryptographic
primitives (the SHA-256 hash function and the core operation of the stream cipher Salsa20/8 [46])
and four generic functions (HMAC, PBKDF2, BlockMix, and ROMix). Second, the data ﬂow of the
ROMix operation is data-dependent, i.e., ROMix reads data from password-dependent addresses. This
renders ROMix, and therefore scrypt, vulnerable to Cache-Timing Attacks (CTAs) as described in
Section 6.4. Moreover, in Section 6.5, we have shown that scrypt is also vulnerable to Garbage-
Collector Attack (GCA). Based on these ﬁndings, we pose that a modern PS should be:
(7) easy to analyze,
(8) resilient to Cache-Timing Attacks, and
(9) resilient to Garbage-Collector Attacks.
6Note that, for simplicity, we ignore the additional inputs of salt s and the optional set T as given in Definition 3.4.
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“Easy to analyze” can mean a lot of things and we do not restrict this term to a certain property.
Nevertheless, with the high complexity of scrypt in mind, one possible approach could be the
dependence of a PS on a single cryptographic primitive. To satisfy Property (8), one has to ensure
that neither the control ﬂow nor the data ﬂow depend on secret inputs, e.g., the password. One
way to satisfy Property (9) is to read and (over)write the memory a couple of times during the
scrambling operation. An adversary that tries to gain information from the utilized memory will
then learn only the information written at the end of the invocation of the PS.
Overview of Properties. To provide a comprehensive overview of all desired properties, we
brieﬂy restate and summarize those from Chapter 3 together with the requirements stated by the
PHC [31]:
Length of the Password: Allow passwords of any length between 0 and 128 bytes.
Length of the Salt: Allow salts of 16 bytes.
Output Length: Produce (but not limited to) 32-byte outputs.
Optional Inputs: Support inputs such a personalization string, a secret key, or any
application-speciﬁc parameter.
Client-Independent Update: Allow to adjust (increase) the security parameters, even without
knowing the password.
Server Relief: The option to shift the main memory and time eﬀort from an au-
thentication server to the client, without burdening the server,
Key-Derivation Function: The output of a PS should not be distinguishable from a random
string of the same length.
Pepper and Garlic: PS should provide security parameters to adjust time and memory
requirements,
Cryptographic Security: Provide preimage resistance, collision resistance, immunity to length
extension, and infeasibility to distinguish outputs from random.
6.3 The Password Scrambler scrypt
As mentioned before, scrypt is based on a complex twist of cryptographic primitives. Nevertheless,
this section mainly focuses on its core operation ROMix, which is, together with scrypt, depicted in
Algorithm 1. To support inputs and outputs of arbitrary lengths, scrypt employs a so-called pre-
and post-processing by invoking PBKDF2 [148]. The core function ROMix utilizes a hash function
H with n output bits, where n is the size of a cache line (at current machines usually 64 bytes [73]).
To support hash functions with smaller output sizes, [211] proposes to instantiate H by a function
called BlockMix, which we will not elaborate on. For our security analysis of ROMix, we model H
as a random oracle.
ROMix takes two inputs: an initial state x, which depends on both salt and password, and the
array size G that deﬁnes the required number of memory units. In the ﬁrst phase (Lines 20-22 of
Algorithm 1), ROMix initializes an array v. More detailed, the array variables v0, v1 . . . , vG−1 are
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Algorithm 1 The scrypt algorithm and its core operation ROMix [211].
Require:
pwd ⊲ password
s ⊲ salt
G ⊲ cost parameter
Ensure: x ⊲ password hash
procedure scrypt (pwd,s,G)
10: x← PBKDF2(pwd, s, 1, 1)
11: x← ROMix(x,G)
12: x← PBKDF2(pwd, x, 1, 1)
13: return x
Require:
x ⊲ initial state
G ⊲ cost parameter
Ensure: x ⊲ hash value
procedure ROMix (x,G)
20: for i = 0, . . . , G− 1 do
21: vi ← x
22: x← H(x)
23: for i = 0, . . . , G− 1 do
24: j ← x mod G
25: x← H(x⊕ vj)
26: return x
Algorithm 2 The algorithm ROMixMC, performing ROMix with K/G memory.
Require:
x ⊲ initial state
G ⊲ 1st cost parameter
K ⊲ 2nd cost parameter
Ensure: x ⊲ hash value
procedure ROMixMC (x,G,K)
1: for i = 0, . . . , G− 1 do
2: if i mod K = 0 then
3: vi ← x
4: x← H(x)
7: for i = 0, . . . , G− 1 do
8: j ← x mod G
9: ℓ← K · ⌊j/K⌋
10: y ← vℓ
11: for m = ℓ+ 1, . . . , j do
12: y ← H(y) ⊲ invariant: y ← vm
13: x← H(x⊕ y)
14: return x
set to x,H(x), . . . ,H(. . . (H(x))), respectively. In the second phase (Lines 23-25), ROMix updates x
depending on vj . After G updates, the ﬁnal value of x is returned and undergoes the post-processing.
A minor issue is that scrypt uses the password pwd as one of the inputs for post-processing.
Thus, it has to stay in memory during the entire password-scrambling process. This may become
a risk if there is any chance that the memory can be compromised during the time scrypt is
running. Compromising the memory should not happen, anyway, but this issue could be easily ﬁxed
without any bad eﬀect on the security of scrypt, e.g., one could replace Line 12 of Algorithm 1 by
x← PBKDF2(x, s, 1, 1).
6.3.1 Brief Analysis of ROMix
The following part deals with a variant of ROMix which can be computed with less than G units of
memory. Suppose, we have only S ≪ G units of memory for the values in v. For convenience, we
assume that G is a multiple of S and deﬁne K ← G/S. As it will turn out, the memory-constrained
algorithm ROMixMC (see Algorithm 2) generates the same result as ROMix with less than G memory
units and is Θ(K) times slower than ROMix. From the array v, we will only store the values v0, vK ,
v2K , . . . , v(S−1)K using all the S memory units available.
At Line 9, the variable ℓ is assigned the biggest multiple of K less or equal j. By verifying the
invariant at Line 12, it is clearly recognizable that ROMixMC computes the same hash value as the
original ROMix, except that vj is computed on-the-ﬂy, beginning with vℓ. These computations call
the random oracle on the average (K − 1)/2 times. Thus, the second phase of ROMixMC requires
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about (K + 1)/2 times the eﬀort than the second phase of ROMix, which dominates the workload
for ROMixMC.
Next, we brieﬂy discuss why ROMix fulﬁlls Sequential Memory Hardness (SMH) (for the full proof
see [211]). The intuition is as follows: The indices j are determined by the output of the random
oracle H and thus, essentially uniformly distributed random values over {0, . . . , G − 1}. With no
practical way to anticipate the next j, the most suitable strategy is to minimize the size of the
“gaps”, i.e., the number of consecutively unknown vj . This is indeed what ROMixMC does, by storing
one vi every K-th step.
6.4 Cache-Timing Attack on scrypt
The motivation behind the attacks discussed in the remainder of this chapter stems from the ex-
istence of Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) which are able to, e.g., (1) extract cryptographic secrets
exploiting a buﬀer over-read in the implementation of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol
(Heartbleed) [69] of the OpenSSL library [268], (2) extract sensitive data on single-core architec-
tures [14, 15, 16, 17, 123, 210], (3) gain coarse cache-based data on Symmetric Multiprocessing (SMP)
architectures [222], and (4) to attack SMP architectures extracting a secret key over a cross-VM
side channel [269].
Now, we have a deeper look at scrypt and ROMix as shown in Algorithm 1 regarding to their
vulnerability to Cache-Timing Attacks (CTAs). CTAs are one form of SCAs and require the adver-
sary to have physical access to the targets machine. Once this access is granted, the adversary will
implement a so-called spy process as described next.
The Spy Process. As it turns out, the idea to compute a “random” index j and then ask for the
value vj , which is immensely useful for SMH, is also an issue. Consider a spy process, running on the
same machine as scrypt. This spy process cannot read the internal memory of scrypt, but, as it is
running on the same machine, it shares its cache memory with ROMix. The spy process interrupts
the execution of ROMix twice:
1. When ROMix enters the second phase (Line 23 of Algorithm 1), the spy process reads from a
bunch of addresses to repress all the values vi that are still in the cache. Thereupon, ROMix is
allowed to run for another short time.
2. Now, the spy process interrupts ROMix again. By measuring access times when reading from
diﬀerent addresses, the spy process can ﬁgure out which of the vi’s has been read by ROMix in
the meantime.
So, the spy process reveals the indices j for which vj has been read, and with this information, we
can mount the following CTA.
Preliminary Cache-Timing Attack. Let x be the output of PBKDF2(pwd, s, 1, 1), where pwd
denotes the current password candidate and s the salt. Then, we can apply the following password-
candidate sieve.
1. Run the ﬁrst phase of ROMix without storing the values vi (i.e., skip Line 21 of Algorithm 1).
2. Compute the index j ← x mod G.
3. If vj is among the values that have been read by ROMix, store pwd in a list.
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4. Otherwise, conclude that pwd is a wrong password.
This sieve can run in parallel on any number of cores, where each core tests another password
candidate pwd. Note that each core needs only a small constant amount of memory – the data
structure to decide if j is one of the indices being read with vj can be shared between all the cores.
Thus, we can use exactly the kind of hardware that scrypt has been designed to hinder.
Next, we discuss the gain of this attack. Let r denote the number of iterations the loop in
Lines 23-25 of Algorithm 1 has performed before the second interrupt by the spy process. So, there
are at most r indices j with vj being read. That means, we expect this approach to sort out all but
r/G candidates. If our spy process manages to interrupt very soon, after allowing it to run again,
we have r ≪ G. This may enable us to use Commercial Oﬀ-The-Shelf (COTS) to run full ROMix to
search for the correct password among the candidates on the list.
Final Cache-Timing Attack. In this attack, we allow the second interrupt to arrive very late
– maybe even as late as the termination time of ROMix. So, the loop in Lines 23-25 of ROMix has
been run r = G times. As it seems, each vi has been read once. But actually, this is only true on
average; some values vi have been read more then once, and we expect about (1/e)G ≈ 0.37G array
elements vi not to have been read at all. So applying the basic attack allows us to eliminate about
37% of all password candidates – a rather small gain for such hard work.
In the following, we introduce a way to push the attack further, inspired by Algorithm 2, the
memory-constrained ROMixMC. Our ﬁnal CTA on scrypt needs only the smallest possible amount
of memory: S = 1,K = G/S = G, and thus, we have only to store the single value v0. Like the
second phase of ROMixMC, we compute the values vj on-the-ﬂy when needed. Unlike ROMixMC, we
stop execution whenever one of our values j is such that vj has not been read by ROMix (according
to the information from our spy process).
Thus, if the ﬁrst j has not been read, we immediately stop the execution without any on-the-ﬂy
computation; if the ﬁrst j has been read, but not the second, we need one on-the-ﬂy computation
of vj , and so forth.
Since a fraction (i.e., 1/e) of all values vi has not been read, we will need about 1/(1 − 1/e) ≈
1.58 on-the-ﬂy computations of some vj , each at the average price of (G − 1)/2 times calling H.
Additionally, each iteration needs one call to H for computing x← H(x⊕ vj). With regards to the
eﬀort for the ﬁrst phase, i.e., G calls to H, the expected number of calls to reject a wrong password
is about
G+ 1.58 ∗
(
1 +
G− 1
2
)
≈ 1.79G.
As it turns out, rejecting a wrong password with constant memory is faster than computing ordinary
ROMix with all the required memory, which actually makes 2G calls to H, without computing any vi
on-the-ﬂy. We stress that the ability to abort the computation, thanks to the information gathered
by the spy process, is crucial.
6.5 (Weak) Garbage-Collector Attacks on scrypt
Memory-demanding password scramblers, and especially those fulﬁlling SMH, provide a decent level
of security against adversaries utilizing massively parallel hardware such as GPUs. Since it is actually
impossible to provide a Swiss army knife of password hashing providing security against all kinds
of adversaries, every act of protecting against a certain threat will open the door to another one.
This is also the case for memory-demanding password scramblers. Assume that a PS allocates a
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large amount of memory blocks v0, v1, . . . , vG−1 when processing a password. These blocks becomes
“garbage” after the ﬁnal hash value is produced, and will remain in memory; maybe for later
reuse. One usually assumes that the adversary learns the hash of the secret. The Garbage-Collector
Attack (GCA) assumes that the adversary additionally learns the memory content, i.e., the values
vi, after termination of the PS (see Deﬁnition 3.10).
Garbage-Collector Attack on ROMix. The function ROMix takes the initial state x and the
memory-cost parameter G as inputs. First, ROMix initializes an array v of size G · n by iteratively
applying a cryptographic hash function H (see Algorithm 1, Lines 20-22), where n denotes the
output size of H in bits. Second, ROMix accesses the internal state at randomly computed points j
to update the password hash (see Lines 23-25).
It is easy to observe that the value v0 ← H(x) is the result of a single call to H, i.e., it is a plain
hash of the original secret x. Assuming an adversary has access to v0, it can easily bypass ROMix
and directly test every password candidate x′ by testing H(x′)
?
= v0, i.e., the time and memory
complexity per candidate is signiﬁcantly decreased to O(1). Furthermore, if the adversary fails to
learn v0, but any of the other values vi ← H(vi−1), the computational eﬀort grows to O(i), but the
memory complexity is still O(1).
As a possible countermeasure, one can simply overwrite v0, . . . , vG−1 after running ROMix. How-
ever, this might be removed by a compiler due to optimization, since it is algorithmically ineﬀective.
Weak Garbage-Collector Attack on scrypt. In Line 12 of Algorithm 1, scrypt invokes
PBKDF2 the second time, again using the password pwd as input. Thus, the value pwd has to
be stored in memory during the entire invocation of scrypt, which implies that scrypt is trivially
vulnerable to WGC attacks as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.11.
Discussion. As already mentioned, the attacks above require an adversary to have physical access
to the target’s machine. A GCA requires an adversary to be provided with access to the internal
memory, whereas the CTA requires to (1) run a spy process on the machine ROMix is running, (2)
interrupt ROMix twice at the right points of time, and (3) precisely measure the timings of memory
reads. Moreover, other processes that run on the same machine can add a huge amount of noise
to the cache timings. That given, it is unclear if a real-world server could be exactly attacked as
described above or requires a more sophisticated version of these attacks which, e.g., would be able
to ﬁlter out noise. However, the applicability of CTAs to ROMix has been demonstrated [34] in an
idealized setting, including execution right on the target system.
Remark 6.1. Even without knowing the password hash at all,
1. the adversary is able to find out when the password has been changed,
2. and the adversary can mount a password-guessing attack
just from knowing the memory-access pattern.
The second point of Remark 6.1 becomes highly interesting when comparing old password scram-
blers, e.g., md5crypt [149], with modern memory-demanding password scramblers, e.g., scrypt.
When considering older password scramblers in terms of oﬀ-line attacks, it is not possible to ﬁnd
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out the password given that the adversary is not provided with the corresponding hash value. Even
storing the password in plain would not be a problem as long as the adversary does not have access to
the ﬁle it is saved in. However, memory-demanding password scramblers with a password-dependent
memory-access pattern fall apart in this scenario.
6.6 Summary
This chapter covers the most noteworthy related work in terms of “classical” password hashing
by providing a survey on its history. Moreover, we deduct all properties which we expect from a
modern Password Scrambler (PS). As a motivation for providing resistance to Cache-Timing Attacks
(CTAs), Garbage-Collector Attacks (GCAs), and Weak Garbage-Collector Attacks (WGCAs), we
introduced particular attacks on the ﬁrst (sequential) memory-hard PS scrypt.
C
h
a
p
t
e
r
7
The Catena Password-Scrambling Framework
If you don’t make mistakes, you’re not working
on hard enough problems. And that’s a mistake.
Frank Anthony Wilczek
T
he previous chapter clearly deﬁned which properties we expect from a modern Password
Scrambler (PS) and which threats we should tackle when realizing a memory-demanding
design. With that knowledge and those requirements in mind, we developed the Password-
Scrambling Framework (PSF) Catena, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the ﬁrst that fulﬁlls all
the aforementioned properties. Since password hashing is desirable in a wide variety of applications,
Catena provides a framework rather than a dedicated design which may only be suitable for a
single application. Therefore, one can easily replace the underlying primitives of Catena to cover a
large quantity of purposes (see Chapter 10). Therefore, in this chapter, we do not focus on particular
instances but concentrate on the framework itself.
7.1 Design Decisions
Before we present our framework, we will elaborate on some decisions we had in mind when designing
Catena and give an informal overview over the main observation and ideas, starting with our
understanding of the defender’s machine, i.e., that of a legal user.
Defender’s Machine. Our understanding of the defender’s machine is straightforward: a typical
CPU, as it would be running on a server, a PC, or a smartphone. While this still leaves a wide
range of diﬀerent choices open, we anticipate a limited number of cores and a limited amount of fast
memory, i.e., cache. Although it thwarts GPU-based attacks, the usage of a large amount of memory
may not always be acceptable, either because that amount of memory is unavailable, or because
allocating too much memory would hinder other running processes on the same machine – further,
a log-in process requiring too much memory may also ease denial-of-service attacks. Therefore,
Catena should be able to increase the running time using memory-independent parameters, e.g.,
increasing the bit size of the pepper (see Chapter 3).
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Usage Scenarios. When thinking about when to apply a password scrambler P , we came up
with the following three use cases:
Password-Based Authentication: Given a triple (username, s, P (s, pwd)), where username is the
alias provided to the user, s is the salt, and pwd the password, a user is authenticated by
providing a password pwd′, such that P (s, pwd′) = P (s, pwd). This can be used to log in at a
server, providing a service for a multitude of diﬀerent users, or at a machine serving a single
user.
Password-Based Key Derivation: The PS is used to generate secure cryptographic keys.
Proof of Work / Proof of Space: The prover has to ﬁnd a speciﬁc value x, such that P (x) satisﬁes
a statistically rare property determined by a boolean function p. This means, the prover
searches for: an input x such that p(P (x)) = 1 holds. This is supposed to be a challenging task
for the prover, while the veriﬁer, given pwd, just needs to compute y ← P (pwd) once and then
check for the property. For example, p(y) = 1 could mean “the c Least Signiﬁcant Bits (LSBs)
of y are 0”. For a well-designed password scrambler, the prover should have to call P about
2c times, the veriﬁer only once. Such schemes have been discussed as a defense against spam
(the sender of an email would have to perform a proof of work or space in order to prevent
them from sending emails to hundreds of thousands of receivers) [257] and they are also used
for cryptocurrencies [178].
Regarding the ﬁrst scenario, resistance to Cache-Timing Attacks (CTAs), Garbage-Collector Attacks
(GCAs), andWeak Garbage-Collector Attacks (WGCAs) is highly important. Recently, it was shown
that Cache-Timing Attacks (CTAs) can be used to perform attacks against virtual machines, even
if the attack program is running on a diﬀerent core than the defender’s program [139]. For the
remaining two scenarios, CTAs, GCAs, and WGCAs are less of an issue, and large amounts of
memory should usually be available for the defender.
Capabilities of an Adversary. Making assumptions on the computational power of adversaries
may seem like a futile exercise since they will actually use all computational power within their
budget, like commodity hardware (CPUs and GPUs), reprogrammable hardware (FPGAs) and
non-reprogrammable hardware (ASICs). Thus, we distinguish adversaries by the hardware they are
using for their attacks:
Typical Password Crackers use cheap oﬀ-the-shelf hardware for their purpose, e.g., GPUs.
Low-Cost Hardware-Based Adversaries use low-cost reprogrammable hardware, e.g., FPGAs.
Clock-Cycle Thieves perform password cracking with hundreds of machines, e.g., botnet.
High-End Adversaries with a large budget who can aﬀord dedicated hardware, e.g., ASICs.
Regarding the ﬁrst two types, a modern memory-demanding PS is likely to cause trouble for adver-
saries who utilize massively parallel computations. For the third type of adversary, the capacities of
a single machine from, e.g., a botnet, would be similar to that of the defender. Therefore, one should
utilize a PS using the maximum amount of memory the defender can aﬀord to reach a maximum
slow-down for an adversary.
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Algorithm 3 Catena
Require:
pwd, t, s ⊲ password, tweak, salt
glow, ghigh,m ⊲ min. garlic, garlic, output length
γ ⊲ public input
Ensure: x ⊲ hash of the password
procedure Catena(pwd, t, s, glow, ghigh,m, γ)
1: x← H(t || pwd || s)
2: x← flap(⌈glow/2⌉, x, γ) ⊲ provides resistance to WGCAs
3: x← H(x)
4: for g = glow, . . . , ghigh do
5: x← flap(g, x || 0∗, γ) ⊲ the core of Catena
6: x← H(g || x) ⊲ provides server relief
7: x← truncate(x,m)
8: return x
Generic Design. We wanted Catena to be a mode of operation for a cryptographic hash function
rather than a primitive PS of its own right. The reasons are as follows:
• Catena would be more ﬂexibility and thus, more likely to be used in a wide range of appli-
cations.
• The underlying cryptographic primitive can be easily replaced by a new one in a case of, e.g.,
performance or security issues.
• Catena inherits the security assurance and the cryptanalytic attempts from the underlying
primitive, whereas a primitive PS would not. Therefore, the latter would require several years
of cryptanalytical work to gain trust in the cryptographic community.
• It signiﬁcantly eases the analysis if the underlying structure and cryptographic primitive is
already well-analyzed.
• The diversity of possibilities for instantiating Catena can frustrate adversaries which base
their attacks on non-programmable hardware, e.g., ASICs.
7.2 Specification of Catena
Following the generic approach, we designed Catena to be a mode of operation for a cryptographic
hash function H (see Deﬁnition 3.3), an eventually reduced version H ′ of a cryptographic hash
function, and a (λ-)memory-hard function flap (see Deﬁnition 3.6). This fact is the reason for
calling Catena a Password-Scrambling Framework (PSF) rather than a Password Scrambler (PS),
whereas the particular instances of that framework (see Chapter 10) would then be actual pass-
word scramblers. A formal deﬁnition of Catena is shown in Algorithm 3. It processes the inputs
pwd, t, s, glow, ghigh,m, and γ, whereas the functions Γ, Fλ, and Φ are given as implicit inputs since
they deﬁne a particular instance of Catena and have to be ﬁxed before Catena can actually be
called.
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pwd The (secret) password.
t A tweak which allows to customize the password hash, which is an additional multi-
byte value given as follows:
t← H(V ) || d || λ || m || |s| || H(AD),
where the ﬁrst n-bit value H(V ) denotes the hash value of a unique version identiﬁer
V (see Chapter 10 for details). The byte-value d denotes the domain (i.e., the mode)
for which Catena is used, where we set d ← 0x00 when used as a PS, d = 0x01
when used as a KDF, and d = 0x02 when used in the proof-of-work/space scenario.
The third byte λ determines the time-cost parameter (in contrast to the value g,
which determines the memory cost). The 2-byte value m denotes the length of the
ﬁnal hash value in bits and the 2-byte value |s| denotes the length of the salt in bits.
Finally, the n-bit value H(AD) denotes the hash of associated data AD, which can
contain additional information like hostname, user-ID, name of the company, or the
IP of the host. Note that the order of these values does not matter as long as they
are ﬁxed for a certain application.
s The salt value (usually provided by the system).
glow The minimum value of g.
ghigh The maximum value of g, where we usually, we set glow ← ghigh. Nevertheless, ghigh
determines the required memory cost for Catena running in minimal computational
time, i.e., optimizing the TMTO regarding to minimal running time and maximal
available memory (see Paragraph Memory Hardness in Chapter 3).
m The length of the ﬁnal hash value in bytes, which is guaranteed by a call to the
function truncate(x,m) (see Line 6 of Algorithm 3) returning the m least signiﬁcant
bytes of x.
γ A public and password-independent value, with γ ∈ {0, 1}∗, which can be used to
customize the memory-access pattern during the invocation of Catena (see later
in this section for details).
The general idea of how Catena works is depicted in Figure 7.1. It starts with processing the pass-
word, the tweak, and the salt, using the cryptographic hash function H (see Line 1 of Algorithm 3).
The second step is given by a call to the core function of Catena, i.e., flap (see Algorithm 4),
where we set the memory parameter to ⌈glow/2⌉ (determining the number of simultaneously stored
memory units). The latter and the fact that the password pwd can (and should) be immediately
removed after the ﬁrst step provides resistance to Weak Garbage-Collector Attacks (WGCAs). In
Line 3 of Algorithm 3, we call H again to provide an n-bit input to the core function flap. The core
function flap is called at least a second time as the ﬁrst step of each invocation of the main loop
(see Line 5 of Algorithm 3). Thereby, if for the password-dependent input x holds that |x| < n, it
is padded with as many 0’s as necessary so that |x || 0∗| = n. This padding is required since the
truncation step at the end of Catena allows |x| < n.
The function flap consists of four phases: (1) an initialization phase (see Lines 1 to 3), where
the memory of size 2g · k bits is written in a sequential order (k denotes the output size of the
underlying hash function H ′ in bits), (2) a call to the function Γ (see Line 4) depending on the
7.2. SPECIFICATION OF CATENA 57
PSfrag replacements
pwd st
H
H
x
glow glow + 1⌈glow/2⌉ ghigh
input
output
flapflapflap flap· · ·
Figure 7.1: The general idea of Catena employing its core function flap.
Algorithm 4 Function flap of Catena using Hinit
Require: g, x, γ ⊲ garlic, value to hash, public input
Ensure: x ∈ {0, 1}k ⊲ intermediate hash value
procedure flap(g, x, γ)
1: (v−2, v−1)← Hinit(x)
2: for i = 0, . . . , 2g − 1 do
3: vi ← H ′(vi−1 || vi−2) ⊲ initialize the memory
4: v ← Γ(g, v, γ) ⊲ one layer with γ-based memory accesses
5: v ← Fλ(v) ⊲ memory-hard function
6: x← Φ(g, v, µ) ⊲ one layer with µ-based memory accesses
7: return x
public input γ (e.g., the salt), (3) a call to a (λ-)memory-hard function Fλ (see Line 5), and (4) a
call to the function Φ (see Line 6) depending on a secret (password-dependent) input µ ∈ {0, 1}∗,
e.g., the last word of the state v := v0, . . . , v2g−1 obtained as output of Fλ, i.e., v2g−1. Note that we
allow Γ to be the identity function and Φ to just return the last state word v2g−1. The reason that
we do not state µ as explicit input to flap is straightforward: assume µ = pwd, which satisﬁes the
fact that µ must be a password-dependent value. Then, pwd must be in memory until the call to Φ,
rendering Catena directly vulnerable to Weak Garbage-Collector Attacks (WGCAs). Both Γ and
Φ are so-called Options to Catena which we discuss later in this section. The general idea of flap
is depicted in Figure 7.2.
Note that the output size in bits k ofH ′ does not necessarily have to be equal to that ofH, i.e., n bits.
This is also the reason for calling the initialization function Hinit as ﬁrst step in the function flap
(see Line 1 of Algorithm 4). Hinit, as deﬁned in Algorithm 5, processes an n-bit input x and outputs
two initial k-bit state words (v−2, v−1). To preserve at least one call to the underlying cryptographic
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Algorithm 5 Hinit
Require: x ⊲ n-bit value to hash
Ensure: v−2, v−1 ⊲ two k-bit outputs
procedure Hinit(x)
1: ℓ = 2 · k/n
2: for i = 0, . . . , ℓ− 1 do
3: wi ← H(i || x)
4: v−2 ← (w0 || · · · || wℓ/2−1)
5: v−1 ← (wℓ/2 || · · · || wℓ−1)
6: return (v−2, v−1)
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Figure 7.2: The general idea of flap with its core Fλ. The elements in light blue denote the optional layers
Γ and Φ, where the state words which are overwritten (exemplary for Γ) are colored in dark blue.
hash function H per 2g state-value computations, we use the function H in Hinit to compute the
ﬁrst chaining values v−2 and v−1 as shown in Line 3 of Algorithm 5. The additional input i ∈ {0, 1}n
(loop counter) satisﬁes distinct inputs for each call to H to guarantee pseudorandom independent
values w0, . . . , wℓ−1. Moreover, we always assume k and n to be multiples of 2 and n|k, i.e., k is
always a multiple of n even if k > n holds.
The penultimate step of Catena consists of processing the output x of flap (see Line 5 of
Algorithm 3) in a post-hashing step invoking H, allowing Catena to support Server Relief (SR) as
explained in Chapter 3. Finally, the output of the post-hashing step is truncated to m bytes (see
Line 7) providing outputs of length ≤ n.
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Algorithm 6 The functions Γ(g, v, γ) and Φ(g, v, µ).
Require:
g, v ⊲ garlic, state
γ ⊲ public input
Ensure: v ⊲ updated state
procedure Γ(g, v, γ)
10: r ← H(γ) || H(H(γ))
11: p← 0
12: for i← 0, . . . , 2⌈3g/4⌉ − 1 do
13: (j1, r, p)← R(r, p, g)
14: (j2, r, p)← R(r, p, g)
15: vj1 ← H ′(vj1 || vj2)
16: return v
Require:
g, v ⊲ garlic, state
µ ⊲ secret input
Ensure: v2g−1 ⊲ output of flap
procedure Φ(g, v, µ)
20: j ← π(µ, g)
21: v0 ← H ′(v2g−1 || vj)
22: for i← 1, . . . , 2g − 1 do
23: j ← π(vi−1, g)
24: vi ← H ′(vi−1 || vj)
25: return v2g−1
Options Γ and Φ. Next, we describe the two aforementioned options Γ and Φ, which can be inte-
grated to the structure of Catena. The function Γ consists of a password-independent graph-based
structure increasing the resistance to ASIC-based adversaries, whereas Φ is a password-dependent
graph-based function providing Sequential Memory Hardness (SMH) (see Deﬁnition 3.7). We call a
function password-dependent if its memory-access pattern, i.e., the order of access to the internal
state words, depends on the password. Thus, it is diﬀerent for each password and, in the best case
pseudorandom, which thwarts, e.g., ASIC-based adversaries.
Password-Independent Random Layer Γ. The optional function Γ is deﬁned in Algorithm 6
(left). It receives the garlic g, the internal state v, and a public value γ as inputs and updates the
state v, where γ determines the memory-access pattern, i.e., the indidces of the internal state words
are accessed in a γ-dependent pseudorandom manner during its invocation. In each iteration of the
for-loop (see Lines 12-15), two random g-bit integers j1 and j2 are computed individually using a
Random-Number Generator (RNG) R : {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}g × {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}n,
where r ∈ {0, 1}2n denotes its current state, p ∈ {0, 1}n denotes the index of the currently computed
output value, and g ∈ {0, 1}n the garlic. The values j1 determines the index for both the updated
word and the ﬁrst input to H ′, and j2 for the second input to H ′ (see Line 15). Even though H
may appear as a natural choice for a random-number generator, we later introduce an instance of
R given a non-cryptographic but statistically sound function, that provides higher performance.
Nevertheless, the stronger function H is used to produce the required seed for R, which is given by
the 2n-bit value r ← H(γ) || H(H(γ)) as shown in Line 10. To increase the performance further,
the main loop overwrites only 2⌈3g/4⌉ (out of 2g) randomly chosen words of the internal state v.
Password-Dependent Random Layer Φ. This option introduces a further graph-based layer
after the call to Fλ (see Line 6 of Algorithm 4). The function Φ is used to update the internal state
v of size 2g · k bits by sequentially computing each state word vi depending on two inputs (see
Algorithm 6): ﬁrst, the immediate predecessor vi−1 (or v2g−1 if i = 0) and second, a value chosen
uniformly at random from the state, where the index is determined by the function π. The function
π can, for example, be given by the RNG R as used for the option Γ1, or it can simply output the
g LSBs of its input. A strict requirement to π is that it satisﬁes the properties of a RNG and for
its call in Line 23, it must hold that its current output depends on the formerly computed value
1That requires the beforehand computation of the seed r ← H(µ) || H(H(µ)).
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vi−1. When called the ﬁrst time (see Line 20), its output depends on the secret input µ, which we
set per default to the value v2g−1 of the output state of Fλ. Thus, we basically follow a slightly
more generic approach in comparison to the ROMix function used within scrypt (see Algorithm 1
in Section 6.3). It is easy to see that Φ conducts sequential writes, whereas Γ conducts writes to
randomly determined words of the state. Thus, by calling Φ, Catena provides SMH
Remark 7.1. Note that the usage of Φ implies Sequential Memory Hardness and thus, it ren-
ders an instance of Catena vulnerable to Cache-Timing Attacks (see Section 6.3). Therefore,
when thinking about using Φ, one should carefully evaluate whether Sequential Memory Hard-
ness is more important than resistance to Cache-Timing Attacks. Moreover, this is also the
reason why invoke Φ only after Fλ, since else, a Cache-Timing Attack adversary could avoid
the memory-demanding part of Catena.
7.3 Functional Properties
Garlic. The function Fλ is deﬁned by a graph-based structure (see Chapter 9 for our proposed
instances), where the memory requirement of Fλ depends on the number of input vertices of the
underlying permutation graph. Since the goal is to hinder an adversary making a reasonable number
of parallel password checks using the same memory, we have to consider a minimal number of input
vertices, which we denote by G← 2g, where we usually set glow ← ghigh ← g.
Client-Independent Update (CIU). Catena’s sequential structure allows client-independent
updates. Let h← Catena(pwd, t, s, glow, ghigh,m, γ) be the hash of a speciﬁc password pwd, where
t, s, glow, ghigh,m, and γ denote tweak, the salt, the minimum garlic, the garlic, the output length, and
the public input, respectively. After increasing the security parameter from ghigh to g′high = ghigh +1,
we can update the hash value h without user interaction by computing
h′ ← truncate(H(g′high || flap(g′high, h || 0∗, γ)),m).
It is easy to see that the equation h′ = Catena(pwd, t, s, glow, g′high,m, γ) holds.
Server Relief (SR). In the ﬁnal iteration of the for-loop in Algorithm 3, the client has to
omit the last invocation of the hash function H (see Line 6). The current output of Catena is
then transmitted to the server. Next, the server computes the password hash by applying the hash
function H and the function truncate. Thus, the vast majority of the eﬀort (memory usage and
computational time) for computing the password hash is handed over to the client, freeing the
server. This enables someone to deploy Catena even under restricted environments or when using
constrained devices – or when a single server has to handle a huge amount of authentication requests,
e.g., in social networks.
Keyed Password Hashing. To thwart oﬀ-line attacks further, we introduce a technique to use
Catena for keyed password hashing, where the password hash depends on both the password and
a secret key K. To simplify the key management, the value K would be the same for all users, and
therefore has to be stored on the side of the server. To still allow SR (see above), we encrypt the
output of Catena by XORing it with H(K || userID || ghigh || K), which, under the reasonable
7.4. SECURITY PROPERTIES 61
assumption that the value (userID || ghigh) is a nonce2, was proven to be IND-CPA-secure in [227].
Let X := (pwd, t, s, glow, ghigh,m, γ), then, the output of Catena
K is computed as
y = CatenaK(userID,X) := Catena(X)⊕H(K || userID || ghigh || K),
where Catena is deﬁned as in Algorithm 3 and the userID is a unique and user-speciﬁc identi-
ﬁcation number which is assigned by the server. Now, we show what happens during the client-
independent update, i.e., when ghigh = ghigh + r for arbitrary r ∈ N. The process takes the following
four steps:
1. Given K and userID, compute z ← H(K || userID || ghigh || K).
2. Compute x← y ⊕ z, where y denotes the current keyed hash value.
3. Update x, i.e., x← H(g || flap(ghigh, x || 0∗, γ)) for g ∈ {ghigh + 1, . . . , ghigh + r}.
4. Compute the new hash value y ← y ⊕H(K || userID || ghigh + r || K).
Remark 7.2. Obviously, it is a bad idea to store the secret key K together with the password
hashes since it can leak in the same way as the password-hash database. One possibility to
separate the key from the hashes is to securely store the secret key in Hardware Security Modules
(HSMs), which provide a tamper-proof memory environment with verifiable security. Then, the
protection of the secret key depends on the level provided by the HSM (see FIPS140-2 [65] for
details). Another possibility is to derive K from a password during the bootstrapping phase.
Afterwards, K will be kept in Random-Access Memory (RAM) and will never be on the hard
drive. Thus, the key and the password-hash database should never be part of the same backup
file.
7.4 Security Properties
Memory Hardness. Catena inherits its memory hardness from the particular instance of Fλ.
Therefore, we provide several possibilities ranging from λ-memory hardness to sequential memory
hardness in Section 9.1, all resting upon a graph-based structure.
Preimage Security. One major requirement for password scramblers is described by the preimage
security, i.e., given a password hash h ← P (pwd), one cannot gain any information about pwd in
practical time. This requirement becomes mostly crucial in the situation of a leaked password-hash
database. In Section 8.1 in the next chapter, we show that the preimage security of Catena depends
on 1) the assumption that the underlying hash functions H and H ′ are a one-way functions and 2)
the entropy of the password (pwd).
2A number used once, i.e., a value which must never repeat.
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PRF Security. For the application of Catena as a password scrambler, this property is noncrit-
ical. But, if Catena is used as a Key-Derivation Function (KDF), one wants the resulting secret
key to be indistinguishable from a random string of the same length. In Section 8.2 we show that
for a secret input (pwd), the output of Catena looks random. The presented proof is based on the
assumption that the underlying hash function behaves like a random oracle.
Resistance to Cache-Timing Attacks. From Deﬁnition 3.9, it follows that an algorithm pro-
vides resistance to CTA if its control ﬂow does not depend on the input. We state that Catena
provides this property based on two requirements: (1) the option Φ is just returning the last state
value v2g−1, i.e., we “neglect” the only function whose memory-access pattern is designed to depend
on a secret input, e.g., an internal state value resulting from the computation of the password. The
control ﬂow of the function Fλ depends only on the security parameters g (garlic) and λ (depth)
(see Section 9.1 for details). Given these two parameters, it provides a predetermined memory-access
pattern, which is independent from the secret input (pwd); and (2) the particular instances of H
and H ′ provide resistance to CTAs.
7.5 Usage
The discussion in this section is done under the reasonable assumption that the parameters λ, glow,
flap, γ, and m are ﬁxed values.
7.5.1 Catena for Proof of Work
The concept of proofs of work was introduced by Dwork and Naor [85] in 1992. The basic design
goal was to combat junk mail under the usage of CPU-bounded functions, i.e., to gain control over
the access to shared resources. The main idea is “to require a user to compute a moderately hard, but
not intractable, function in order to gain access to the resource ” [85]. Therefore, they introduced
so-called CPU-bound pricing functions based on certain mathematical problems which may be
hard to solve (depending on the parameters), e.g., extracting square roots modulo a prime. Tromp
recently proposed the “ﬁrst trivially veriﬁable, scalable, memory-hard and TMTO-hard proof-of-
work system” in [257].
As a further development to CPU-bound functions, Abadi et al. [1], and Dwork et al. [84] con-
sidered moderately hard memory-bound functions since memory-access speeds do not vary much on
diﬀerent machines as CPU accesses do. Therefore, memory-bound functions may behave more equi-
tably than CPU-bound functions. The former base on a large table that is randomly accessed during
the execution, causing a lot of cache misses. Dwork et al. presented in [86] a compact representation
of such a table by using a Time-Memory Tradeoﬀs (TMTOs) for its generation. Dziembowski et
al. [89] as well as Ateniese et al. [29] put forward the concept of proofs of space, i.e., they do not
consider the number of accesses to the memory (as memory-bound function do), but the amount
of disk space the prover has to use. In [89], the authors proposed a new scheme using “graphs with
high pebbling complexity and Merkle hash-trees”.
For Catena, there exist at least two possible approached to be used for proofs of work. We
denote by C the client which has to fulﬁll the challenge to gain access to a server S. Furthermore,
the methods explained below work for all possible instances of our framework.
Guessing Secret Bits (Pepper). Initially, S chooses ﬁxed values for pwd, t, s and ghigh, where s
denotes a randomly chosen salt value, where, on the other hand, p bits of s are secret, i.e., pepper.
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Afterwards, S computes h← Catena(pwd, t, s, g) and sends the tuple (pwd, t, s[0,|s|−p−1], ghigh, h, p)
to C, where s[0,|s|−p−1] denote the |s| − p least signiﬁcant bits of s (the public part). Now, C has
to guess the secret bits of the salt by computing h′ ← Catena(pwd, t, s′, ghigh) about 2p times and
comparing if h = h′. If so, C sends the correct s to S and gains access to S. The eﬀort of C is given
by about 2p computations of Catena (and about 2p comparisons for h = h′). Hence, the eﬀort of
C is scalable by adapting p.
Guessing the Correct Password. In this scenario, S chooses a p-bit password pwd, a tweak t,
a salt s, and the garlic ghigh. Then, S computes h ← Catena(pwd, t, s, ghigh) and sends the tuple
(t, s, ghigh, p, h) to C. The client C then has to guess the password by computing about 2p times
h′ ← Catena(pwd′, t, s, ghigh) for diﬀerent values of pwd′, and comparing if h′ = h. If so, C send
the correct pwd to S and gains access to S. The eﬀort of C is given by about 2p computations of
Catena (and about 2p comparisons for h = h′). Hence, in this case, the eﬀort of C is scalable by
adapting the length p of the password.
7.5.2 Catena in Different Environments
This section considers several applications of the generic Catena framework which would work
independently from a particular instance. A discussion about where instances of Catena could be
applied is presented in Chapter 10.
Backup of User Data. When maintaining a database of user data, e.g., password hashes, storage
providers (servers) sometimes store a backup of their data on a third-party storage, e.g., a cloud.
This implies that the owner looses control over its data, which can lead to unintentional publication
(leakage). Therefore, we highly recommend to use Catena in the keyed password hashing mode
(see Section 7.3) to encrypt/protect the outsources backups. Thus, the security of each password is
given by the underlying secret key and does not longer solely depend on the strength of password
itself. Note that the key must be kept secret, e.g., it must not be stored together with the backup.
Using Catena with Multiple Cores. Catena has been designed to run on a modern single-
core machine. To use multiple cores during the legitimate login process, one can apply the pepper
approach. Therefore, p bits of the salt are kept secret, i.e., when one is capable of using b cores,
it would set p ← log2(b). During the login process, the i-th core will then compute the value
hi ← Catena(pwd, t, s0,...,|s|−p−1 || i, ghigh) for i = 0, . . . , b − 1. The login is successful if and
only if one of the values hi is valid. This approach is fully transparent for the user, since due
to the parallelism, the login time is not eﬀected. Nevertheless, the total memory usage and the
computational eﬀort are increased by a factor b. This also holds for an adversary, since it has to
test 2p possible values for the pepper to rule out a password candidate.
Low-Memory Environments. The application of the SR technique leads to signiﬁcantly reduced
eﬀort on the side of the server for computing the output of Catena, i.e., Catena is split into two
functions P (typically flap) and H, where P is time- and memory-demanding and H is eﬃcient.
Obviously, the application of this technique makes most sense when the server has to administrate
a large amount of requests in little time. Then, each client has to compute an intermediate hash
y ← P (·) and the server only has to compute h← H(y) for each user.
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Algorithm 7 Catena-KG
Require:
pwd, t′, s ⊲ password, tweak, salt
glow, ghigh,m ⊲ min. garlic, garlic, output length
γ, ℓ, I ⊲ public input, key size, key identiﬁer
Ensure: k ⊲ ℓ-byte key derived from the password
procedure Catena-KG(pwd, t′, s, glow, ghigh,m, γ, ℓ, I)
1: x← Catena(pwd, t′, s, glow, ghigh,m, γ)
2: k ← ε
3: for i = 1, . . . , ⌈ℓ/n⌉ do
4: k ← k || H(i || I || ℓ || x) ⊲ 2-byte counter i satisﬁes unique outputs
5: return truncate(k, ℓ)
7.5.3 The Key-Derivation Function Catena-KG
In this section, we introduce Catena-KG – a mode of operation based on Catena, which can be
used to generate diﬀerent keys of diﬀerent sizes (even larger than the natural output size of Catena,
see Algorithm 7). To always guarantee distinct inputs even for equal values for pwd, the domain
value d of the tweak for Catena is set to 1, i.e., t′ is given by
t′ ← H(V ) || 0x01 || λ || m || |s| || H(AD).
Note that for key derivation, it makes no sense to give the user control over the output length m
of Catena. It controls only the output of Catena-KG by adapting ℓ. Thus, within Catena-KG,
the value for m is set per default to the output size of the underlying hash function. The call to
Catena is followed by an output transform that takes the output x of Catena, a byte array key
identifier I, and a 2-byte value ℓ for the key length as the input, and generates key material of the
desired output size. Catena-KG is even able to handle the generation of extra-long keys (longer
than the output size of H), by applying H in Counter Mode [87]. Note that longer keys do not
imply improved security in that context.
The key identiﬁer I is supposed to be used when diﬀerent keys are generated from the same
password. For example, when Alice and Bob set up a secure connection, they may need four keys:
an encryption and a message authentication key for messages from Alice to Bob, and another two
keys for the opposite direction. Further, one could argue that I should also become a part of the
associated data. But actually, this would be a bad move, since setting up the connection would
require legitimate users to run Catena several times. However, the adversary can search for the
password for one key, and just derive the other keys, once that password has been found. For a given
budget for key derivation, one should rather employ one single call to Catena with larger security
parameters and then run the output transform for each key.
In contrast to the password-hashing scenario, where a user wants to perform a log-in without
noticeable delay, users may tolerate a delay of several seconds to derive an encryption key from a
password process [258], e.g., when setting up a secure connection, or when mounting a cryptographic
ﬁle system. Thus, one can increase the time- and memory-cost parameter λ and g for Catena-KG
in contrast to Catena.
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7.6 Summary
Catena is a framework that allows users to choose their own instances that suits their speciﬁc needs
best. Making the proper choice may be diﬃcult for many users, though. Furthermore, cryptanalysts
prefer a ﬁxed target rather than a generic framework where any attack can be defended by changing
the instances. For these reasons, we provide particular instances of Catena in Chapter 10.
Catena is Flexible. An instantiation of Catena is deﬁned by: (1) a cryptographic primitive
H, e.g., BLAKE2b [33], (2) a “reduced” primitive H ′ (e.g., a reduced-round version of H), though
H ′ = H is also possible, (3) a “memory-hard” function Fλ, that uses both H and H ′, (4) an option
Γ that employs a password-independent memory-access pattern, and (5) an option Φ that employs
a password-dependent memory-access pattern.
Catena has Tunable Parameters. The garlic g and the depth λ determine memory and time
requirements for Catena. Increasing the pepper allows to increase the time without aﬀecting the
memory, and the salt size impacts the resistance to so-called rainbow tables [203]. Catena supports
Server Relief, i.e., it allows to shift the eﬀort (both time and memory) for computing the password
hash from the server to the client, and it provides Client-Independent Updates, allowing the defender
to increase the security parameters g and pepper at any time, even for inactive accounts.
Catena has a Sound Theoretical Foundation. All instances utilize a cryptographic hash
function H as one of the underlying primitives and the Catena framework itself is easy to analyze
(see Chapter 8). The underlying graph-based structures (see Section 9.1) follow an elegant design
and are understood well.
Catena is secure. We claim the following security properties of Catena: preimage security
(a strict requirement for password hashing), indistinguishability from random bits (PRF security)
(important for key derivation), lower bounds on the TMTOs3 (for high resilience to massively parallel
attacks with constrained memory, e.g., when using GPUs), and resistance to Side-Channel Attacks,
such as Cache-Timing Attacks, Garbage-Collector Attacks, and Weak Garbage-Collector Attacks.
Furthermore, Catena supports keyed password hashing, i.e., the output of the unkeyed version of
Catena is encrypted by XORing it with a hash value generated from the userID, the memory-cost
parameter, and secret key.
3The lower bounds presented in Section 9.2 are achieved in the sequential pebbling game (see Section 11.2 for
details and a discussion about a different model, i.e., the Parallel Random-Oracle Model [23].)
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Catena – Security Analysis of the Framework
Mathematical reasoning may be regarded rather
schematically as the exercise of a combination
of two facilities, which we may call intuition
and ingenuity.
Alan M. Turing
D
uring this chapter, we focus on the security properties which are provided by the general
framework rather than immersing on particular instances of the underlying components
of Catena. Moreover, the discussion about the two options Γ and Φ is also postponed
to Chapter 9 since it requires knowledge about certain instances of the graph-based structure,
which are presented earlier in the very same chapter. Thus, the focus lies on the preimage and PRF
security of Catena. Further, in Section 8.3, we show that the KDF Catena-KG (see Section 7.5.3)
provides PRF security for generating cryptographic keys. For all proofs shown in this chapter, we
set H = H ′ and model the underlying hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n as a random oracle (as
our proofs are given in the random-oracle model). Additionally, for all values x ∈ {0, 1}∗, we set
Hm(x) := truncate(H(x),m), i.e., Hm truncates the output of H to m bits. Finally, for simplicity,
we set g ← ghigh.
8.1 Password-Recovery Resistance
In this section, we provide an analysis of Catena that shows that for guessing a valid password
and being provided with a hash value h, an adversary either has to try out all possible password
candidates in likelihood order, it has to ﬁnd a preimage for the underlying hash function, or a
preimage for Catena itself.
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Theorem 8.1 (Catena is Password-Recovery Resistant). Let p denote the min-entropy
of a password source Q. Then, it holds that
AdvRECCatena,Q(q) ≤
q
2p
+
q
2m
.
Proof. Note that an adversary A can always guess a password by trying out about 2p password
candidates. For a maximum of q queries, it holds that the success probability is given by q/2p.
Instead of guessing 2p password candidates, an adversary can also try to ﬁnd a preimage for a
given hash value h. It is easy to see from Algorithm 3 that an adversary has to ﬁnd a preimage
for H in Line 6, that is truncated to m bits in Line 7. More detailed, for a given value h with
h ← Hm(ghigh || x), A has to ﬁnd a valid value for x. Since A is allowed to ask at most q queries,
the success probability for that event can be upper bounded by q/2m. Our claim follows by adding
up the individual terms. 
8.2 PRF Security of Catena
In the following, we analyze the advantage of an adversaryA in distinguishing the output of Catena
from a random bitstring of the same length as the output of Catena. More detailed, as mentioned
before, we consider the PRF security of Catena in the random-oracle model. Note that the time
parameter λ and the memory parameter glow (minimum garlic) are constant values which are set
once when initializing a system the ﬁrst time.
Theorem 8.2 (PRF Security of Catena). Let q denote the number of queries made by an
adversary and s ∈ {0, 1}|s| a randomly chosen salt value. Furthermore, let H be modeled as a
random oracle and g ≥ glow ≥ 1. Then, it holds that
AdvPRFCatena(q) ≤
(q · g + q)2
2m
+AdvCOLLflap (q · g).
Proof. Let ai = (pwdi || ui || si || g || γi) represent the i-th query of A, where pwd denotes the
password, u denotes the tweak, s the salt, g the garlic, and γ the public input. For this proof,
we impose the reasonable condition that all queries of an adversary are distinct, i.e., ai 6= aj for
i 6= j. Suppose that yj denotes the output of flap(g, x || 0∗, γj) of the j-th query (see Line 5 of
Algorithm 3). Then,Hm(g || yj) is the output of Catena(aj). In the case that y1, . . . , yq are pairwise
distinct and q ≪ 2m/2, an adversary A cannot distinguish Catena(·) from a random function $(·)
since in since both functions return a value chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}m. Therefore,
we have to upper bound the probability of the event yi = yj with i 6= j. Due to the assumption that
A’s queries are pairwise distinct, there must be at least one collision for Hm or flap. For q queries,
we have at most q(g+1) invocations of Hm. Thus, we can upper bound the collision probability by
(q · g + q)2
2m
.
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Furthermore, we have q · g invocations of the memory-consuming function flap and thus, we can
upper bound the probability of a collision for flap by its collision advantage AdvCOLLflap (q · g). Thus,
our claim in Theorem 8.2 follows. 
8.3 PRF Security of Catena-KG
It is easy to see that Catena-KG inherits its memory hardness from Catena since it invokes
Catena (Line 1 of Algorithm 7). Next, we show that Catena-KG is also a good PRF.
Theorem 8.3 (PRF Security of Catena-KG). Let q denote the number of queries made
by an adversary and s ∈ {0, 1}|s| a randomly chosen salt value. Furthermore, let H be modeled
as a random oracle and g ≥ glow ≥ 1. Then, it holds that
AdvPRFCatena-KG(q) ≤ AdvPRFCatena(q) +
⌈ℓ/n⌉ · q
2n
.
Proof. For the sake of simpliﬁcation, we omit the ﬁnal truncation step (see Line 5 in Algorithm 7)
and let the adversary always get access to the untruncated key k in Line 4. Suppose xi denotes the
output of Catena of the i-th query. In the case xi 6= xj for all values with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q, the output
k is always a random value, since H is modeled as a random oracle and is always invoked with a
fresh input (see Line 4). The only chance for an adversary to distinguish Catena-KG(·) from the
random function $(·) is (1) a collision in Catena or (2) a preimage for H in Line 4. The advantage
of a PRF adversary for the former event is upper bounded by AdvPRFCatena(q) in Theorem 8.2. Since
H is called at most ⌈ℓ/n⌉ · q times in Line 4, the upper bond for the latter is given by
⌈ℓ/n⌉ · q
2n
.
8.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have shown that Catena and Catena-KG provide preimage security as well
as PRF security.
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Catena – Instances of its Components
Ideas do not always come in a flash but by
diligent trial-and-error experiments that take
time and thought.
Charles Kuen Kao
I
n this chapter, we elaborate on concrete instances of (1) the underlying graph-based structures
Fλ, Γ, and Φ of Catena (see Algorithm 3 in Section 7.2), and (2) the underlying cryptographic
hash function H and the hash function H ′. For the former, we also consider the impact induced
by a diﬀerent ordering of the graph-based layers, i.e., diﬀerent placements of Γ within flap. Based
on the insights gained during this chapter, we provide 14 instances of the Catena framework in
Chapter 10 that are suitable for a wide range of applications.
9.1 Instances of Fλ, Γ, and Φ
Generic Graph-Based Hashing Scheme and the Initialization Function Hfirst. Since four
out of ﬁve considered instances (BRGgλ, SBRG
g
λ, GRG2
g
λ, and GRG3
g
λ) base on the same structure,
we can provide the Generic Graph-Based Hashing Scheme GHSgλ (see Algorithm 8), where the
diﬀerence between the four variants is given by an individual indexing function ρ(i). The GHSgλ
operation requires O(2g) invocations of a given hash function H ′ per stack. It accepts the garlic
g, the current state v, as well as the depth λ as input and returns the updated 2g · k-bit state v,
where k denotes the output length of H ′ in bits1. A call to H ′ requires two inputs ri−1 and vρ(i)
(see Line 13 of Algorithm 8), where ri−1 is the predecessor of the currently updated state word and
ρ(i) an index determined by the index function ρ : {0, 1}g → {0, 1}g. A formal deﬁnition of the
underlying graph-based structure, which we denote as a Generic (g, λ)-Graph Scheme (GGSgλ), is
shown in Deﬁnition 9.1.
1Note that n|k always holds, where n denotes the output size of H in bits.
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Algorithm 8 Generic (g, λ)-Graph-Based Hashing (GHSgλ) and Hfirst
Require: g, v, λ ⊲ garlic, state, depth
Ensure: v ⊲ updated state
procedure GHSgλ(g, v, λ)
10: for j = 1, . . . , λ do
11: r0 ← Hfirst(v2g−1, vρ(0))
12: for i = 1, . . . , 2g − 1 do
13: ri ← H ′(ri−1 || vρ(i))
14: v ← r
15: return v
Require: vα, vβ ⊲ two k-bit state words
Ensure: r0 ⊲ k-bit state word
procedure Hfirst(vα, vβ)
20: w0 ← H(vα || vβ)
21: ℓ← k/n
22: for i = 1, . . . , ℓ− 1 do
23: wi ← H(i || w0)
24: r0 ← (w0, . . . , wℓ−1)
25: return r0
Definition 9.1 (Generic (g, λ)-Graph Scheme). Fix a natural number g, let V denote the
set of vertices, and E the set of edges within this graph. Then, a GGSgλ(V, E) consists of (λ+1)·2g
vertices
{vji }, 0 ≤ i ≤ 2g − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ λ,
and (2λ+ 1) · 2g − 1 edges as follows:
• (λ+ 1) · (2g − 1) edges vji−1 → vji for i ∈ {1, . . . , 2g − 1} and j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , λ}.
• λ · 2g edges vji → vj+1ρ(i) for i ∈ {0, . . . , 2g − 1} and j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , λ− 1}.
• λ additional edges vj2g−1 → vj+10 where j ∈ {0, . . . , λ− 1}.
Moreover, all considered instances of the function Fλ work on the same state v (see Line 5 of
Algorithm 4) consisting of 2g k-bit state words, which allows us to provide a generic function
Hfirst (see Algorithm 8) computing the ﬁrst k-bit value r0 (or v0 resp.) of the internal state2. This
initialization function is required since Catena supports hash functions H ′ with arbitrary k-bit
output sizes for which it may hold that k 6= n, where n denotes the output size of H in bits. All
instances of Fλ consider exactly two inputs to the underlying hash function H (or H ′ resp.) when
updating an internal state word. Therefore, the generic initialization function Hfirst takes exactly
two k-bit state words vα and vβ as input and computes the new ﬁrst k-bit state word r0 consisting
of ℓ pseudorandom values w0, . . . , wℓ−1, with ℓ← k/n (see Lines 22-25 of Algorithm 8). The use of
H and the loop counter i as its input is based on similar arguments as mentioned for the function
Hinit in Section 7.2.
For each instance of Fλ, we require a password-independent memory-access pattern, i.e., the
resistance to Cache-Timing Attacks (CTAs) of an instance of Catena must not depend on the in-
stance of Fλ. Nevertheless, if resistance to CTAs is no mandatory requirement and SMH is desirable,
one can use the option Φ as introduced in Section 7.2 (see Algorithm 6).
2Note that in practice, r0 is actually the same value as v0. But, to increase the readability, we always use two
variables r and v to represent the internal state in the pseudocode. Obviously, the actual implementation is working
on a single variable v.
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Figure 9.1: A (3, 1)-Bit-Reversal Graph (BRG31) (left) and a Shifted (3, 1)-Bit-Reversal Graph (SBRG
3
1)
with c = 1 (right).
9.1.1 (g, λ)-Bit-Reversal Graph
The graph-based structure of a (g, λ)-Bit-Reversal Graph (BRGgλ) is almost identical – except for
one additional edge e = (v02g−1, v
1
0) – to the Bit-Reversal Graph (BRG) presented by Lengauer
and Tarjan in [170]. The (g, λ)-Bit-Reversal Hashing (BRHgλ), based on the GHS
g
λ operation (see
Algorithm 8), deﬁnes the algorithm following the structure of a BRGgλ, where ρBRG(i) with i =
(i0, i1, . . . , iq−1) and ij ∈ {0, 1}, 0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1, is deﬁned by
ρBRG(i) = (iq−1, . . . , i1, i0).
Thus, the function ρBRG(i) returns the bitwise reverse of an input i. For example, Figure 9.1 (left)
illustrates a BRG31. One structural property of an BRG
g
λ is its self-inverting structure, i.e., ρ
2
BRG(i) =
i, ∀i. This was exploited by the TMTO attacks introduced by Biryukov and Khovratovich in [55],
where they have shown that a BRGgλ does not satisfy λ-Memory Hardness (LMH). Therefore, we
searched for an alternative with the objective of ﬁnding a graph structure with less dependencies
between the single layers.
9.1.2 Shifted (g, λ)-Bit-Reversal Graph
A Shifted (g, λ)-Bit-Reversal Graph (SBRGgλ) can be adjusted by a constant c that avoids the self-
inverse property of a BRGgλ, i.e., it leads to a less symmetric structure of the underlying permutation.
The corresponding indexing function ρSBRG(i) of a SBRG
g
λ is given by
ρSBRG(i) = (ρBRG(i) + c) mod 2
g.
We show an SBRG31 with c = 1 in Figure 9.1 (right). Unfortunately, an SBRG
g
λ does not protect
well against the TMTO attacks mentioned before, e.g., we have shown for g = 12, that even if we
consider all possible shift constants c, the penalties (see Remark 9.2) do not exceed that of the
(g, λ, ℓ)-Gray-Reverse Graph presented in the next section (see Table 9.1).3 Based on the structure
of an SBRG12λ , the penalties follow a cyclic property, i.e., it holds that pc = pc mod 16 for 0 ≤ c < 212,
where pc denotes the penalty for the shift constant c. Thus, Table 9.1 contains all possible penalties
which exist for an SBRG12λ with λ ∈ {2, 3}.
3The value g = 12 was chosen for time reasons.
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Remark 9.2. By penalty, we denote the relative additional costs of a TMTO adversary for
computing the password hash with less than 2g · k bits of memory. For example, as shown in
Table 9.1 for c = 0 and when considering the SBRG122 , an adversary with 2
⌈g/3⌉ · k = 24 · k
bits of memory available requires 22 times the effort of an adversary with 2g ·k bits of memory
available.
c Penalty c Penalty
0 22.00 8 28.31
1 25.03 9 28.78
2 25.50 10 29.25
3 25.96 11 29.71
4 26.43 12 30.18
5 26.90 13 30.65
6 27.37 14 31.12
7 27.84 15 31.59
GRG2122 54.56 GRG3
12
2 72.25
c Penalty c Penalty
0 47.00 8 66.95
1 48.41 9 70.04
2 50.76 10 73.22
3 53.23 11 76.52
4 55.80 12 79.80
5 58.47 13 83.30
6 61.26 14 86.88
7 63.97 15 65.87
GRG2123 254.93 GRG3
12
3 223.52
Table 9.1: Relative costs (penalties) for computing an SBRG122 (left) and an SBRG
12
3 (right) depending
on the shift constant c, where c = 0 corresponds to a BRG122 and BRG
12
3 , respectively. The penalties were
computed for the case when an adversary has λ · 2g−σ · k bits of memory available (with σ = g/3). For
comparison, we added the recomputation costs for a GRG212λ and a GRG3
12
λ for λ ∈ {2, 3}.
It follows that instantiating Fλ with an SBRG
g
λ does not signiﬁcantly increase the resistance of
Catena to the attacks presented by Biryukov and Khovratovich [55]. We assume these fact stems
from the close relation between a BRGgλ and an SBRG
g
λ. Following from this, we took another
approach into consideration, called (g, λ, ℓ)-Gray-Reverse Graph.
9.1.3 (g, λ, ℓ)-Gray-Reverse Graph
The GRHgλ operation (the algorithm deﬁned by a GRGℓ
g
λ) is based on the combination of ρBRGgλ
and the Gray Code [121].4 It was initially suggested by Harris on the PHC mailing list [128] to
increase the asymmetry between multiple layers of underlying graph-based permutation. It utilizes
the following indexing function ρGRG:
ρGRG(i) = ρBRG(i)⊕
(
ρBRG
(
i
)≫ ⌈g/ℓ⌉) ,
where ℓ ∈ {2, 3} is ﬁxed in advance and i denotes the bitwise inversion of i. In Figure 9.2, we show
a GRG231 (left) and a GRG3
3
1 (right). In Table 9.1 and more detailed in Section 9.2, we observe
that a GRG2gλ is strong in comparison to the formerly introduced instances since it leads to a
signiﬁcantly increased penalty when considering the TMTO attacks in [55]. On the other hand,
the choice of a GRG3gλ does not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the penalty in comparison to a
4Even if the basic idea (hamming distance of 1 of adjacent indices) is hard to find (if at all), the author described
it that way; and we have adopted his description.
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Figure 9.2: A (3, 1, 2)-Gray-Reverse Graph (GRG231) (left) and a (3, 1, 3)-Gray-Reverse Graph (GRG3
3
1)
(right).
Figure 9.3: A Cooley-Tukey FFT graph with eight input and output vertices.
GRG2gλ. Nevertheless, it is an intuitive assumption to say that the increased resistance to TMTO
attacks stems more from the general asymmetric structure of a (g, λ, ℓ)-Gray-Reverse Graph that
also explains the weak resistance of an SBRGgλ to those attacks which were initially designed for a
BRGgλ.
9.1.4 (g, λ)-Double-Butterfly Graph
The structure of a (g, λ)-Double-Butterﬂy Graph (DBGgλ) does not ﬁt into the generic pattern of
Algorithm 8 and Deﬁnition 9.1. The basic structure was discussed by Lengauer and Tarjan in [170].
It consists of a stack of λ stacked G-superconcentrators, where the following deﬁnition of a G-su-
perconcentrator is a slightly adapted version of that introduced in [170].
Definition 9.3 (G-Superconcentrator). A directed acyclic graph Ψ(V, E) with a set of ver-
tices V and a set of edges E, a bounded indegree, G inputs, and G outputs is called a G-su-
perconcentrator if for every ω such that 1 ≤ ω ≤ G and for every pair of subsets V1 ⊂ V of ω
inputs and V2 ⊂ V of ω outputs, there are ω vertex-disjoint paths that connect the vertices in
V1 to the vertices in V2.
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A Double-Butterﬂy Graph (DBG) is a special form of a G-superconcentrator which is deﬁned by
the graph representation of two mirrored Fast Fourier Transformations [64]. More detailed, it is
a representation of two invocations of the Cooley-Tukey FFT algorithm [71], omitting one row in
the middle (see Figure 9.3 for an example where g ← 3 and thus, G = 2g = 23 = 8). Therefore,
a DBG consists of 2 · g rows, each consisting of 2g · k state words. Based on the DBG, we deﬁne
the sequential and stacked (g, λ)-Double-Butterﬂy Graph (see Deﬁnition 9.4) and the corresponding
(g, λ)-Double-Butterﬂy Hashing operation in Algorithm 9, where the indexing function ρ(g, j, i) (see
Lines 3 and 5) is deﬁned by
ρ(g, j, i) =
{
i⊕ 2g−1−j if 0 ≤ j ≤ g − 1,
i⊕ 2j−(g−1) otherwise.
Thus, ρ determines the indices of the vertices of the diagonal edges (see Figure 9.4).
Definition 9.4 ((g, λ)-Double-Butterfly Graph). Fix a natural number g ≥ 1 and let G =
2g. Then, a (g, λ)-Double-Butterfly Graph DBGgλ(V, E) consists of 2
g · (λ · (2g−1)+1) vertices
• vωi,j , 0 ≤ i ≤ 2g − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2g − 1, 1 ≤ ω ≤ λ
• vλi,j , 0 ≤ i ≤ 2g − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2g − 1,
and λ · (2g − 1) · (3 · 2g) + 2g − 1 edges as follows:
vertical: 2g · (λ · (2g − 1)) edges
(vωi,j , v
ω
i,j+1) for 0 ≤ j ≤ 2g − 2, 0 ≤ i ≤ 2g − 1 and 1 ≤ ω ≤ λ,
diagonal: 2g · λ · g + 2g · λ · (g − 1) edges
(vωi,j , v
ω
i⊕2g−1−j ,j+1), 0 ≤ j ≤ g − 1, 0 ≤ i ≤ 2g − 1, 1 ≤ ω ≤ λ.
(vωi,j , v
ω
i⊕2j−(g−1),j+1
), g ≤ j ≤ 2g − 2, 0 ≤ i ≤ 2g − 1, 1 ≤ ω ≤ λ.
sequential: (2g − 1) · (λ · (2g − 1) + 1) edges
(vωi,j , v
ω
i+1,j), 1 ≤ j ≤ 2g − 1, 0 ≤ i ≤ 2g − 2, 1 ≤ ω ≤ λ.
(vλi,2g−1, v
λ
i+1,2g−1), 0 ≤ i ≤ 2g − 2.
connecting layer: λ · (2g − 1) edges
(vω2g−1,j , v
ω
0,i+1), 1 ≤ ω ≤ λ, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2g − 2.
Figure 9.4 illustrates the individual types of edges we used in Deﬁnition 9.4 and Figures 9.5 shows
a DBG31.
Since providing resistance to TMTO attacks is a crucial goal of a modern and memory-demanding
PS, it is desired to implement it in the most eﬃcient way possible to allow for increasing the
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Figure 9.4: Types of edges as we use them in our definitions: vertical (left), diagonal (center), sequential
and connecting layer (right).
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Figure 9.5: A (3, 1)-double-butterfly graph (DBG31.).
required memory. As mentioned before, all instances of H (and H ′) take exactly two input words
when updating a word of the internal state. This is suitable for all formerly mentioned graph-based
hashing operations since a BRG, a Shifted Bit-Reversal Graph (SBRG), as well as a Gray-Reverse
Graph (GRG) satisfy a ﬁxed indegree of at most 2. When considering the DBHgλ operation, we cannot
simply concatenate the inputs to H (and H ′) while keeping the same performance per hash-function
call, i.e., three inputs to H usually require two calls to the underlying compression function, which
would be a strong slow-down in comparison to other instances. Therefore, we compute H(X,Y,Z) =
H(X⊕Y || Z) instead of H(X,Y,Z) = H(X || Y || Z) (see Lines 3 and 5 of Algorithm 9) obtaining
the same performance as for the BRHgλ, SBRH
g
λ, and GRH
g
λ operations per hash-function call.
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Algorithm 9 (g, λ)-Double-Butterﬂy Hashing (DBHgλ)
Require: g, v, λ ⊲ garlic, state, depth
Ensure: v ⊲ updated state
procedure DBHgλ(v)
1: for k = 1, . . . , λ do
2: for j = 1, . . . , 2g − 1 do
3: r0 ← Hfirst(v2g−1 ⊕ v0, vρ(g,j−1,0))
4: for i = 1, . . . , 2g − 1 do
5: ri ← H ′(ri−1 ⊕ vi || vρ(g,j−1,i))
6: v ← r
7: return v
Algorithm 10 The Random-Number Generator xorshift1024star
Require: r, p, g ⊲ current state of the RNG, garlic
Ensure: idx, r, p ⊲ current index, updated state of the RNG
procedure xorshift1024star(r, p, g)
1: s0 ← r
2: p← (p+ 1) mod 16
3: s1 ← r
4: s1 ← s1 ⊕ (s1 ≪ 31)
5: s1 ← s1 ⊕ (s1 ≫ 11)
6: s0 ← s0 ⊕ (s0 ≫ 30)
7: r ← s0 ⊕ s1
8: idx← r · 1181783497276652981
9: return (idx≫ (64− g), r, p)
Unfortunately, this would then double the probability of an input collision. But, since our instances
of H (and H ′) produce at least 512-bit outputs (see Section 9.3), the success probability for a
collision of an adversary is still negligible.
Remark 9.5. Note that the performance optimization discussed above has no influence on the
memory hardness of the DBHgλ operation since the first input X⊕Y is given by XORing vertices
from the sequential or connecting layer and the vertical layer. In Section 9.2, we discuss the
results of [170] who have shown that even without the sequential inputs, the DBHgλ operation
provides LMH. Adding additional inputs to that operation does not invalidate their results. The
objective of the sequential layer is to harden attacks in a parallel setting (see Section 11.2 for
a discussion).
9.1.5 Instance of Γ and Φ
The TMTO attacks by Biryukov and Khovratovich [55] are only possible due to the predictable
memory-access pattern of a BRGgλ. Therefore, we introduced the functions Γ and Φ (see Algorithm 6
in Chapter 7.2), which update the state v by accessing its elements dependent on a public input γ
(e.g., the salt s), or secret input µ, e.g., the last state word v2g−1 of Fλ, respectively (see Section 7.2).
Both functions come with the hope to strengthen an instance of Catena against the implementation
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of TMTOs attacks. Furthermore, we claim that such a construction would also increase the costs
of attacks with expensive non-reprogrammable hardware, e.g., ASICs: either, an adversary would
have to design a new computational circuit for each public/secret input; It would require almost
“reprogrammable” hardware to support multiple distinct values of the former.
Instance of both Γ as well as Φ are deﬁned by the functions H, H ′, and R. The concrete
instances for H and H ′ are discussed in Section 9.3, whereas now, we present our proposed instance
of the RNG R (see Algorithm 10). Even if the cryptographic hash function H may appear as
a natural choice for an RNG, we preferred the non-cryptographic but statistically sound RNG
xorshift1024star [259] due to its better performance. Another possible approach was presented
by the designers of Argon2 [52], which uses the g LSBs of the previous computed value to determine
the new index.
9.2 Security Analysis of the Instances of Fλ
In this section, we ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss a well-known proof method from theoretical computer science
called the Pebble Game, which is used to analyze Time-Memory Tradeoﬀs (TMTOs) for a restricted
set of programs. This means, it can be used for determining the memory hardness of a particular
algorithm. Even if we do not apply that technique by ourselves, the memory hardness results of the
aforementioned instances of Fλ depend on that technique and knowing it helps to understand the
underlying proofs given by Lengauer and Tarjan in [170]. Second, we present the memory hardness
results of named instances and show the behavior of the graph-based structures in terms of the
TMTO attacks presented by Biryukov and Khovratovich [53, 55]. Finally, we complete our security
analysis by considering (1) the resistance to CTAs, GCAs, and WGCAs, and (2) the collision security
and pseudorandomness of the given instances.
The Pebble Game. In 1970, Hewitt and Paterson [209] introduced the pebble game as a method
for analyzing TMTOs on Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), which became an important tool for
that purpose (see [237, 238, 241, 252, 255]). Additionally, the pebble game has been occasionally
used in cryptographic context (see [90] for a recent example).
The pebble game is meant to analyze TMTOs for a restricted set of programs, which are required
to fulﬁll two conditions. First, the programs must be “straight-line programs”, i.e., without any data-
dependent branches. Thus, neither conditional statements (if-then-else) nor loops are allowed, except
when the number of loop-iterations is a ﬁxed number since one can remove such loops by unrolling.
Second, reading to or writing from a certain element vi of an array v0, . . . , vn−1 in memory is only
allowed if the index i is statically determined a priori – and thus, independent from the input.
Programs following these two restrictions can be represented by a DAG.
The goal of the pebble game is to determine a TMTO for a given algorithm by pebbling a
predetermined vertex within the corresponding DAG, considering a certain amount of available
memory, i.e., number of available pebbles. Initially, there is a heap of free pebbles, and no pebbles
on the DAG. The player performs a number of certain actions until a predeﬁned output vertex has
been pebbled, where the following two actions are possible:
Move: If a vertex vi is unpebbled and all vertices wi with edges wi → vi are pebbled, perform either
one of the following two operations:
1. Put a pebble from the heap onto vi (all wi remain pebbled).
2. Move a pebble from one of the wi to vi (all wj with j 6= i remain pebbled).
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Collect: Remove one pebble from any vertex. The pebble goes back into the heap.
Note that a “move” is either a “read input” operation (if it applies to an input vertex, i.e., one
without any edges wi → v) or the actual computation of a value. The computational time for a
straight-line program is then given by counting the number of moves, whereas the required memory
is given by the maximum number of pebbles simultaneously placed on the DAG.
The game explained above is called the black pebble game. A variation of the former, studied in [70,
186, 114], is called the black and white pebble game, where two types of pebbles exist. As mentioned
by Lengauer and Tarjan [170], a few additional rules for white pebbles have to be considered:
• A white pebble can be placed on an empty vertex at any time.
• A white pebble can be removed from a vertex vi if all its immediate predecessors are pebbled.
• If all but one of the immediate predecessors of a vertex vi having a white pebble are pebbled,
then, the white pebble can be moved from vi to its unpebbled immediate predecessor.
That very game is used for the analysis of a stack of λ G-Superconcentrators [170] (see Theorem 9.9),
whereas the black pebble game is used for the analysis of the BRG (see Theorem 9.6).
9.2.1 Memory Hardness
In [170], Lengauer and Tarjan have proven the lower bound of pebble movements for a (g, 1)-Bit-
Reversal Graph.
Theorem 9.6 (Lower Bound for a BRGg1 [170]). If S ≥ 2, then, pebbling the Bit-
Reversal Graph BRGg1(V, E) consisting of G = 2
g input nodes with S pebbles takes time
T >
G2
16S
.
Since the SBRGgλ is directly derived from a BRG
g
λ, we state the following corollary.
Corollary 9.7 (Lower Bound for an SBRGg1). Let S ≥ 2 and G = 2g denote the number
of input nodes. Then, it holds that pebbling an Shifted Bit-Reversal Graph SBRGg1(V, E) with
S pebbles takes time
T >
G2
16S
.
Biryukov and Khovratovich have shown in [55] that stacking more than one BRG only adds some
linear factor to the quadratic TMTO. Hence, a BRGgλ with λ > 1 does not achieve the properties
of a λ-memory-hard function.
In contrast to a BRGgλ and an SBRG
g
λ, a GRGℓ
g
λ does not follow such a symmetric structure.
Therefore, we state the following conjecture.
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Conjecture 9.8 (Lower Bound for an GRGℓg1). Let S ≥ 2 and G = 2g denote the number
of input nodes. Then, it holds that pebbling a Gray-Reverse Graph GRGℓg1(V, E) with S pebbles
takes time
T >
G2
16S
.
Also by utilizing the pebble game, the authors of [170] analyzed the TMTO for a stack of λ G-su-
perconcentrators. Since the DBG is a special form of a G-superconcentrator, their bound also holds
for DBGgλ.
Theorem 9.9 (Lower Bound for a Stack of λ G-Superconcentrators [170]).
Pebbling a stack of λ G-superconcentrators using S ≤ G/20 black and white pebbles
requires T placements such that
T ≥ G
(
λG
64S
)λ
.
From Theorem 9.9, we can derive Corollary 9.10.
Corollary 9.10 (Lower Bound for a DBGgλ). If S ≤ G/20, then, pebbling the Double-
Butterfly Graph DBGgλ(V, E) consisting of G = 2
g input nodes with S pebbles takes time
T ≥ G
(
λG
64S
)λ
.
Thus, a DBGgλ fulfills requirement of a λ-memory-hard function as defined in Definition 3.6.
Note that the computational eﬀort for computing the DBHgλ operation with reasonable values for
g, e.g., g ∈ [19, 21], may stress the patience of many users since the number of vertices and edges
grows logarithmically with G = 2g. Thus, it remains an open research problem to ﬁnd a stack
of λ G-superconcentrators – or any other λ-memory-hard function– that can be computed more
eﬃciently than DBHgλ.
Remark 9.11. All results presented in this section only hold in the so-called sequential pebble
game as introduced by [170]. A different model considering parallel executions of the underlying
graph-based structure was presented by Alwen and Serbinenko [23] and is called the Parallel
Random-Oracle Model (pROM). We discuss the results following the pROM in Section 11.2.
Next, we have a deeper look at the resistance of the instances GRG2gλ and GRG3
g
λ to the precom-
putation attack described in [55] (see the paper for details on the attack) and we consider both in
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comparison to the BRGgλ.
5 The reason for disregarding DBGgλ from our analysis is given by the fact
that the aforementioned attacks were focused on the BRGgλ and we were searching for an alterna-
tive for that graph structure6 while preserving a decent performance, where the latter cannot be
guaranteed by a DBGgλ. Moreover, we disregarded the SBRG
g
λ since it does not defend well against
those attacks as already shown in Section 9.1.1.
For our analysis, we ﬁrst look for the sweet spot (regarding the required memory) for the pre-
computation attack [55]. Assume that an adversary has 2g−σ ·k bits of memory available (as always,
k denotes the size of a state words in bits) that are used to permanently store 2g−σ words of the
internal state v in an equidistant manner. Moreover, we say that an adversary can aﬀord 22σ ·k bits
of memory that are used to store additional state words, temporarily. Then, it is shown in [55] that
the memory eﬀort for computing a BRGgλ is given by
M(λ, g, σ) ≤ λ · 2g−σ + λ · 22σ.
We show the required memory M , depending on λ ∈ {2, 3} and g ∈ {18, 21}, in Figure 9.6. Note
that we disregard values of σ/g > 0.5 since for those values, the precomputation method performs
worse than a naive recomputation and moreover, from σ/g = 0.5 follows 22σ = 2g and thus, the
adversary would already have the same amount of memory as the defender. From Figure 9.6, we
can observe that the minimal required memory of an adversary is given when σ = g/3. Therefore,
we assume σ = g/3 for all considered penalty computations independently from the instance of Fλ.
Based on the available memory, we compute the relative cost (penalty) an adversary would require
in comparison to the case when it has 2g ·k memory available (which would be the case for a defender
using Catena). First, we will consider graphs with a depth of 2 or 3, i.e., λ ∈ {2, 3}. Then, we
add the optional random layer Γ (see Algorithm 6) and recompute the penalties to determine the
impact of the random layer on the precomputation method.
Shifting Sampling Points. The precomputation method of Biryukov and Khovratovich with
an optimal tradeoﬀ considers 2g−σ, σ = g/3, sampling points stored in each level of the underlying
graph-based structure. Thus, an adversary is allowed to store 22g/3 memory units per level, where
one memory unit is given by one word of internal state v. The sampling points are placed on
the internal state so that it consists of 22g/3 segments of 2g/3 state words each (beginning with
placing the ﬁrst sampling point on the ﬁrst state value v0). First, we were interested in the fact
whether shifting the sampling points by a constant amount (which could diﬀer for each layer) would
strengthen the resistance of an instance of Fλ to the precomputation attack method. Thus, for all
possible (2σ)λ = 2σ·λ shift conﬁgurations of the sampling points (where the sampling points were
still ordered with a distance of 2g/3 state words), we recomputed the penalty of an adversary. The
results can be seen in Table 9.2, where we only considered the minimum and maximum values for
the penalty. The values in brackets denote the shift constants which are applied to the particular
layers, e.g., 67.61 (4, 7) denotes that all sampling points in the ﬁrst layer are shifted by four positions
to the right, whereas the sampling points in the second layer are shifted by seven positions to the
right.
From Table 9.2, we conclude that shifting the sampling points on the internal state does not
signiﬁcantly help an adversary. Therefore, all following results are based on the same conﬁguration
of sampling points as used in the original attack [55]. Nevertheless, we leave the question open if an
5Most of the upcoming discussion is an only slightly adopted version of that presented in [174].
6The precomputation attack was the actual reason for introducing the SBRGg
λ
and GRGℓg
λ
with the hope that
those graphs provide a better resistance.
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Figure 9.6: Required memory for the recomputation method shown in [55], depending on the garlic g and
the depth λ.
Graph No Shift Min. Penalty Max. Penalty
BRG122 25.03 25.00 (0,7) 31.59 (1,0)
GRG2122 54.56 54.35 (14,12) 67.61 (4,7)
GRG3122 74.25 72.88 (5,8) 74.25 (0,0)
BRG123 47.59 46.70 (0,0,15) 90.13 (1,1,14)
GRG2123 254.93 246.72 (12,13,4) 296.54 (6,4,11)
GRG3123 223.52 217.64 (8,6,15) 262.36 (11,4,10)
Table 9.2: Relative costs (penalty) depending on the shift of the sampling points and the depth λ.
adversary could obtain a signiﬁcant lower penalty when considering an optimal distribution of all
λ · 22g/3 sampling points over the whole graph.
Naive Recomputation vs. Precomputation Method. First, we brieﬂy discuss the diﬀerence
between the naive recomputation approach and the precomputation method, where the former
serves as a base for the latter. The conﬁguration of the sampling points is the same for both attack
methods, i.e., an adversary stores λ · 2g−σ sampling points over the whole graph with a constant
distance of 2σ state words between each other. For the naive approach, the sampling points already
determine the required memory for an adversary, whereas the precomputation method allows to
use additional memory in each layer to speed-up the recomputation. In Table 9.3, we show the
memory requirement for both attacks depending on the garlic g and depth λ. Note that the values
shown for the precomputation method are given by the maximum additional memory which is
required within one layer. For comparison, we also include the memory requirement for one layer
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when conducting the naive recomputation approach which solely consists of the sampling points.
For simplicity, we assume H = H ′ so that all state words are of n bits in size. Therefore, the values
for the precomputation method given in Table 9.3 denote the number of state words which have to
be stored (excluding the ﬁxed sampling points).
λ = 2 λ = 3
Attack Graph g = 18 g = 21 g = 18 g = 21
Precomp.
BRGgλ 2
11.98 213.98 211.98 211.98
GRG2gλ 2
14.95 216.98 217.95 219.98
GRG3gλ 2
17.95 220.98 217.95 220.98
Naive all 213 215 213.58 215.58
Table 9.3: Memory requirement depending on the garlic g, the attack method, the particular graph instance,
and the depth λ. All values refer to the maximum memory required within one layer.
From Table 9.3, we can deduce that the precomputation method is highly optimized for the ap-
plication to a BRGgλ. We observed that for λ ∈ {2, 3}, the instance given by a GRG3gλ massively
thwarts an adversary since its memory savings are negligible. For example, for g = 18 and λ = 2, it
would have to store 212 state words for the ﬁxed sampling points plus 217.95 additional state words,
leading to a total amount of about 217.97 state words. The same holds for a GRG2g3, whereas at
least some memory is saved when λ = 2. For the sake of completeness, the relative costs (penalties)
of a naive recomputation and a precomputation attack on the instances given above are shown in
Table 9.4. Considering the naive approach, the penalties do not diﬀer between the graph instances
since the underlying structure is given by a permutation, i.e., all values from the previous layer are
used to compute the current layer.
λ = 2 λ = 3
Attack Graph g = 18 g = 21 g = 18 g = 21
Precomp.
BRGgλ 32.33 64.33 47.81 95.87
GRG2gλ 150.11 334.08 1051.77 2344.44
GRG3gλ 352.75 1387.33 912.11 3666.58
Naive all 352.75 1387.41 5895.25 45411.00
Table 9.4: Penalties depending on the garlic g, the attack method, the particular graph instance, and the
depth λ.
Even with the enormous extra costs in terms of memory, the application of the precomputation
method to a GRGℓgλ leads to a signiﬁcantly higher penalty in comparison to the same attack on a
BRGgλ. Thus, we can conclude that the instances of Fλ given by a GRGℓ
g
λ provide a strong resistance
to the TMTO attacks introduced by Biryukov et al. Nevertheless, there might exist attacks which are
speciﬁcally focused on such instances, hence, reducing the penalty of an adversary. At the moment,
we are not aware of such attacks and leave it as an open research question.
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Impact of the Random Layer Γ. As shown in Algorithms 6 and 10, the function Γ overwrites
2⌈3g/4⌉ randomly chosen state words. With respect to the memory requirement in Table 9.3, it is
intuitive to say that the penalty for a GRGℓgλ will not signiﬁcantly increase since almost the whole
state is already stored. On the other hand, when considering a BRGgλ, one would expect an increased
penalty.
First, we wanted to know if the currently designated position of Γ (invoked before Fλ, see
Algorithm 4) provides the best possible resistance (in comparison to other chosen positions) to the
precomputation attack. Therefore, we set g = 12 (for time reasons), and recomputed the penalties
for diﬀerent positions of Γ within Fλ, for λ ∈ {2, 3}, and the graph instances GRG2122 and GRG3122
as before. Further, we set the public input γ to the salt and ﬁxed it to a constant value (γ = 0). This
as a valid approach since if R is instantiated with a good RNG (e.g., the function xorshift1024star
given in Algorithm 10), all indices computed during the invocation of Γ are pseudorandom. The
penalties depending on the positions of Γ are shown in Table 9.5, where we can observer that placing
the random layer Γ at the third-last position leads to the highest penalty.
Layer Structure
λ = 2 λ = 3
Graph ΓFλ0Fλ1 Fλ0ΓFλ1 ΓFλ0Fλ1Fλ2 Fλ0ΓFλ1Fλ2 Fλ0Fλ1ΓFλ2
BRG12λ 33.34 31.84 62.44 103.81 81.27
GRG212λ 62.02 61.39 270.68 306.48 288.73
GRG312λ 79.68 81.06 248.48 264.10 257.30
Table 9.5: Penalties depending on the position of Γ within Fλ, the particular graph instance, where Fλi
denotes the i-th layer of Fλ and g = 12, and the depth λ ∈ {2, 3}.
Thus, we assumed the conﬁgurations ΓFλ0Fλ1 and Fλ0ΓFλ1Fλ2 when computing the impact of the
random layer, where we choose g ∈ {18, 21} for the garlic as before. Our ﬁrst intuition was conﬁrmed
by the results shown in Table 9.6. Note that due to time issues, the values for the precomputation
method with λ = 3 and g = 21 are rough estimations based on the values for λ = 3 in Table 9.4.
λ = 2 λ = 3
Attack Graph g = 18 g = 21 g = 18 g = 21
Precomp.
BRGgλ 54.11 107.36 417.03 836.24
GRG2gλ 169.18 374.66 1386.31 3090.14
GRG3gλ 365.40 1411.90 1163.19 4675.89
Naive all 376.59 1432.87 6456.97 47581.00
Table 9.6: Penalties depending on the garlic g, the attack method, the particular graph instance extended
by a random layer Γ, and the depth λ ∈ {2, 3}.
By comparing the values presented in Table 9.4 and Table 9.6, we observed that the penalties
increase monotonically only for a BRGgλ. Thus, we can conclude that the additional invocation
of Γ helps substantially against precomputation attacks since the penalties given for a BRGgλ are
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still much smaller than that of a GRGℓgλ. Nevertheless, the main aspect of including Γ in our core
function flap was the increased resistance to ASIC-based adversaries, and not to thwart TMTO
attacks. Furthermore, the penalties presented in Table 9.6 hold only if an adversary does not have
the additional 2⌈3g/4⌉ · k bits of memory available.
9.2.2 Resistance to Side-Channel Attacks
Straightforward implementations of all presented instances of Fλ follow neither a password-de-
pendent memory-access pattern nor password-dependent branches. Therefore, those instances are
resistant to CTAs (see Deﬁnition 3.9) as long as H and H ′ provide resistance to CTAs.
When considering GCAs (see Deﬁnition 3.10), we have to consider only the functions GHSgλ (see
Algorithm 8) and DBHgλ (see Algorithm 9) since all instances of GHS
g
λ diﬀer only in their indexing
function but none of them requires a password-dependent input. Both hashing operations maintain
the arrays v and r, which are overwritten multiple times (depending on the choice of λ). Assume
g = 3 and λ = 1. Then, for GHS32, the array v is overwritten twice and the array r once, whereas for
DBH32, v is overwritten ten times and r nine times. Thus, even for λ = 1, both algorithms provide
resistance to GCAs. Furthermore, it follows that any variant of Catena with some fixed λ ≥ 2 is
at least as resistant to GCAs as the same variant with λ − 1 layers in the absence of a malicious
garbage collector.
The resistance to WGCAs (see Deﬁnition 3.11) is provided by two facts. First, the password
pwd is overwritten immediately after it is processed (see Line 1 of Algorithm 3). Second, the value
x← H(t || pwd || s) (which also could be fetched from memory to launch a WGCA), is overwritten
by the call to flap in Line 2 of Algorithm 3 using only ⌈glow/2⌉.
Remark 9.12. Note that CTAs, GCAs, and WGCAs have even more severe consequences.
Not only do they speed-up regular password-recovery attacks where the password hash is already
in possession of the adversary, but also enable an adversary A to recover a password without
knowing the password hash at all, e.g., by verifying the memory-access pattern (CTA) or reading
valuable information from the memory (GCA and WGCA).
9.2.3 Pseudorandomness
For proving the pseudorandomness of the underlying graph-based hashing operations, we refer to
the PRF security (see Deﬁnition 3.2). Therefore, we set H = H ′ and model the internally used hash
function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n as a random oracle. The upper bounds presented in that very section
depend on the number of calls to H. We start by considering the function flap, consisting of its
initialization step (including the call to Hinit; see Lines 1-3 of Algorithm 4), a call to the option Γ
(see Line 4), the memory-hard function Fλ (see Line 5), and the option Φ (see Line 6).
Theorem 9.13 (PRF Security of flap). Let q denote the number of queries made by an
adversary and sև {0, 1}|s|. Furthermore, let H be modeled as a random oracle. Then,
AdvPRFflap (q) ≤
4q2
2n−2g
+AdvCOLLΓ (q · g) +AdvCOLLFλ (q · g) +AdvCOLLΦ (q · g).
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Proof. By looking at Algorithm 4, we can observe that the PRF security of flap is determined
by the probability of a collision of the form flap(g, x, γ) = flap(g, x′, γ) for x 6= x′. On the other
hand, that implies a collision for H. We upper bound the collision probability for H by deducing
the total amount of invocations of H per query, where the respective bounds for Γ, Φ, and Fλ are
given in Theorems 9.16, 9.17, and 9.14 or 9.15, depending on the particular instance of Fλ. Thus, it
remains to upper bound the collision probability of H for the initialization step of flap. Since we set
H = H ′, the function Hinit (see Algorithm 5) requires only two calls to H since for n = k it holds
that ℓ = 2k/n = 2. In addition, there are 2g invocations of H in Lines 2-3 of Algorithm 4. Since
we model H as a random oracle, we can upper bound the collision probability for the initialization
step for q queries by
(q · (2g + 2))2
2n
≤ 4q
2
2n−2g
.
Thus, we have
AdvPRFflap(q) ≤
4q2
2n−2g
+AdvCOLLΓ (q · g) +AdvCOLLFλ (q · g) +AdvCOLLΦ (q · g).

Next, we consider the generic hashing scheme GHSgλ and the hashing operation DBH
g
λ as they cover
all instances of Fλ which we have presented earlier in this chapter.
Theorem 9.14 (Collision Security of GHSgλ). Let q denote the number of queries made
by an adversary and sև {0, 1}|s|. Furthermore, let H be modeled as a random oracle. Then,
AdvCOLLGHSg
λ
(q) ≤ (q · λ)
2
2n−2g
.
Proof. It is easy to see from Algorithm 8 that a collision GHSgλλ(x) = GHS
g
λ(x
′) for x 6= x′ implies
a collision for H. We upper bound the collision probability for H by deducing the total amount of
invocations of H per query. There are λ · 2g invocations in Lines 10-14 of Algorithm 8. Since H is
modeled as a random oracle, we can upper bound the collision probability for q queries by
(q · λ · 2g)2
2n
≤ (q · λ)
2
2n−2g
.
Thus, our claim follows. 
Now, we analyze the collision resistance of DBHgλ. Again, we model the internally used hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n as a random oracle.
Theorem 9.15 (Collision Security of DBHgλ). Let q denote the number of queries made
by an adversary and sև {0, 1}|s|. Furthermore, let H be modeled as a random oracle. Then,
AdvCOLLDBHg
λ
(q) ≤ (q · λ · g)
2
2n−2g−3
.
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Proof. It is easy to see from Algorithm 9 that a collision DBHgλ(x) = DBH
g
λ(x
′) for x 6= x′ implies
either an input or an output collision for H. For our analysis, we replace the random oracle H by
Ht(x) := H(truncaten(x)) that truncates any input to n bits before hashing. Thus, any collision in
the ﬁrst n bits of the input of H in Lines 3 and 5 of Algorithm 9 leads to a collision of the output
of Ht, regardless of the remaining inputs.
Output Collision. In this case, we upper bound the collision probability for H by deducing
the total amount of invocations of Ht per query. There are 2g invocations of Ht in Lines 2-3
(initialization) of Algorithm 4. In addition, there are λ · (2g − 1) · 2g invocations in Lines 3-5 of
Algorithm 9 leading to a total of λ · 2g · 2g invocations of Ht. Since H (and thus Ht) is modeled as
a random oracle, we can upper bound the collision probability for q queries by
(q · λ · 2g · 2g)2
2n
≤ (q · λ · g)
2
2n−2g−2
.
Input Collision. In this case we have to take into account that an input collision for distinct
queries a and b in Lines 3 and 5 of Algorithm 9 can occur:
va2g−1 ⊕ va0 = vb2g−1 ⊕ vb0 (Algorithm 9, Line 3)
or
rai−1 ⊕ vai = rbi−1 ⊕ vbi (Algorithm 9, Line 5).
For each query, this can happen λ · (2g − 1) · 2g times. Note that all values vi and ri are outputs
from the random oracle Ht, except the initial value v0. Hence, we can upper bound the collision
probability for this event by
(q · λ · (2g − 1) · 2g)2
2n
≤ (q · λ · g)
2
2n−2g−2
.
Our claim follows from the union bound. 
Finally, we present the collision security of Γ and Φ.
Theorem 9.16 (Collision Security of Γ). Let q denote the number of queries made by an
adversary and sև {0, 1}|s|. Furthermore, let H be modeled as a random oracle. Then,
AdvCOLLΓ (q) ≤
q2
2n−⌈3g/4⌉
.
Proof. The function Γ (see Algorithm 6) overwrites 2⌈3g/4⌉ randomly chosen state words vi. By
similar arguments as in the proof for Theorem 9.14, we can upper bound the collision probability
for q queries by (
q · 2⌈3g/4⌉)2
2n
≤ q
2
2n−⌈3g/4⌉
.

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Theorem 9.17 (Collision Security of Φ). Let q denote the number of queries made by an
adversary and sև {0, 1}|s|. Furthermore, let H be modeled as a random oracle. Then,
AdvCOLLΦ (q) ≤
q2
2n−2g
.
Proof. The function Φ (see Algorithm 6) overwrites 2g randomly chosen state words vi. By similar
arguments as in the proof for Theorem 9.14, we can upper bound the collision probability for q
queries by
(q · 2g)2
2n
≤ q
2
2n−2g
.

Remark 9.18. The proofs in this section clearly hold when H = H ′, which is our recommen-
dation for Catena-KG. For the case H 6= H ′, the PRF security of Catena may be weakened
due to a poor choice for H ′, e.g., the choice H ′(x) = c for all possible values x and a fixed
constant c would lead to the same password hash independently from any input parameter.
However, the instances of H ′ used in our recommended instances of Catena (see Chapter 10)
are well-analyzed and should have only a negligible effect (if at all) on the PRF security of
Catena.
9.3 Instances of H and H ′
Since the choice of H has a signiﬁcant impact on the security of an instance of Catena (see
Theorems 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 9.14, and 9.15), the criteria are straightforward: H has to be a cryptographic
hash function (see Deﬁnition 3.3). On the other hand, the function H ′ can be a reduced variant
of H or any other reasonable secure7 function which is able to compress two k-bit input values to
one k-bit output value.8 In total, we discuss eight instances9 and compare them regarding to their
throughput in gigabyte per second (GB/s) and their running time when employed in one of the
recommended instances of Catena, i.e., Catena-Dragonfly (see Section 10 for details about
Catena-Dragonfly and Section 9.3.4 for the comparison).
For the practical application of Catena, we looked ﬁrst for a hash function with a 512-bit (64
byte) output since this often complies with the size of a cache line on common CPUs (e.g., [73]). In
any case, we assume that both output sizes of H and H ′ and the cache-line size are powers of two.
So, if they diﬀer, the bigger number is a multiple of the smaller one. Inspired by Argon2 [52], we
also provide instances of H ′ with a larger output size, i.e., k > n with e.g., n = 512 and k = 8192
bits. This allows an instance of Catena to ﬁll the memory signiﬁcantly faster.
7For example, H′ must provide resistance to side-channel attacks if that is a requirement on Catena. Moreover,
H′ must not be a constant function or the identity. In general, H′ should be an entropy-preserving one-way function.
8Note that the restriction H = H′ is only given for the usage of Catena as a KDF.
9Note that we do not provide an extra paragraph for SHA-512 since it is an already well-known standard.
Moreover, it is well-analyzed [27, 124, 154], standardized, and widely used, e.g., in sha512crypt, the common PS in
several Linux distributions [82].
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Remark 9.19. Note that choosing H 6= H ′ has the additional side effect of frustrating well-
funded adversaries who use expensive non-reprogrammable hardware. Thus, for every instance
of Catena using different instances of H and H ′, the adversaries would have to buy new
hardware, significantly increasing their costs.
Remark 9.20. The security of Catena relies not only on the performance of a specific hash
function, but also on the size of the underlying graph (GGSgλ or DBG
g
λ), i.e., the depth λ and
the width g. Thus, even in the case of a secure but very fast cryptographic hash function, which
may be counter-intuitive for a PS, one can adapt the security parameter to reach the desired
computational effort.
For two instances of H ′, we also discuss the functions GB of BlaMka [244] as a possible variant
of the underlying permutation. For simplicity, we denote by GO the underlying permutation of the
original BLAKE2b and by GL the underlying permutation of Lyra2 [244]. Note that GB is a variant
of GL extended by 32-bit multiplications.
9.3.1 BLAKE2b and BLAKE2b-1
Our recommended instance of H is BLAKE2b [33] (see Algorithm 11), which possesses a block size
of 1024 bits with 512 bits of output. Thus, it can process two input blocks within one compression
function call. Its high performance in software allows to use a large value for the garlic g, resulting in
higher memory eﬀort than for, e.g., SHA3-512 [48]. We used BLAKE2b (consisting of twelve rounds)
also as a basis of H ′ by introducing BLAKE2b-1, which is actually a single round of BLAKE2b
including its ﬁnalization (see Algorithm 12). The diﬀerence between the function BLAKE2b-1 and
the original BLAKE2b can be seen in Algorithms 11 and 12, where the lengths are given in bytes.
Following from Line 1 in Algorithm 11, BLAKE2b initializes the internal state S in every invo-
cation, whereas BLAKE2b-1 does not. Thus, for Catena, S is only (re)initialized when computing
the ﬁrst value of each layer of the underlying graph structure using H as speciﬁed for example in
Algorithms 8 and 9. This assures that twelve invocations of BLAKE2b-1 are as close as possible to
the original BLAKE2b and also saves computations as shown in Table 9.7. To further ensure this
similarity, we compute the round index as shown in Line 5 of Algorithm 12.
Remark 9.21. Note that we iterate H ′ = BLAKE2b-1 thousands of times and have imple-
mented it in a compatible way to H, i.e., twelve times the application of H ′ (excluding finaliza-
tion except for the last step) is similar to one times the application of H. Thus, we (informally)
assume that twelve times the application of H ′ provides similar security as one invocation of
H.
The functions blake2b_init, increment_counter, and set_last_block are used as speciﬁed
in the reference implementation of BLAKE2b [245]. For BLAKE2b-1, we ﬁxed the input length to
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Algorithm 11 BLAKE2b
Require: I, ℓ,m ⊲ input array, input length, output length
Ensure: h ⊲ hash value
procedure BLAKE2b(I, ℓ,m)
1: blake2b_init(S,m) ⊲ init state
2: for i = 0, . . . , ⌊ℓ/128⌋ − 1 do
3: S.buf ← I[i]
4: S.buflen ← 128
5: increment_counter(S, S.buflen)
6: compress(S)
7: S.buf ← I[⌊l/128⌋] || 0∗
8: S.buflen ← ℓ mod 128
9: increment_counter(S,S.buflen)
10: set_last_block(S)
11: compress(S)
12: h← S.h
13: return h
Algorithm 12 BLAKE2b-1
Require: i1, i2, j ⊲ ﬁrst input, second input, vertex index
Ensure: h ⊲ hash value
procedure BLAKE2b-1(i1, i2, j)
1: S.buf ← i1 || i2
2: S.buflen ← 128
3: increment_counter(S, S.buflen)
4: set_last_block(S)
5: r ← j mod 12
6: compress(S, r)
7: h← S.h
8: return h
Algorithm Cycles per Byte
BLAKE2b 9.81
BLAKE2b-1 2.44
BLAKE2b-1 w/o initialization 0.86
Table 9.7: Benchmark comparison of BLAKE2b-1, BLAKE2b-1 without initialization, and BLAKE2b.
Timings are measured on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3930M CPU @ 3.20GHz with Turbo Boost and Hyper-
Threading enabled. The values denote the median of 1001 runs processing a single message block, each.
128 bytes and neglect the padding since the size of the inputs never changes when using BLAKE2b-1
within Catena. For the sake of completeness, we also show the core functions of BLAKE2b and
BLAKE2b-1, i.e., the functions compress from Algorithms 13 and 14, where σ denotes the message
schedule and GO [33] the underlying permutation. There are mainly two diﬀerences for the function
compress of BLAKE2b-1 in comparison to that of BLAKE2b: (1) it requires the round index r as
input and (2) the for loop of the original BLAKE2b (see Lines 5-14 of Algorithm 11) is invoked
only once to behave like a single round.
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Algorithm 13 Function compress of BLAKE2b
Require: S ⊲ BLAKE2b state
Ensure: S ⊲ updated BLAKE2b state
procedure compress(S)
1: v[0 . . . 7]← S.h
2: v[8 . . . 15]← IV
3: v[12, 13]← v[12, 13]⊕ S.t
4: v[14, 15]← v[14, 15]⊕ S.f
5: for r = 0, . . . , 11 do
6: s[0 . . . 15]← σ[r mod 10][0 . . . 15]
7: v ← GO(v, 0, 4, 8, 12, S.buf[s[0]], S.buf[s[1]])
8: v ← GO(v, 1, 5, 9, 13, S.buf[s[2]], S.buf[s[3]])
9: v ← GO(v, 2, 6, 10, 14, S.buf[s[4]], S.buf[s[5]])
10: v ← GO(v, 3, 7, 11, 15, S.buf[s[6]], S.buf[s[7]])
11: v ← GO(v, 0, 5, 10, 15, S.buf[s[8]], S.buf[s[9]])
12: v ← GO(v, 1, 6, 11, 12, S.buf[s[10]], S.buf[s[11]])
13: v ← GO(v, 2, 7, 8, 13, S.buf[s[12]], S.buf[s[13]])
14: v ← GO(v, 3, 4, 9, 14, S.buf[s[14]], S.buf[s[15]])
15: S.h← S.h⊕ v[0 . . . 7]⊕ v[8 . . . 15]
Algorithm 14 Function compress of BLAKE2b-1
Require: S, r ⊲ BLAKE2b state, round index
Ensure: S ⊲ updated BLAKE2b state
procedure compress(S, r)
1: v[0 . . . 7]← S.h
2: v[8 . . . 15]← IV
3: v[12, 13]← v[12, 13]⊕ S.t
4: v[14, 15]← v[14, 15]⊕ S.f
5: s[0 . . . 15]← σ[r mod 10][0 . . . 15]
6: v ← GO(v, 0, 4, 8, 12, S.buf[s[0]], S.buf[s[1]])
7: v ← GO(v, 1, 5, 9, 13, S.buf[s[2]], S.buf[s[3]])
8: v ← GO(v, 2, 6, 10, 14, S.buf[s[4]], S.buf[s[5]])
9: v ← GO(v, 3, 7, 11, 15, S.buf[s[6]], S.buf[s[7]])
10: v ← GO(v, 0, 5, 10, 15, S.buf[s[8]], S.buf[s[9]])
11: v ← GO(v, 1, 6, 11, 12, S.buf[s[10]], S.buf[s[11]])
12: v ← GO(v, 2, 7, 8, 13, S.buf[s[12]], S.buf[s[13]])
13: v ← GO(v, 3, 4, 9, 14, S.buf[s[14]], S.buf[s[15]])
14: S.h← S.h⊕ v[0 . . . 7]⊕ v[8 . . . 15]
9.3.2 Compression Function of Argon2
In this section, we consider the underlying compression function of the PHC winner Argon2 [52]. The
function CF10 is built upon a permutation P using the round function GL as deﬁned in Lyra2 [244]
and is formally deﬁned in Algorithm 15. Note that the function GL, in comparison to the original
round function GO of BLAKE2b, considers neither the message schedule σ nor processing the
message input. The input state words are written directly to the internal 256-bit state (a, b, c, d)
10Within the specification of Argon2, this function is called G, but since we use G already for the variants of the
round function of BLAKE2b, we rename it here to CF.
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Algorithm 15 Compression Function CF of Argon2 [52]
Require: X,Y ⊲ two 8192-bit values fetched from memory
Ensure: Z ⊲ intermediate hash (8192 bits)
procedure CF(X,Y )
1: R← X ⊕ Y
2: for i = 0, . . . , 7 do
3: (Q8i, . . . , Q8i+7)← P (R8i, . . . , R8i+7) ⊲ updating the rows
4: for i = 0, . . . , 7 do
5: (Qi, Qi+8, . . . , Qi+56)← P (Ri, Ri+8 . . . , Ri+56) ⊲ updating the columns
6: Z ← R⊕Q
7: return Z
Algorithm 16 Functions GL (left) and GB (right)
Require: a, b, c, d ⊲ 256-bit state
Ensure: a, b, c, d ⊲ updated state
procedure GL(a, b, c, d)
1: a← a+ b
2: d← (d⊕ a)≫ 32
3: c← c+ d
4: b← (b⊕ c)≫ 24
5: a← a+ b
6: d← (d⊕ a)≫ 16
7: c← c+ d
8: b← (b⊕ c)≫ 63
Require: a, b, c, d ⊲ 256-bit state
Ensure: a, b, c, d ⊲ updated state
procedure GB(a, b, c, d)
1: a← a+ b+ 2 · lsw(a) · lsw(b)
2: d← (d⊕ a)≫ 32
3: c← c+ d+ 2 · lsw(c) · lsw(d)
4: b← (b⊕ c)≫ 24
5: a← a+ b+ 2 · lsw(a) · lsw(b)
6: d← (d⊕ a)≫ 16
7: c← c+ d+ 2 · lsw(c) · lsw(d)
8: b← (b⊕ c)≫ 63
and then processed as shown in Algorithm 16.
The function CF takes two 8192-bit values X,Y as input and outputs a 8192-bit value Z. The
value R = X ⊕ Y (see Line 1 of Algorithm 15) is represented as an 8 × 8 matrix consisting of 64
128-bit values R0, . . . , R63 ordered from left to right and top to down. First, all rows are updated
using the permutation P generating an intermediate matrix Q (Lines 2 and 3). Then, all columns
of Q are updated, again using P (Lines 4 and 5). The output of CF is then given by the XOR
operation of the input matrix R and the intermediate matrix Q. Based on the large state of CF, it
is possible to ﬁll memory fast, e.g., about 1 GB memory is ﬁlled in less than one second [52]. For a
formal deﬁnition of P , we refer to the speciﬁcation of Argon2 [52].
Even if the function CF requires two calls to the underlying round function of BLAKE2b to
process 1024 bits, it is still signiﬁcantly faster than BLAKE2b-1 (see Table 9.8 in Section 9.3.4).
The speed-up stems from the fact that CF processes 16384 bits per invocation, whereas BLAKE2b-1
processes only 1024 bits. Thus, the usage of BLAKE2b-1 requires signiﬁcantly more loading opera-
tions in comparison to the usage of CF when processing inputs of equal size.
Remark 9.22. Note that we evaluate another instance of H ′ in Section 9.3.4, called Pcompress.
This is a modification of the permutation P , where we split the output of P into two 512-bit
halves and combine them using the XOR operation. This is a simple way to build a compression
function out of the permutation P . We introduce Pcompress for comparison with BLAKE2b-1,
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H ′ Garlic (g) Time (s) Throughput (GB/s)
BLAKE2b 21 1.54 0.08
BLAKE2b-1 (GO) 21 0.37 0.34
CF (GB) 17 0.26 0.49
CF (GL) 17 0.18 0.69
Pcompress (GB) 21 0.43 0.30
Pcompress (GL) 21 0.33 0.39
SHA-512 21 4.04 0.03
Table 9.8: Measurements of Catena-Dragonfly for different hash functions H ′, where we fix the memory
usage to 128 MB, λ = 2, and both options Γ and Φ are disabled.
which includes the regular message schedule, the initialization, and finalization of the round
function of BLAKE2b (as shown in Algorithm 12), whereas Pcompress does not. Nevertheless,
we do not consider it as a recommended instance of H ′ since it will never achieve the same
throughput as the function CF due to the smaller size of the state words.
9.3.3 BlaMka
The function GB was introduced by the authors of Lyra2 [244]. It described a slightly adjusted
variant of GL (see Algorithm 16 for a comparison) and is used in Lyra2 as the underlying permu-
tation of a sponge-based structure. Due to the missing cryptanalysis of BlaMka, the authors do
not recommend its usage. Nevertheless, since it consists of a neat combination of ARX (Addition,
Rotation, XOR) and integer multiplication, we also consider it as an alternative to GL.
The only diﬀerence between the functions GL and GB is that each addition a + b is replaced
by a+ b+ 2 · lsw(a) · lsw(b), where lsw(x) denotes the least signiﬁcant 32-bit word of x. The idea
behind the so-called multiplication hardening is to provide a similar performance for hardware- and
software-based adversaries [243, 246].
9.3.4 Comparison
We provide performance values based on the instance of the underlying hash function H ′. All mea-
surements shown in Table 9.8 are done using the tool Catena-Variants written by Schmidt [113]
and its extended version by Schilling [138]. Due to the fact that the compression function of Argon2
(CF) supports state words of k > n bits, we ﬁx the memory usage to 128 MB and let the garlic g
to be variable. Moreover, we ﬁxed λ = 2 and disabled both options Γ and Φ. The measurements
reﬂect the median of 101 runs using an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3930K CPU @ 3.20GHz with Turbo
Boost and Hyper-Threading enabled. For SHA-512, we used the implementation from the OpenSSL
version 1.0.2d (9th July 2015).
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9.4 Summary
We have shown and discussed several instantiations of the underlying hash function H ′ as well as
of the graph-based structure Fλ. Furthermore, we considered instances of the two options Γ and Φ.
Based on the presented instances and their variety of properties, we are now able to combine them
with the goal of constructing suitable instances of Catena.
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Catena – Instances of the Framework
A man provided with paper, pencil, and rubber,
and subject to strict discipline, is in effect a
universal machine.
Alan M. Turing
C
atena is a highly ﬂexible Password-Scrambling Framework (PSF). More detailed, an in-
stance of Catena is deﬁned by the following parameters, which can be freely adapted to
form a variant of Catena suitable for a particular application:
• a memory-cost parameter g (minimum: glow, maximum: ghigh),
• time-cost parameter λ (depth of the underlying graph used as instance of Fλ),
• a cryptographic hash function H,
• a hash function H ′,
• a memory-hard function Fλ,
• a password-independent option Γ (and its public input γ), and
• a password-dependent option Φ (and its secret input µ).
This enables Catena to maximize the defense against speciﬁc adversaries, their capabilities and
goals, and to cope with a high variation of hardware and constraints on the side of the defender.
Before we present our recommendations, we brieﬂy discuss the common parameter choices, the
naming when using an instance as a KDF, and certain security-related facts.
Common Parameter Choices. For all instances, we set glow = ghigh, γ = s, and µ to the
output of Fλ. The particular choices of g and λ are done while focusing on COTS systems. The
recommended parameters for keyed password hashing are exactly the same as they are for password
hashing, plus an additional 128-bit key. The unique identiﬁer V (used as input of the tweak com-
putation, see Section 7.2) is always given by the string representation of the suﬃx of a particular
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instance, e.g., we set V =“Dragonﬂy-Full” for Catena-Dragonfly-Full and V =“Butterﬂy” for
Catena-Butterfly. For all but the default instances of Catena, the indexing function R used
within Φ simply returns the g LSBs of its input, whereas for the default instances, R is given by
xorshift1024star.1 Finally, we set the maximal running time for password hashing to 0.5 s and
for the usage as a KDF to 5 s.
Key-Derivation Function. An instance of Catena can be used as a KDF if (1) the cost para-
meters are adapted accordingly and (2) if H = H ′ holds. An instance that uses H = H ′ contains
the suﬃx ’-FULL’ in its name.
Security. All variants presented and recommended in this section provide preimage resistance as
well as resistance to Weak Garbage-Collector Attacks (WGCAs). Resistance to Garbage-Collector
Attacks (GCAs) is only a mandatory requirement for instances of Catena for password hashing
since an adversary launching a GCA on an instance of Catena must already have access to the
RAM used by this particular instance. Thus, reading the internal state of an instance of Catena
(required for launching a GCA) is usually as easy as obtaining the key generated by this instance.
Nevertheless, if a variant uses the option Φ, it directly becomes resistant to GCAs since the internal
state is overwritten at least twice: ﬁrst, during the call to Fλ and second, during the call to Φ. To
obtain memory hardness of an instance of Catena, it is suﬃcient to choose a memory-hard instance
of Fλ. If one would like an instance of Catena to thwart parallel-working adversaries by providing
Sequential Memory Hardness (SMH), we recommend to use the option Φ. If an instance of Catena
should be used as a KDF, it must provide PRF security. Fortunately, as long as H is a cryptographic
hash function and it holds that H = H ′, PRF security is already provided by the framework itself,
as shown in Theorems 8.2 and 8.3. The resistance to adversaries able to utilize ASICs or FPGAs
mainly depends on whether Γ or Φ is enabled or not. Finally, the decision for a particular instance
should always considering the most probably occurring type of adversary in mind.
Remark 10.1. All instances of Catena set γ = s, which may leak as a result of a Cache-
Timing Attack (CTA). Usually, the salt is not secret and this is not an issue. But, in some
special cases, an application may require to keep the salt secret. In that case, we suggest to
choose any fixed random value as γ. Consider, e.g., an encrypted file system with different
partitions. Naturally, the salt used to generate the secret key is different for each partition. If
the security requirement is to hide which partition has been mounted, the salt must not be used
for γ.
In the following, we ﬁrst provide the default instances of Catena as they were submitted to the
Password Hashing Competition (PHC), and second, introduce four more instances suitable for dif-
ferent applications.
10.1 Default Instances (Catena-Dragonfly, Catena-Butterfly)
For Catena-Dragonfly and Catena-Butterfly, we instantiate the function Fλ with BRH
g
λ
(see Section 9.1.1) and DBHgλ (see Section 9.1.4), respectively. Therefore, all variants of Catena-
1The usage of xorshift1024star is due to historical reasons since the choice was made at a time when we were
not aware of the second approach.
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Dragonfly provide only memory hardness (see Deﬁnition 3.5), whereas variants of Catena-
Butterfly satisfy λ-memory hardness (see Deﬁnition 3.6), i.e., the latter provide higher resistance
to TMTO attacks. Since the number of vertices is given by 2 · 2g for a BRGgλ and by 2g · 2g for
a DBGgλ, a variant of Catena-Dragonfly runs signiﬁcantly faster than a variant of Catena-
Butterfly, allowing to allocate more memory, i.e., a larger number of state words. Therefore,
Catena-Dragonfly should be used in settings, where the defender can aﬀord to allocate much
memory without any problems and as a technique to maximize the cost of password cracking even for
high-budget adversaries. On the other hand, Catena-Butterfly should be used in settings, where
the defender has limited memory available, or as a defense against typical “memory-constrained”
adversaries that cannot aﬀord 2g units of memory for many parallel cores, and thus, would suﬀer
from the resistance to TMTO attacks.
In total, six default instances were submitted to the PHC (see Table 10.1). The versions Catena-
Dragonfly-Full and Catena-Butterfly-Full instantiated with the operations BRH182 and
DBH144 , respectively, show the impact of the choice H
′ = H = BLAKE2b in comparison to H =
BLAKE2b and H ′ = BLAKE2b-1. We can observe that, while adhering to the maximal running
time for password hashing, i.e., 0.5 s, the choice of H ′ = BLAKE2b-1 allows to choose four to eight
times the memory compared to the full variants. For completeness, we also provide two instances for
the usage as a KDF, i.e., Catena-Dragonfly-Full and Catena-Butterfly-Full which use
the operations BRH222 and DBH
17
4 , respectively. None of the default instances enable the option Φ
since this would render them vulnerable to CTAs, where avoiding those attacks was one of the main
goals when submitting Catena to the PHC. Resistance to the precomputation attacks by Biryukov
and Khovratovich [55] is only provided for instances using the hashing operation DBHgλ, whereas
the resistance to GCAs is provided by all default instances.
10.2 Catena-Stonefly – An ASIC-Resistant Instance of Catena
For password hashing, strong resistance to ASIC-based adversaries can be achieved (among other
things) by a memory-access pattern that depends on the password (providing SMH), a public input,
and multiplication hardening. The password-dependent memory-access pattern is realized by the
option Φ. We highly recommend to place the Φ at the end of flap since then, the advantage of an
adversary launching a CTA against Catena is negligible. We further recommend to use a function
conducting a public-input-dependent memory-access at the start of flap. Then, an ASIC-based
adversary would have to copy the whole state to and from the hardware if it aims to compute the
underlying memory-hard function Fλ on the ASIC itself (which would be intuitive since it follows
a password-independent memory-access pattern and thus, can be computed eﬃciently there). For
that purpose, we recommend the option Γ, where the public input is given by the salt as mentioned
above. Finally, multiplication hardening is provided by using the function GB (see Section 9.3.3) as
the underlying permutation of H ′. For performance reasons, we instantiate Fλ with a BRG
18
2 since
we do not aim to provide full resistance to TMTO attacks for this instance. Catena-Stonefly and
Catena-Stonefly-Full can be seen as the Catena complements to the data-dependent variant
of the PHC winner Argon2, i.e., Argon2d [52].
10.3 Catena-Horsefly – A High-Throughput Instance of Catena
Even if we aim for maximal performance and memory usage, each instance of Catena should still
provide a certain level of security. For H ′, we opted for the compression function CF of Argon2
using GL (see Section 9.3.2). The underlying graph-based function Fλ is instantiated by BRH
19
1 ,
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which is faster than GRH3g1 and DBH
g
1. Be aware that λ = 1 provides high performance but, on
the other hand, allows for GCAs. Therefore, we refer to λ = 2 if GCAs are likely to happen. The
instance presented here would be also suitable for the application in a proof-of-space scenario based
on a challenge-response protocol.
10.4 Catena-Mydasfly – A TMTO-Resistant Instance of Catena
For a tradeoﬀ-resistant instance of Catena, we decided to use a DBG142 for Fλ. This decision is
based on the fact that we want to provide strong resistance to TMTO attacks without enabling an
adversary to launch a CTA on the “ﬁrst part” of flap. To further increase the resistance to TMTO
attacks, we use the option Φ, providing SMH. Since the focus of this instance does not lie in ASIC
resistance, we favor CF with GL over GB as the underlying hash function H ′. Catena-Mydasfly
and Catena-Mydasfly-Full can be seen as the Catena complements to the data-independent
variant of the PHC winner Argon2, i.e., Argon2i [52].
10.5 Catena-Lanternfly – A Hybrid Instance of Catena
Here, we wanted to aim for the best performance while retain suitable security against ASIC-based
adversaries, tradeoﬀ attacks, as well as resistance to CTAs. Therefore, in comparison to Catena-
Stonefly, we disregard the option Φ, but keep the invocation of Γ to provide suﬃcient resistance to
ASICs. We instantiate Fλ by a GRG3172 , which maintains reasonable resistance to precomputation
attacks while still providing acceptable performance (in comparison to a DBGgλ). The hash function
H ′ is instantiated with CF of Argon2 using GB internally, which leads to a good throughput in
terms of memory while providing multiplication-hardening. Catena-Lanternfly and Catena-
Lanternfly-Full can be seen as the Catena complements to the hybrid variant of the PHC
winner Argon2, i.e., Argon2id [52].
In Table 10.1, we list and compare all variants of Catena which we recommend.
Implementation. The latest reference implementation of Catena can be found on
https://github.com/medsec/catena.
Furthermore, we provide Catena-Variants, which allows to construct arbitrary instances of
Catena by choosing the parameters g, λ, H, H ′, Fλ, Γ, and Φ. Catena-Variants can be found
on:
https://github.com/medsec/catena-variants.
It supports also the possibility to change the position of Γ within flap (see Section 9.2.1 for a
discussion about the impact of changing the order).
Finally, a search tool for optimal parameters under given constraints is given by Catena-Axungia,
which can be found on:
https://github.com/medsec/catena-axungia.
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Default Instances
Catena-Dragonfly BRH212 BLAKE2b-1 128 MB 0.38 • • - • - • -
Catena-Dragonfly-Full BRH182 BLAKE2b 16 MB 0.18 • • - • - • -
Catena-Dragonfly-Full BRH222 BLAKE2b 256 MB 3.15 • • - • - • •
Catena-Butterfly DBH164 BLAKE2b-1 4 MB 0.33 LMH • - • • • -
Catena-Butterfly-Full DBH144 BLAKE2b 1 MB 0.41 LMH • - • • • -
Catena-Butterfly-Full DBH174 BLAKE2b 8 MB 3.97 LMH • - • • • •
ASIC-Resistant
Catena-Stonefly BRH182 CF (GB) 256 MB 0.69* SMH • • - - • -
Catena-Stonefly-Full BRH222 BLAKE2b 256 MB 4.41 SMH • • - - • •
High Throughput
Catena-Horsefly BRH191 CF (GL) 512 MB 0.45 • - - • - - -
Catena-Horsefly-Full BRH231 BLAKE2b 512 MB 3.64 • - - • - - •
TMTO-Resistant
Catena-Mydasfly DBH142 CF (GL) 128 MB 0.40 SMH, LMH - • - • • -
Catena-Mydasfly-Full DBH182 BLAKE2b 256 MB 4.40 SMH, LMH - • - • • •
Hybrid
Catena-Lanternfly GRH3172 CF (GB) 128 MB 0.35 • • - • • • -
Catena-Lanternfly-Full GRH3222 BLAKE2b 256 MB 3.66 • • - • • • •
Table 10.1: Comparison of instances of Catena regarding their instances of the underlying primitives,
memory usage, time, memory hardness (SQ = sequential), options, resistance to Cache-Timing Attacks
(CTAs), Precomputation Attacks (PCAs), and Garbage-Collector Attacks (GCAs), and their applicability
as a Key-Derivation Function (KDF). By ’•’, we denote that a property is fulfilled and by ’-’ that it is
not fulfilled. All instances use H = BLAKE2b. The function Γ for the here-mentioned instances is always
called right before Fλ due to the given layer structure. The measurements reflect the median of 101 runs in
each case, using an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3930K CPU @ 3.20GHz with Turbo Boost and Hyper-Threading
enabled. The recommendations were made in 2015 [174], using an older version of clang. Therefore, some
of the currently computed values (marked by ’∗’) exceed the maximum time for password hashing. SMH –
sequential memory hardness, LMH – λ-memory hardness.
10.6 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a comprehensive Catena portfolio including six instances for a wide
variety of applications. For each of these instances, we further provide versions suitable for the
usage as a Key-Derivation Function (KDF). Note that Catena has obtained special recognition of
the Password Hashing Competition (PHC) based on the two instances Catena-Dragonfly and
Catena-Butterfly.2
2The other instances of Catena were published after the PHC.
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Comparison of Modern Password Scramblers
When it is obvious that the goals cannot be
reached, don’t adjust the goals, adjust the action
steps.
Confucius
Overview of Modern Password Scramblers
and their Resistance to Garbage-Collector Attacks
A
fter introducing the Password-Scrambling Framework (PSF) Catena and certain instances,
we obviously wanted to see how those instances perform in comparison to other modern
password scramblers, i.e., the (non-withdrawn) submissions to the PHC and scrypt. In this
chapter, the considered algorithms are analyzed with regards to their functional properties (e.g.,
Client-Independent Update (CIU) and Server Relief (SR)), their security properties (e.g., memory
hardness and resistance to Cache-Timing Attacks (CTAs)), their general properties (e.g., amount of
memory required), and their ﬂexibility (i.e., is the PS designed to replace the underlying algorithms?)
Next, we provide a brief discussion for each candidate of the PHC regarding to their resistance to
Garbage-Collector Attacks (GCAs) and Weak Garbage-Collector Attacks (WGCAs). We close this
chapter with a discussion on the Parallel Random-Oracle Model (pROM) introduced by Alwen and
Serbinenko [23]. Before we go on with the comparison, we brieﬂy introduce two types of memory-hard
password scramblers which are distinguished by their corresponding memory-handling.
Type-A: Allocating a huge amount of memory which is rarely overwritten.
Type-B: Allocating a reasonable amount of memory which is overwritten multiple times.
Algorithms following Type-A usually aim at providing decent resistance to dedicated password-
cracking hardware, i.e., ASICs and FPGAs. However, the fact that the memory locations are over-
written rarely can render those algorithms vulnerable to GCAs. On the other hand, algorithms
following Type-B have the goal to thwart GPU-based attacks by forcing a high amount of cache
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misses during the computation of the password hash. Naturally, those algorithms provide some
built-in protection against GCAs. In general, while implementing cryptographic algorithms, it is
advised to remove any critical data from memory as soon as possible (latest after the termination
of the algorithm)1.
Remark 11.1. For our theoretical consideration of the proposed attacks, we assume a natural
implementation of the algorithms, e.g., we assume that overwriting the internal state of an
algorithm after its invocation is neglected due to optimization,
In Tables 11.1 through 11.4, we provide an overview of modern password scramblers in comparison
to the proposed instances of Catena. Note that we disregard Catena-Dragonfly-Full and
Catena-Butterfly-Full using a BRH182 and a DBH
14
4 , respectively (see Table 10.1 in Chapter 10)
since they were only added for showing the impact of setting H = H ′.
Tables 11.1 and 11.2 focus on general properties, i.e., the basis of the algorithm, the range
of required memory (RAM and ROM) which can be utilized if the algorithm can be parallelized,
and which underlying cryptographic primitive(s) they utilize. For that comparison, we use our
recommendations of Catena for password hashing. Our full versions (recommendations as KDFs)
only diﬀer in setting H ′ = H instead of H 6= H ′ and the particular instance of Fλ.
Tables 11.3 and 11.4 compare the functional and security properties of the password scramblers.
Since we see the possibility of being used as a KDF an important feature of a modern PS, we use
the full versions of the proposed instances of Catena for comparison.
Remark 11.2. Note that we do not claim completeness for Tables 11.3 and 11.4. For example,
we defined a scheme not to be resistant to Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) if it maintains a
password-dependent memory-access pattern. Nevertheless, there exist several other types of
SCAs such as those based on power consumption or acoustic analysis.
A further comparison of modern password scramblers (including scrypt, bcrypt, PBKDF2, and
the PHC ﬁnalists) is presented by Hatzivasilis et al. [130]. Next, we brieﬂy discuss the results stated
in Tables 11.3 and 11.4 regarding the resistance of a scheme to GCAs and WGCAs.
1https://cryptocoding.net/index.php/Coding_rules
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Memory Usage Primitive
Algorithm Based On RAM ROM Parallel BC/SC/PERM HF
Argon AES 1 kB - 1 GB - - AES (5R) BLAKE2b
Argon2d 250 MB - 4 GB - • BLAKE2b (CF, 2R) BLAKE2b
Argon2i 1 GB - 6 GB - • BLAKE2b (CF, 2R) BLAKE2b
battcrypt Blowﬁsh/bcrypt 128 kB - 128 MB - ◦ Blowﬁsh-CBC SHA-512
Lyra2 Sponge 400 MB - 1 GB - • BLAKE2b (CF)/(BlaMka) -
Makwa Squarings negl. - • - SHA-256
Parallel negl. - • - SHA-512
POMELO (8 KB, 256 GB) - • - -
Puﬀerﬁsh mod. Blowﬁsh/bcrypt 4 kB - 16 kB - - mod. Blowﬁsh SHA-512
yescrypt scrypt 3 MB 3 GB ◦ Salsa20/8 SHA-256
Catena-Dragonfly BRH212 128 MB - ◦ - BLAKE2b/BLAKE2b-1
Catena-Butterfly DBH164 4 MB - ◦ - BLAKE2b/BLAKE2b-1
Catena-Stonefly BRH181 256 MB - ◦ - BLAKE2b/CF(GB)
Catena-Horsefly BRH191 512 MB - ◦ - BLAKE2b/CF(GL)
Catena-Mydasfly DBH142 128 MB - ◦ - BLAKE2b/CF(GL)
Catena-Lanternfly GRH3172 128 MB - ◦ - BLAKE2b/CF(GB)
Table 11.1: Overview of the finalists of the PHC and all noteworthy instances of Catena regarding to their general properties. The values in the column
“Memory Usage” are taken from the authors recommendation for password hashing. The entry ’A(CF)’ denotes that only the compression function of
algorithm A is used. An entry A(xR) denotes that an algorithm A is reduced to x rounds. If an algorithm can be only be partially computed in parallel,
we marked the corresponding entry with ’◦’. All algorithms shown here are iteration-based. BC – block cipher, SC – stream cipher, PERM – keyless
permutation, HF – hash function.
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Memory Usage Primitive
Algorithm Based On RAM ROM Parallel BC/SC/PERM HF
AntCrypt 32 kB - ◦ - SHA-512
CENTRIFUGE 2 MB - - AES-256 SHA-512
EARWORM - 2 GB • AES (1R) SHA-256
Gambit Sponge 50 MB - - Keccakf -
Lanarea DF 256 B - - - BLAKE2b
MCS_PHS negl. - - - MCSSHA-8
ocrypt scrypt 1 MB - 1 GB - - ChaCha CubeHash
PolyPassHash Shamir Sec. Sharing negl. - - AES SHA-256
Rig BRG 15 MB - ◦ - BLAKE2b
schvrch 8 MB - ◦ - -
scrypt 1 GB - - Salsa20/8 -
Tortuga Sponge & recursive Feistel ◦ - - Turtle -
SkinnyCat BRG ◦ - - - SHA-*/BLAKE2*
TwoCats BRG ◦ - • - SHA-*/BLAKE2*
Yarn ◦ - ◦ BLAKE2b (CF), AES -
Table 11.2: Overview of the first- and second-round PHC candidates and scrypt regarding to their general properties. The values in the column “Memory
Usage” are taken from the authors recommendation for password hashing or are marked as ‘◦‘ if no recommendation exists. The entry ’A(CF)’ denotes that
only the compression function of algorithm A is used. An entry A(xR) denotes that an algorithm A is reduced to x rounds. If an algorithm can only be
partially computed in parallel, we marked the corresponding entry with ’◦’. Except for PolyPassHash, all other algorithms are iteration-based. BC – block
cipher, SC – stream cipher, PERM – keyless permutation, HF – hash function.
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11.1 Resistance of PHC Candidates against (W)GC Attacks
Note that for the upcoming discussion, we assume, the reader is familiar with the internals of the
particular PHC candidates since we concentrate only on those parts of the candidates that are
relevant regarding GCAs and WGCAs.
AntCrypt [83]. The internal state of AntCrypt is initialized with the secret pwd. During the
hashing process, the state is overwritten multiple times (based on the parameter outer_rounds and
inner_rounds), which thwarts GCA. Moreover, since the password pwd is used only to initialize
the internal state, WGCAs are not applicable.
Argon/Argon2d/Argon2i [54]. First, the internal state, derived from the password pwd, is the
input to the padding phase. After the padding phase, the internal state is overwritten by applying the
functions ShuffleSlices and SubGroups at least R times. Based on this structure, and since pwd
is used only to initialize the state, Argon is not vulnerable to GCAs/WGCAs. Within Argon2d and
Argon2i, after hashing the password and salt among other inputs, the internal state is overwritten
t times using the compression function G. Thus, Argon2d and Argon2i provide a similar resistance
to GCAs/WGCAs as Argon.
battcrypt [253]. Within battcrypt, the plain password is used only once, namely, to generate
a value key ← SHA-512(SHA-512(salt || pwd)). The value key is then used to initialize the in-
ternal state, which is expanded afterwards. In the Work phase, the internal state is overwritten
t_cost×m_size times using password-dependent indices. Thus, GCAs are not applicable. Note
that the value key is used in the three phases Initialize blowfish, Initialize data, and Finish, whereas
it is overwritten in the phase Finish the ﬁrst time. Further, the main eﬀort for battcrypt is given
by the Work phase. Thus, one can assume that one iteration of the outer loop (iterating over
t_cost_upgrade) lasts enough time so that a WGCA adversary can launch the following attack:
For each password candidate x and the public salt value s, compute key′ ← SHA512(SHA512(s || x))
and check whether key′ = key. If so, mark x as a valid password candidate.
Catena [109]. The resistance of the instances of Catena was already discussed before in the
respecting parts of this thesis. Summarizing, due to the fact that the password pwd is only used
once and should be overwritten right after its usage by the call to flap (see Line 2 of Algorithm 3),
all instances provide resistance to WGCAs. Furthermore, since we assume an instance of Catena to
provide resistance to GCAs if the internal (full) state (consisting of 2g ·k bits2) is at least overwritten
twice, only Catena-Horsefly and Catena-Horsefly-Full are vulnerable since they instantiate
Fλ by BRH
19
1 and a BRH
23
1 , respectively, and do not make use of the option Φ. For all other instances,
the state is overwritten at least λ (BRGgλ, SBRG
g
λ, GRGℓ
g
λ) or λ(2g − 1) times (DBGgλ). Thus, the
state is overwritten at least twice.
CENTRIFUGE [18]. The internal stateM of size p_mem×outlen byte is initialized with a seed S
derived from the password and the salt as follows: S ← H(sL || sR), where sL ← H(pwd || len(pwd))
and sR ← H(salt || len(salt)). Furthermore, S is used as the initialization vector (IV ) and the key
2For GCAs, we neglect the call to flap using only 2⌈glow/2⌉ state words (see Line 2 of Algorithm 3) since that
would not initialize the full state size which could be leaked to an adversary, i.e., the (full) state, consisting of 2g · k
state words, is written first in Line 5 of Algorithm 3. From that point on, we count the times the state is overwritten.
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Argon • • - • B • • • • - • -
Argon2d • • - • B • • • • - • -
Argon2i • • - • B • • • • • • -
battcrypt • • - ◦ B • • • - - ◦ -
Lyra2 • • - ◦ B • • • • - • -
Makwa ◦ • - ◦ - - • • • ◦ • •
Parallel • • - • - - • • - • ◦ -
POMELO - - - - B • • • • ◦ ◦ -
Puﬀerﬁsh - • - ◦ B ◦ • • • - ◦ -
yescrypt • • - • A RPH, SMH • ◦ ◦ - ◦ -
Catena-Dragonfly-Full • • - • B • • • • • • -
Catena-Butterfly-Full • • - • B LMH • • • • • -
Catena-Stonefly-Full • • - • B SMH • • • - • -
Catena-Horsefly-Full • • - • A • • - • • • -
Catena-Mydasfly-Full • • - • B SMH, LMH • • • • • -
Catena-Lanternfly-Full • • - • B • • • • - • -
Table 11.3: Overview of the finalists of the PHC and all noteworthy instances of Catena regarding their
security properties. By ’•’, we denote that a property is fulfilled, by ’◦’ that it is partially fulfilled or only
under certain requirements, and by ’-’ that it is not fulfilled. Note that we say that an algorithm does not
support SR when it requires the whole state to be transmitted to the server. Moreover, we say that an
algorithm does not support CIU if any additional information to the password hash itself is required. SMH
– sequential memory hardness, LMH – λ-memory hardness, RPH – ROM-port hardness as defined in [80].
for the CFB encryption. The internal stateM is written once and later accessed only in a password-
dependent manner. Thus, an adversary can launch the GCA in Algorithm 17.
The ﬁnal step of CENTRIFUGE is to encrypt the internal state, requiring the key and the IV , which
therefore must remain in memory during the invocation of CENTRIFUGE. Thus, an adversary can
launch the WGCA in Algorithm 18.
EARWORM [112]. EARWORM maintains an array called arena which consists of 2m_cost ×
L×W 128-bit blocks, where W ← 4 and L← 64 are recommended by the authors. This read-only
array is randomly initialized (using an additional secret input which has to be constant within a
given system) and is used blockwise as AES round keys. Since the values within this array do not
depend on the secret pwd, knowledge about arena does not help any malicious garbage collector.
Within the main function of EARWORM (WORKUNIT), an internal state scratchpad is updated
multiple times using password-dependent accesses to arena. Thus, a GCA adversary cannot proﬁt
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AntCrypt • - • ◦ B • • • • • ◦ -
CENTRIFUGE - - - • A ◦ - - - • ◦ -
EARWORM - • - - B RPH - • - • • -
Gambit - • opt. ◦ B ◦ • • • • ◦ -
Lanarea DF - • - • B ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ -
MCS_PHS - • - ◦ - - • • • • - -
ocrypt - - - • B ◦ • • • - ◦ -
PolyPassHash • - - • - - - - - - • •
Rig • • - • B LMH • • • • • -
schvrch - - - - B - - • • • ◦ -
scrypt - - - • A SMH • - - - • -
Tortuga - - - - B ◦ • • • • ◦ -
SkinnyCat - • - • A SMH • - - ◦ • -
TwoCats • • - • B SMH • • • ◦ • -
Yarn - • - - B ◦ - • - - ◦ -
Table 11.4: Overview of first-round and second-round PHC candidates and scrypt regarding their security
properties. By ’•’, we denote that a property is fulfilled, by ’◦’ that it is partially fulfilled or only under
certain requirements, and by ’-’ that it is not fulfilled. Note that we say that an algorithm does not support
SR when it requires the whole state to be transmitted to the server. Moreover, we say that an algorithm
does not support CIU if any additional information to the password hash itself is required. SMH – sequential
memory hardness, LMH – λ-memory hardness, RPH – ROM-port hardness as defined in [80].
from knowledge about scratchpad, rendering GCAs not applicable.
Within the function WORKUNIT, the value scratchpad_tmpbuf is derived directly from the pass-
word as follows:
scratchpad_tmpbuf ← EWPRF(pwd, 01 || salt, 16W ),
where EWPRF denotes PBKDF2HMAC-SHA256 with the ﬁrst input denoting the secret key.
This value is updated only at the end of WORKUNIT using the internal state. Thus, it has
to be in memory during almost the whole invocation of EARWORM, rendering the following
WGC attack possible: For each password candidate x and the known value salt, compute y ←
EWPRF(x, 01 || salt, 16W ) and check whether scratchpad_tmpbuf = y. If so, mark x as a valid
password candidate.
Gambit [214]. Gambit bases on a duplex-sponge construction [49] maintaining two internal states
S and Mem, where S is used to subsequently update Mem. First, password and salt are absorbed
into the sponge. After one call to the underlying permutation, the value obtained from the internal
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Algorithm 17 Garbage-Collector Attack on CENTRIFUGE
1: receive the internal state M (or at least M [1]) from memory
2: for each password candidate x do
3: initialization (seeding and S-box)
4: compute the ﬁrst table entry M ′[1] (during the build table step)
5: if M ′[1] =M [1] then
6: mark x as a valid password candidate
7: else
8: go to Line 2
Algorithm 18 Weak Garbage-Collector Attack on CENTRIFUGE
1: sR ← H(salt || len(salt))
2: for every password candidate x do
3: s′L ← H(x || len(x))
4: S′ ← H(s′L || sR)
5: if S′ = IV then
6: mark x as a valid password candidate
7: else
8: go to Line 2
state is written to the internal state Mem and Mem is updated r times (number of words in
the ratio of S). The output after the r steps is optionally XORed with an array lying in ROM.
Subsequently, Mem is absorbed into S again. This step is executed t times, where t denotes the
time-cost parameter. The size of Mem is given by m, the memory-cost parameter. Continuously
updating the states Mem and S thwarts GCAs. Moreover, since pwd is used only to initialize the
state within the sponge construction, WGCAs are not applicable.
Lanarea DF [192]. Lanarea DF maintains a matrix (internal state) consisting of 16× 16×m_cost
byte values, where m_cost denotes the memory-cost parameter. After the password-independent
setup phase, the password is processed by the internal pseudorandom function producing the array
(h0, . . . , h31), which determines the positions on which the internal state is accessed during the core
phase (thus, allowing CTAs). In the core phase, the internal state is overwritten t_cost×m_cost×16
times, rendering GCAs impossible. Moreover, the array (h0, . . . , h31) is overwritten t_cost×m_cost
times which thwarts WGCAs.
Lyra2 [146]. The Lyra2 password scrambler (and KDF) is based on a duplex sponge construction
that maintains a state H, which is initialized with the password, the salt, and some tweak in the
ﬁrst step of its algorithm. The authors indicate that the password can be overwritten from this
point on, rendering WGCAs impossible. Moreover, Lyra2 maintains an internal state M , which is
overwritten (updated using values from the sponge state H) multiple times. Thus, GCAs are not
applicable for Lyra2.
Makwa [215]. Makwa has not been designed to be a memory-demanding password scrambler.
Its strength is based on a high number of squarings modulo a composite (Blum) integer n. The
plain (or hashed) password is used twice to initialize the internal state, which is then processed by
squarings modulo n. Thus, neither GCAs nor WGCAs are applicable for Makwa.
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MCS_PHS [179]. Depending on the size of the output, MCS_PHS applies iterated hashing
operations, reducing the output size of the hash function by one byte in each iteration – starting
from 64 bytes. Note that the memory-cost parameter m_cost is used only to increase the size of the
initial chaining value T0. The secret input pwd is used once, namely when computing the value T0
and can be deleted afterwards, rendering WGCAs not applicable. Furthermore, since the output of
MCS_PHS is computed by iteratively applying the underlying hash function (without handling an
internal state which has to be placed in memory), GCAs are not possible.
ocrypt [91]. The basic idea of ocrypt is similar to that of scrypt, besides the fact that the
random memory accesses are determined by the output of a stream cipher (ChaCha) instead of a
hash-function cascade. The output of the stream cipher determines which element of the internal
state is updated, which consists of 217+mcost 64-bit words. During the invocation of ocrypt, the
password is used only twice: (1) as input to CubeHash, generating the key for the stream cipher
and (2) to initialize the internal state. Neither the password nor the output of CubeHash are used
again after the initialization. Thus, ocrypt is not vulnerable to WGCAs.
The internal state is processed 217+tcost times, where in each step, one state word is updated.
Since the indices of the array elements accessed depend only on the password, GCAs are not possible
by observing the internal state after the invocation of ocrypt.
Remark 11.3. Note that the authors of ocrypt claim resistance to SCAs since the indices of
the array elements are chosen in a password-independent way. But, since the password (beyond
other inputs) is used to derive the key of the underlying stream cipher, this assumption does
not hold, i.e., the output of the stream cipher depends on the password, rendering (theoretical)
CTAs possible.
Parallel [254]. Parallel has not been designed to be a memory-demanding password scrambler.
Instead, it is highly optimized for parallelization. First, a value key is derived from the secret input
pwd and the salt s by
key ← SHA-512(SHA-512(s) || pwd).
The value key is used (without being changed) during the Clear work phase of Parallel. Since
this phase deﬁnes the main eﬀort for computing the password hash, it is highly likely that a WGCA
adversary can gain knowledge about key. Then, the following WGC attack is possible: For each
password candidate x and the known value s, compute y ← SHA-512(SHA-512(s) || x) and check
whether key = y. If so, mark x as a valid password candidate. Since the internal state is given by
only the subsequently updated output of SHA-512, GCAs are not applicable for Parallel.
PolyPassHash [66]. PolyPassHash denotes a threshold system with the goal to protect an indi-
vidual password (hash) until a certain number of correct passwords (and their corresponding hashes)
are known. Thus, it aims at protecting an individual password hash within a ﬁle containing a lot
of password hashes, rendering PolyPassHash not to be a password scrambler itself. The protection
lies in the fact that one cannot easily verify a target hash without knowing a minimum number
of hashes (this technical approach is referred to as PolyHashing). In the PolyHashing construction,
one maintains a (k, n)-threshold cryptosystem, e.g., Shamir Secret Sharing [242]. Each password
hash h(pwdi) is blinded by a share s(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k ≤ n. The value zi ← h(pwdi) ⊕ s(i) is
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stored in a so-called PolyHashing store at index i. The shares s(i) are not stored on disk. For ef-
ﬁciency reasons, a legal party, e.g., a server of a social networking system, has to store at least k
shares in the RAM to compare incoming requests on-the-ﬂy. Thus, this system provides security
only against adversaries that are only able to read the hard disk but not the volatile memory (RAM).
Since the secret (of the threshold cryptosystem) or at least the k shares have to be in memory,
GCAs are possible by just reading the corresponding memory. The password itself is only hashed
and blinded by s(i). Thus, if an adversary is able to read the shares or the secret from memory, it
can easily ﬁlter wrong password candidates, i.e., rendering PolyPassHash vulnerable to WGCAs.
POMELO [263]. POMELO contains three update functions F (S, i), G(S, i, j), andH(S, i), where
S denotes the internal state and i and j the indices at which the state is accessed. Those functions
update at most two state words per invocation. The functions F and G provide deterministic
random memory accesses (determined by the cost parameter t_cost and m_cost), whereas the
function H provides random memory accesses determined by the password, rendering POMELO
at least vulnerable to CTAs. Since the password is used only to initialize the state, which itself is
overwritten 3 · 2t_cost + 2 times on average, POMELO provides resistance to GCAs and WGCAs.
Pufferfish [120]. The main memory used within Puﬀerﬁsh is given by a two-dimensional array
consisting of 25+m_cost 512-bit values, which is regularly accessed during the password-hash gener-
ation. The ﬁrst steps of Puﬀerﬁsh hash the password. The result is then overwritten 25+m_cost + 3
times, rendering WGCAs not possible. The state word containing the hash of the password (S[0][0])
is overwritten 2t_cost times. Thus, there exists no shortcut for an adversary, rendering GCAs im-
possible.
Rig [67]. Rig maintains two arrays a (sequential access) and k (bit-reversal access). Both arrays
are iteratively overwritten r · n times, where r denotes the round parameter and n the iteration
parameter, rendering Rig resistant to GCAs. Note that within the setup phase, a value α is computed
by
α = H1(x) with x = pwd || len(pwd) || . . . ,
Since the ﬁrst α (which is directly derived from the password) is only used during the initialization
phase, WGCAs are not applicable.
schvrch [260]. The password scrambler schvrch maintains an internal state of 256 · 64-bit words
(2 kB), which is initialized with the password, salt and their corresponding lengths, and the ﬁnal
output length. After this step, the password can be overwritten. This state is processed t_cost
times by a function revolve(), which aﬀects in each invocation all state words. Next, after applying
a function stir() (again, changing all state entries), it expands the state to m_cost times the state
length. Each part (of size state length) is then processed to update the internal state, producing
the hash after each part was processed. Thus, the state word initially containing the password is
overwritten t_cost ·m_cost times, rendering GCAs impossible. Further, neither the password nor a
value directly derived from it is required during the invocation of schvrch, which thwarts WGCAs.
Tortuga [239]. GCAs and WGCAs are not possible for Tortuga since the password is absorbed
into the underlying sponge structure, which is then processed at least twice by the underlying keyed
permutation (Turtle block cipher [61]), and neither the password nor a value derived from it has to
be in memory.
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Algorithm 19 Garbage-Collector Attack on SkinnyCat
1: Obtain mem[0, . . . ,memlen/(2 · blocklen)− 1] and PRK from memory
2: Create a state state′ and an array mem′ of the same size as state and mem
3: fromAddr ← slidingReverse(1) · blocklen
4: prevAddr ← 0
5: toAddr ← blocklen
6: for each password candidate x do
7: Compute PRK ′ as described using the password candidate x
8: Initialize state′ and mem′ as prescribed using PRK ′
9: state′[0]← (state′[0] +mem′[1])⊕mem′[fromAddr ++]
10: state′[0]← ROTATE_LEFT(state′[0], 8)
11: mem′[blocklen+ 1]← state′[0]
12: if mem′[blocklen+ 1] = mem[blocklen+ 1] then
13: mark x as a valid password candidate
14: else
15: go to Line 6.
SkinnyCat and TwoCats [74]. SkinnyCat is a subset of the TwoCats scheme optimized for
implementation. Both algorithms maintain a 256-bit state state and an array of 2m_cost+8 32-bit
values (mem). During the initialization, a value PRK is computed as follows:
PRK ← Hash(len(pwd), len(s), . . . , pwd, s),
where s denotes the salt. The value PRK is used in the initialization phase and is overwritten only
in the penultimate step of SkinnyCat (in the function addIntoHash()). Thus, an adversary that
gains knowledge about the value PRK is able to launch the following WGCA: For each password
candidates x and the known value s, compute PRK ′ ← Hash(len(x), len(s), . . . , x, s) and check
whether PRK = PRK ′. If so, mark x as a valid password candidate.
Within TwoCats, the value PRK is overwritten at an early state of the hash value generation.
TwoCats maintains consists of a garlic application loop from startMemCost = 0 to stopMemCost,
where stopMemCost is a user-deﬁned value. In each iteration, the value PRK is overwritten,
rendering WGCAs for TwoCats not possible.
Both SkinnyCat and TwoCats consist of two phases each. The ﬁrst phase updates the ﬁrst
half of the memory (early memory) mem[0, . . . ,memlen/(2 · blocklen) − 1], where the memory
is accessed in a password-independent manner. The second phase updates the second half of the
memory mem[memlen/(2 · blocklen), . . . ,memlen/blocklen − 1], where the memory is accessed in
a password-dependent manner. Thus, both schemes provide only partial resistance to CTAs. For
SkinnyCat, the early memory is never overwritten, allowing an adversary to launch the GCA in
Algorithm 19. Note that this attack does not work for TwoCats because the memory is overwritten
early.
Yarn [150]. Yarn maintains two arrays state and memory, consisting of par and 2m_cost 16-byte
blocks, respectively. The array state is initialized using the salt. Afterwards, state is processed using
the BLAKE2b compression function with the password pwd as message, resulting in an updated
array state1. This array has to be stored in memory since it is used as input to the ﬁnal phase of
Yarn. The array state is expanded afterwards and further, it is used to initialize the array memory.
Next, memory is updated continuously and both memory and state are overwritten continually.
The array state1 is overwritten lastest in the ﬁnal phase of Yarn. Thus, GCAs are not possible for
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Yarn. Nevertheless, the array state1 is directly derived from pwd and is stored until the ﬁnal phase
occurs. Thus, an adversary can launch the WGCA in Algorithm 20, where s denotes the salt.
Algorithm 20 Garbage-Collector Attack on Yarn
1: h← Blake2b_GenerateInitialState(outlen, s, pers)
2: for each password candidate x do
3: h′ ← Blake2b_ConsumeInput(h, x)
4: state1’← Truncate(h′, outlen)
5: if state1’ = state1 then
6: mark x as a valid password candidate
7: else
8: go to Line 2
yescrypt [212]. The yescrypt password scrambler maintains two lookup tables V and V ROM ,
where V is located in the RAM and V ROM in the ROM. Since our attacks only target the RAM,
we neglect the lookup table V ROM for our analysis. Depending on the ﬂag YESCRYPT_RW, the
behavior of the memory management in the RAM can be switched from “write once, read many”
to “read-write”, which leads to (at least) partial overwriting of V using random memory accesses.
Furthermore, yescrypt provides (among others) a ﬂag YESCRYPT_WORM, which is used to activate
the scrypt compatibility mode by enabling a parameter t (controlling the computational time of
yescrypt) and pre- and post-hashing (whereas pre-hashing is used to overwrite the password before
any time- and memory-consuming action is performed). In the following, we brieﬂy analyze under
which requirements (parameter sets) yescrypt provides resistance to GCAs and WGCAs.
No flags are set and g = 0: Then, yescrypt runs in scrypt compatibilitry mode (when used with-
out Read-Only Memory (ROM)) and thus, the same attacks as described in Section 6.3 are
applicable.
No flags are set and g >= 0: Then, yescrypt is vulnerable to WGCAs. Thus, even if g > 0, the
password remains in memory for one full invocation of the time- and memory-consuming core
of yescrypt since pre- and post-hashing do not overwrite the password.
YESCRYPT_RW is set and g = 0: Then, the second loop of ROMix (Lines 23-25 of Algorithm 1) per-
forms less than N writes to V if t = 0 or if t = 1 and N ≥ 8. Since V is not fully overwritten,
this allows GCAs similar to the ones explained for scrypt (but with higher eﬀort since V is
at least partially overwritten). For t > 1, it is most likely that the whole internal state V is
overwritten; hence, we say that yescrypt provides resistance to GCAs in this case.
g > 0: Then, yescrypt provides resistance to GCAs since V is overwritten at least once in the second
invocation of the ﬁrst loop of ROMix (Lines 20-22 of Algorithm 1). This holds independently
from any ﬂags or the parameter t.
Smaller instance called before: Under the following requirements, a 64-times smaller instance of
yescrypt is invoked before the full yescrypt:
• YESCRYPT_RW is set.
• p ≥ 1, where p denotes the number of threads running in parallel.
• N/p ≥ 256, where N denotes the memory size of the state in the RAM, i.e., size of V .
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Algorithm Complexity in pROM
Catena-Dragonfly O(G1.5) (BRG) [23], Ω˜(G1.5), O˜(G1.625) [21]
Catena-Butterfly O(G log2(G)) (DBG) [23], Ω˜(G1.5), o(G1.625) [21]
Argon2i-A Ω˜(G1.6), O˜(G1.708) [21]
Argon2i-B Ω˜(G1.6) [21], O(G1.8) [20]
Balloon Hashing (SB) Ω˜(G1.6), O˜(G1.708) [21]
Balloon Hashing (DB) Ω˜(G1.5), O˜(G1.625) [21]
Rig, TwoCats, Gambit O(G1.75) [24]
POMELO O(G1.83) [24]
Lyra2 O(G1.67) [24]
MHF example [23] O(G2)
Table 11.5: Overview of the pebbling complexities in the pROM. All candidates provide a pebbling com-
plexity of O(G2) in the sequential setting. The Balloon Hashing family consists of three members, where SB
refers to the Single-Buffer and DB to the Double-Buffer variant. The family Argon2i provides two members,
Argon2i-A and Argon2i-B. The ’˜’ symbol denotes that the given bounds disregard logarithmic factors.
• N/p ∗ r ≥ 217, where r denotes the memory per thread.
If these conditions hold, yescrypt overwrites the password very fast; hence, providing resistance
to WGCAs.
11.2 Sequential vs. Parallel Model
In the last section of this chapter, we will brieﬂy discuss the so-called Parallel Random-Oracle
Model (pROM) that was introduced in 2015 by Alwen and Serbinenko [23]. This model contrasts
the sequential pebbling game introduced by Lengauer and Tarjan [170] since it considers multiple
invocations of the considered memory-hard function in parallel for distinct inputs. Lengauer and
Tarjan have shown that Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) with constant in-degree, e.g., DBGgλ and
BRGgλ, do not scale well in that setting. In Table 11.5, we have summarized the best results obtained
in the parallel setting published so far (at the time when writing this thesis), where all algorithms
employ a data-independent graph-based structure which can be exploited in the pROM, except for
the memory-hard function presented in [23].
In 2016, Alwen and Blocki introduced a new measure for memory-hard functions considering the
required amount of energy (i.e., electricity) for their introduced attack [19]. Further, they introduced
the security notion of depth robustness, which they describe as follows:
Informally, a DAG G is not depth-robust if there is a relatively small set S of nodes such
that after removing S from G the resulting graph [. . . ] has low depth (i.e. contains only
short paths). [19]
Based on this new notion, the authors provide a generic attack on graphs which do not satisfy depth
robustness, i.e.,
[. . . ] no DAG with constant indegree is suﬃciently depth-robust to completely resist
the attack (referring to the newly introduced attack in the pROM). More precisely, we
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show that any iMHF (data-independent memory-hard function) is at best c-ideal3 for
c = Ω(log1−ǫ n) and any ǫ > 0. [19]
(Annotation added by the author of this thesis.)
Assume an algorithm designed to require O(G) memory units. Then, the generic attack considers
two phases:
Balloon Phase: Requires about O(G) memory; can be computed fast based on the stored values
in S. After that phase, all but the S pebbles can be removed from the graph.
Light Phase: Requires negligible ℓ≪ G (much less than G) memory units and can be computed
in parallel for many distinct inputs.
The main idea behind the two phases is that an adversary in the pROM model requires only O(G+ℓ)
memory units while computing many password hashes in parallel. The authors also presented a
hypothetical machine which could run using G1/4 light-phase chips while requiring only a single
balloon-phase chip. Thereby, the light phase requires O(G3/4 lnG) memory and a single instance
of H while the balloon phase requires O(G lnG) memory and
√
G instances of H. However, they
concluded their paper with the following statement:
Because pROM is a theoretical model of computation it is not obvious a priori that
our attacks translate to practically eﬃcient attacks that could be implemented in real
hardware because it can be diﬃcult to dynamically reallocate memory between pro-
cesses in an ASIC (the amount of memory used during each round of a balloon phase
is signiﬁcantly greater than the amount of memory used during each round of a light
phase). [19]
A further extension of their attacks and its application to Argon2-B is given by Alwen and Blocki
in [20].
Remark 11.4. All results discussed in this section do only hold for memory-hard functions
which employ a secret-independent memory-access patter. When considering Catena, one
would enable the options Γ and Φ as discussed in Sections 7.2 and 9.1. Then, an adversary in
the Parallel Random-Oracle Model (pROM) would suffer from the following two facts: (1) it
requires a new balloon-phase chip for every fresh public input given to Γ, and (2) the graph layer
within Φ could not be computed in parallel due to its property of being sequential memory-hard.
Nevertheless, the adversary could still reduce the memory effort for computing Fλ between Γ
and Φ. However, that would require an even higher number of synchronization steps between
the light-phase and balloon-phase chips.
The application of the proposed attack [19] makes most sense as long as the memory-access
pattern depends on neither a public or a secret input. Thus, one must make a decision whether
to provide resistance in the pROM or to CTAs.
In a second work [22], Alwen et al. introduced two new classes of the pebble game: the randomized
and the entangled pebbling game:
3See [19] for a definition of c-ideal.
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Randomized: In the randomized pebble game, a single node of the underlying graph structure is
chosen at random and the complexity is given by measuring the number of required
pebble movements for pebbling that very node. In the parallel setting, multiple
challenges (nodes) are chosen at random. Alwen et al. analyzed scrypt-like functions
in this model providing a lower bound of Θ(G2/ log2(G)). The complexity can be
further reduced to O(G1.5), if the challenges are known in advance.
Entangled: In this model, Alwen et al. improved the pebble game by storing the XOR value
of hash values instead of the values itself, reducing the total amount of memory
required. They have shown, that the complexity of an entangled pebbling adversary
is given by Θ(G2/ log2(G)) for scrypt-like functions.
The authors further provided a lower bound for arbitrary adversaries for pebbling scrypt-like func-
tions: Θ(G2/ log2(G) · γG), where γG > 3/2 is the best lower bound the authors can provide.
Summarising, the parallel attack model gives a new opportunity to analyze password-hashing
schemes. And, even if there does not exist a practical instance of the depth-robust example in-
troduced by Alwen and Serbinenko [23], we recommend depth robustness to be considered as a
desirable goal of modern password scramblers.
11.3 Summary
In this chapter, we provided an overview (functionality, security, and general properties) of the
non-withdrawn candidates of the Password Hashing Competition (PHC), the instances of Catena
introduced in Chapter 10, and scrypt. Furthermore, we analyzed each algorithm regarding to its
vulnerability to Garbage-Collector Attacks (GCAs) and Weak Garbage-Collector Attacks (WGCAs)
– two attack types introduced in this thesis (see Section 3). Even if both attacks require access to
the memory on the target’s machine, they show potential weaknesses that should be taken into
consideration. As a results, we have shown GCAs on CENTRIFUGE, PolyPassHash, scrypt (see
Section 6.3), SkinnyCat, and yescrypt. Additionally, we have shown that WGCAs are applicable to
battcrypt, CENTRIFUGE, EARWORM, Parallel, PolyPassHash, scrypt, SkinnyCat, Yarn, and
yescrypt. Moreover, we discussed the Parallel Random-Oracle Model (pROM) introduced by Alwen
and Serbinenko [23] and further developments and enhancements of the generic attacks in that
model.
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Reforgeability of Authenticated Encryption Schemes
The question of integrity will get finer and finer
and more delicate and more beautiful.
Richard Buckminster Fuller
T
he goal of Authenticated Encryption (AE) schemes is to protect simultaneously privacy and
authenticity of messages. Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) schemes
provide additional authentication for associated data. The standard security requirement
for AE schemes is to prevent leakage of any information about protected messages except for their
respective lengths. However, stateless encryption schemes would enable adversaries to detect if the
same associated data and message has been encrypted before under the current key. Thus, Rogaway
proposed nonce-based encryption [228], where the user must provide an additional nonce for every
message it wants to process – a number used once (nonce). An AE scheme requiring a nonce as
input is called a Nonce-Based Authenticated Encryption (NAE) scheme.
In this chapter, we focus on the integrity of NAE schemes. More detailed, we elaborate on
the possibility for ﬁnding multiple forgeries once a single forgery against the considered scheme
is found. The ﬁrst attack that headed in that direction was introduced in 2002 by Ferguson, who
showed collision attacks on OCB (version 1) [230] and a Ctr-CBC-like MAC [92]. He demonstrated
that ﬁnding a collision within the message processing of OCB “leads to complete loss of an essential
function” (referring to the loss of authenticity/integrity).
Later on, in 2005, the term multiple forgery attacks was deﬁned by McGrew and Fluhrer [181].
They introduced the measure of expected number of forgeries and conducted a thorough analysis of
GCM [180], HMAC [36], and CBC-MAC [38]. In 2008, Handschuh and Preneel [127] introduced
key-recovery and universal forgery attacks against several Message Authentication Code (MAC)
algorithms. The term Reforgeability was ﬁrst formally deﬁned by Black and Cochran in 2009, where
they examined common MACs regarding their security to this new measurement [57]. Further, they
introduced WMAC, which they argued to be the “best fit for resource-limited devices”.
Here, we recoin the term Reforgeability so that refers to the complexity of ﬁnding subsequent
forgeries once a ﬁrst forgery has been found. Thus, it deﬁnes the hardness of forging a ciphertext
after the ﬁrst forgery succeeded. For a reforgeability attack to work, an adversary must be provided
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with a veriﬁcation oracle in addition to its authentication (and encryption) oracle. In practice, such
a setting can, for example, be found when a client tries to authenticate itself to a server and has
multiple tries to log in to a system. Thus, the server would be the veriﬁcation oracle for the client.
Obviously, the same argument holds for the case when the data to be send is of sensitive nature,
i.e., the data itself has to be encrypted. Thus, besides the resistance of MACs to reforgeability, also
the resistance of AE schemes is of high practical relevance.
Since modern and cryptographically secure AE schemes should provide at least INT-CTXT se-
curity when considering integrity, the ﬁrst forgery is usually not trivially found and depends on
the size of the tag or the internal state. For that reason, reforgeability becomes especially essential
when considering resource-constrained devices limited by, e.g., radio power, bandwidth, area, or
throughput. This is not uncommon when considering low-end applications such as sensor networks,
Voice over IP (VoIP), streaming interfaces, or, for example, devices connected to the Internet of
Things (IoT). In these domains, the tag size τ of MACs and AE schemes can be quite small, e.g.,
τ = 64 or τ = 32 bits [137, 183], or even drop to τ = 8 bits as mentioned by Ferguson for voice
systems [93]. Therefore, even if the AE scheme is secure in the INT-CTXT setting up to τ bits, it is
not unreasonable for an adversary to ﬁnd a forgery for such a scheme in general. Nevertheless, even
if ﬁnding the ﬁrst forgery requires a large amount of work, a rising question is, whether it can be
exploited to ﬁnd more forgeries with signiﬁcantly less eﬀort than 2τ operations per forgery.
For our analysis, we derive a new security notion j-INT-CTXT: an adversary, ﬁnding the ﬁrst
forgery with an eﬀort of t1, can generate j additional forgeries in polynomial time depending on j. In
general, the best case for an adversary would be to ﬁnd j additional forgeries in t1+ j. Nevertheless,
for three schemes (AES-OTR [188], COLM [25], and OCB [162]), we recall and show that ﬁnding
j forgeries can also be done in time t1 (thus, the j additional authentication queries are not even
required).
Due to the vast number of submissions to the CAESAR competition [44], cryptanalysis proceeds
slowly for each individual scheme, e.g., the only forgery attacks published for third-round CAESAR
candidates are on AES-COPA [26, 172, 194], which even might become obsolete since AES-COPA
and ELmD [77] have been merged to COLM [25]. Besides looking at third-round CAESAR candi-
dates, we also analyzed further widely-used AE schemes, e.g., GCM [180], EAX [42], CCM [88],
and CWC [158]. Naturally, due to their longer existence, there exist a lot more cryptanalysis on
those schemes in comparison to the CAESAR candidates (see [111, 144, 145, 182, 225, 233] for
some examples. The hope is that an INT-CTXT-secure AE scheme does not lose its security when
considering reforgeability, i.e., j-INT-CTXT.
We brieﬂy introduce what we mean by resistant to j-IV-Collision Attacks (j-IV-CAs), whereby
we assume the ﬁrst forgery to be the result from an internal collision of the processing of the
associated data and or the nonce. Hereby, we consider nonce-ignoring as well as nonce-respecting
adversaries.
Nonce-Ignoring Adversaries: We call an NAE scheme resistant to j-IV-CAs if the required eﬀort
of a nonce-ignoring j-IV-CA adversary for ﬁnding j + 1 forgeries (including the ﬁrst one) is
greater than t1 + j, where t1 denotes the eﬀort for ﬁnding the ﬁrst forgery.
Nonce-Respecting Adversaries: We call an NAE scheme resistant to j-IV-CAs if the required eﬀort
of a nonce-respecting j-IV-CA adversary for ﬁnding j + 1 forgeries (including the ﬁrst one) is
greater than t1 · j/2, where t1 denotes the eﬀort for ﬁnding the ﬁrst forgery.
Further, we say that an NAE scheme is semi-resistant to j-IV-CAs if the internal state is wide, e.g.,
greater or equal to 2n bits (e.g., sponge-based NAE schemes), where n denotes the block size of
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Scheme NI NR Scheme NI NR
Third-Round CAESAR Candidates
ACORN [264] t1 + j t1 · j/2 Ketje [50] t2 + j t2 · j/2
AEGIS [267] t2 + j t2 · j/2 Keyak [122] t2 + j t2 · j/2
AES-OTR [188] t1 t1 MORUS [265] t2 + j t2 · j/2
AEZv4 [135] t1 + j t1 · j/2 NORX [32] t2 + j t2 · j/2
Ascon [81] t2 + j t2 · j/2 NR-NORX [32] t2 + j t2 · j
CLOC [141] t1 + j t1 · j OCB [162] t1 t1
COLM [25] t1 t1 + j SILC [141] t1 + j t1 · j
Deoxys [143] t1 + j t1 · j Tiaoxin [201] t2 + j t2 · j/2
JAMBU [266] t1 + j t1 · j/2
Classical AE Schemes
CWC [158] t1 + j t1 · j CCM [88] t1 + j t1 + j
EAX [42] t1 + j t1 · j GCM [180] t1 + j t1 + j
Table 12.1: Expected #oracle queries required for j forgeries for IV/nonce-based classical schemes and
third-round CAESAR candidates. By t1 and t2, we denote the computational cost for obtaining the first
forgery, where t2 relates to wide-state designs. NI/NR = nonce-ignoring/nonce-respecting setting. Since
we obtained the same results for Deoxys-I and Deoxys-II, we combine them to Deoxys in this table.
NR-NORX (draft) means the nonce-misuse-resistant version of NORX.
message and ciphertext blocks. That would make the search for a generic collision signiﬁcantly more
demanding than the search for multiple forgeries. We denote the eﬀort for ﬁnding a collision within
a wide internal state by t2. Finally, we call an NAE scheme vulnerable to j-IV-CAs if it is neither
resistant nor semi-resistant to j-IV-CAs.
This chapter classiﬁes NAE schemes depending on the usage of their inputs to the initialization,
encryption, and authentication process, and categorize the considered AE schemes regarding to that
classiﬁcation.
For a systematic analysis, we introduce the j-IV-CA based on the introduced security deﬁnition
j-INT-CTXT where the former allows us to compute expected upper bounds on the hardness of
further forgeries (a summary of our results can be found in Table 12.1). For our attack, we pursue
the idea of the message-block-collision attacks presented in [92, 230]. However, in contrast to those
works, we focus on an internal collision within the processing of the associated data and the nonce.
In the last section, we provide two alternative approaches to provide resistance in the sense of
reforgeability and j-IV-CAs. Moreover, for AES-OTR, COLM, and OCB, we recall and describe
further attacks that render multi-forgery attacks more eﬃcient than our generic approach.
12.1 Classification of AE Schemes
In our work, we consider AE schemes from a general point of view. Therefore, in comparison to
the classiﬁcation of Namprempre, Rogaway, and Shrimpton [193], we introduce one additional op-
tional input to the tag-generation step (a key-dependent chaining value) and further, we distinguish
between the message and the ciphertext being input to the tag generation.
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Figure 12.1: Generic AE scheme as considered in our analysis.
We classify AE schemes according to their inputs to an initialization function FIV and a tag-
generation function FT . Let K,AD, N, IV , T ,M, CV , and C deﬁne the key, associated data, nonce,
IV, tag, message, chaining-value, and ciphertext space, respectively. We deﬁne three functions FIV ,
E , and FT as follows:
FIV : K[×AD][×N ][×M] → IV,
E : K × IV ×M → C[×CV],
FT : K[×CV][×M][×C][×AD][×N ] → T ,
where AD, N,M, CV , C ⊆ {0, 1}∗, T ⊆ {0, 1}τ , and IV ⊆ {0, 1}∗. The expressions (sets) given in
brackets are optional inputs to the corresponding function, e.g., the function FIV must be provided
with at least one input (the keyK ∈ K), but is able to process up to four inputs (including associated
data AD ∈ AD, nonce N ∈ N , and message M ∈M).
From this, we introduce a generic classiﬁcation based on which input is used in FIV and FT . Note
that the signature of the encryption algorithm E is equal for all classes described, i.e., it encrypts a
message M under a key K and an IV ∈ IV, and outputs a ciphertext C ∈ C.
In the following, we encode the combination of inputs as a sequence of eight bits x0, . . . , x7,
where each bit denotes whether an input is used (1) or not (0), resulting in a total of 28 = 256
possible classes. More detailed, the ﬁrst three bits x0, x1, x2 denote whether the associated data AD,
the nonce N , or the message M are used as input to FIV , respectively. The bits x3, . . . , x7 denote
whether a key-dependent chaining value CV ,M , C, AD, or N are used as input to FT , respectively.
Figure 12.1 depicts our generic AE scheme. For example, the string (11010011) represents FIV :
K ×AD ×N → IV and FT : K × CV ×AD ×N → T as it would be the case for, e.g., POET [3],
CLOC, and SILC [141]. Further, we mark a bit position by ’*’ if we do not care about whether the
speciﬁc input is available or not.
The authors of [193] distinguished between IV-based (ivE) and nonce-based (nE) encryption
schemes. Such a distinction is covered by our generalized approach since one can simply assume the
only input to FIV to be the nonce (and the key) and making FIV itself the identity function, i.e.,
it forwards the nonce N to the encryption function E . Moreover, AE schemes built from generic
composition can be modeled by setting x3 = 0 and assuming FT to be a PRF-secure MAC.
Our next step is to signiﬁcantly reduce the number of possible classes by disregarding those
that are trivially insecure. First, we can simply discard 24 = 16 classes of the form (00 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗00),
where neither the nonce N nor the associated data AD is considered as input. Similarly, we can
exclude 6 · 24 = 96 classes which lack the use of either the nonce or the associated data, i.e.,
{(01 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗00), (01 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗01), (10 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗00), (10 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗10), (00 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗01), (00 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗10)}. Finally, since a
secure nonce-based AE scheme requires the nonce to inﬂuence at least the encryption step, we can
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Set of Classes Input to FIV Input to FT
(01 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗10) K ×N [×M] K[×CV ][×M][×C]×AD
(01 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗11) K ×N [×M] K[×CV ][×M][×C]×AD ×N
(11 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗00) K ×AD ×N [×M] K[×CV ][×M][×C]
(11 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗01) K ×AD ×N [×M] K[×CV ][×M][×C]×N
(11 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗10) K ×AD ×N [×M] K[×CV ][×M][×C]×AD
(11 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗11) K ×AD ×N [×M] K[×CV ][×M][×C]×AD ×N
Table 12.2: Overview of accepted classes. All excluded classes are trivially insecure.
Name & Class [193] Class Name & Class [193] Class
A1, A1.100111 (01001011) A7, A3.100111 (01001011)
A2, A1.110111 (11001011) A8, A3.110111 (11001011)
A3, A1.101111 (01101011) N1, N1.111 (11100000)
A4, A1.111111 (11101011) N2, N2.111 (01000111)
A5, A2.100111 (01000111) N3, N3.111 (01001011)
A6, A2.110111 (11000111)
Table 12.3: The eleven “favored” NAE schemes considered by [193] and how we map them according to
our classification. The classes (A1, A7) and (A2, A8) have pairwise the same class according to our generic
NAE scheme. That stems from the fact that we do not follow the distinction of NAE schemes from [193]
regarding to whether the message/ciphertext can be processed in parallel or if the tag can be truncated. For
the scheme N3, it holds that E gets the two separate inputs FL(A,N,M) and the nonce N . Since there is no
segregated tag generation for N3 (the tag is part of the ciphertext), we interpreted FL as FIV and consider
FIV to additionally hand over the nonce N to the encryption E internally in plain.
further disregard the 3 · 24 = 48 classes {(00 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗11), (10 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗01), (10 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗11)} which omit the
nonce in the initialization function FIV . As a result, we reduced the number of relevant classes to
96. An overview can be found in Table 12.2.
Remark 12.1. Namprempre et al. [193] reduced 160 to eight IV-based and three nonce-based
“favored” schemes that can be mapped according to our classification (see Table 12.3, and
Section 12.1 for our classification). Moreover, our generalized AE scheme, as introduced in
Section 12.1, allows to model any possible instantiation, including GC-based schemes.
12.2 j-INT-CTXT Analysis of NAE Schemes
In this section, we introduce a new attack type called j-IV-Collision Attack (j-IV-CA) as one possible
way to analyze the security of an NAE scheme regarding to reforgeability. We provide two variants
(1) for the nonce-ignoring (NI; also known as nonce-misuse) and (2) the nonce-respecting (NR)
setting.
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Algorithm 21 j-IV-Collision Attack for nonce-ignoring adversaries.
1: Choose an arbitrary ﬁxed message M
2: Q← ∅
3: for i← 1 to t1 do
4: Choose (ADi, Ni) with (ADi, Ni) /∈ Q|AD,N
5: Query (ADi, Ni,M) and receive (Ci, Ti).
6: Q← Q ∪ {(ADi, Ni,M,Ci, Ti)}
7: if Ti ∈ Q|T then
8: Store the tuples (ADi, Ni,M,Ci, Ti) and (ADk, Nk,M,Ck, Tk) for which Ti = Tk
9: break
10: for ℓ← 1 to j do
11: Choose Mℓ /∈ Q|M
12: Query (ADi, Ni,Mℓ) and receive (C ′ℓ, T
′
ℓ)
13: Q← Q ∪ {(∗, ∗,Mℓ, ∗, ∗)}
14: Output the forgery (ADk, Nk, C ′ℓ, T
′
ℓ)
12.2.1 j-IV-Collision Attack
The core idea of a j-IV-CA is to (1) assume a ﬁrst forgery can be found caused by an internal
collision within the processing of the associated data AD and/or the nonce N and (2) to exploit
this collision for eﬃciently constructing j further forgeries. Depending on the class of an AE scheme,
such a collision can occur during the invocation of FIV , FT , or both.
Due to the character of the attacks presented in this section, we can derive a set of classes
C0 of NAE schemes for which those attacks are trivially applicable. For all schemes belonging to
this class, neither the message M , nor a message/ciphertext-depending chaining value CV , nor the
ciphertext C inﬂuence the ﬁrst collision found by our adversary. For instance, if an adversary tries
to construct a collision for the outputs of FIV , the only possible inputs to FIV are either the nonce
N , the associated data AD, or both. Therefore, the set C0 contains the following 22 classes of AE
schemes:
C0 = {(110 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0∗), (01 ∗ 0001∗), (1100001∗)}.
Nonce-Ignoring Setting. The attack for the nonce-ignoring setting is described in Algorithm 21.
An adversary A starts by choosing a ﬁxed arbitrary message M and pairs (ADi, Ni) not queried
before ((ADi, Ni) /∈ Q|AD,N , see Line 4). That builds up a query (ADi, Ni,M) resulting in an oracle
answer (Ci, Ti) which is stored by A in the query history Q. Once a collision of two tag values Ti and
Tk (implying a collision of two pairs (ADi, Ni) 6= (ADk, Nk))1 was found (Line 7 of Algorithm 21),
A starts to generate j additionally queries with an eﬀort of O(j) (Lines 10-14). In Lines 6 and 13,
the adversary is collecting all tuples queried so far, where in Line 13 we are only interested in the
values of Mℓ, since these are not allowed to repeat (see Line 11) by the deﬁnition of A.
It is easy to observe that A has to use the same nonce twice, i.e., Ni is chosen in Line 4 and
reused in Line 12 of Algorithm 21. Independent from the number of queries of ﬁnding the j additional
forgeries, A always (in the nonce-ignoring as well as in the nonce-respecting setting) has to ﬁnd a
collision for two pairs (ADi, Ni) 6= (ADk, Nk). That number of queries (denoted by t1 in general, or
by t2 if the scheme employs a wide state of ≥ 2n bits (or ≥ 2τ bits, when referring to the size of the
1Based on our assumption, the case Ti = Tk can be caused by an internal collision of the processing of two pairs
(ADi, Ni) 6= (ADk, Nk). Moreover, since we are considering the nonce-ignoring setting allowing an adversary for
repeating the values Ni, we can say WLOG that we must have found two associated data values Ai 6= Ak leading to
an equal output of the processing of the associated data, e.g., the initialization vector IV (see Figure 12.1).
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Algorithm 22 j-IV-Collision Attack for nonce-respecting adversaries.
1: Choose an arbitrary ﬁxed message block M
2: Q← ∅
3: for 1 to j do
4: for i← 1 to t1 do
5: Choose (ADi, Ni) with (ADi, Ni) /∈ Q|AD,N
6: Choose Pi with Pi /∈ Q|P
7: Query (ADi, Ni,M ‖Pi) and receive (C1i ‖CPii , Ti).
8: Q← Q ∪ {(ADi, Ni, C1i ‖CPii , Ti)}
9: if C1i ∈ Q|C1 then
10: A outputs the tuples (ADi, Ni, C1i ‖CPkk , Tk) and (ADk, Nk, C1k ‖CPii , Ti)
11: for which C1i = C
1
k holds
12: goto Step 4
Scheme NI NR Scheme NI NR
Third-Round CAESAR Candidates
ACORN – 2τ JAMBU 22n/2 22n/2
AEGIS – 2τ Ketje – 2min{τ,s}
AES-OTR – 2τ/2 Keyak
2min{c/2,τ} 2min{c/2,τ}
AEZv4 255 255 MORUS – 2128
Ascon – 2τ OCB – 2τ
CLOC 2n/2 2n/2 SILC – 2τ/2
COLM 264 264 NORX – 2|τ |
Deoxys-I – 2τ Tiaoxin – 2128
Deoxys-II 2τ/2 2τ−1
Classical AE Schemes
CCM – 2n/2 CWC – 2n/2
EAX – 2n/2 GCM – 2n/2
Table 12.4: Claimed INT-CTXT bounds of the considered AE schemes; NR/NI = nonce-respecting/nonce-
ignoring adversary, where τ denotes the length of the tag, n the size of the internal state (usually the block
size of the internally used block cipher), and c the capacity for sponge-based designs.
tag value), see Table 12.1) always depends on the concrete instance of our generic AE scheme and
is usually bounded by at least O(q2/2n) (birthday bound), where q denotes the number of queries
and n the state size in bits. In Table 12.4, the reader can ﬁnd the security claims of the considered
AE schemes provided by their respective designers.
Nonce-Respecting Setting. The second setting prohibits an adversary from repeating any value
Ni during its encryption queries. Therefore, we introduce a modiﬁed version of the j-IV-CA as
proposed above. Such an attack works for all schemes that allow to observe a collision of the outputs
of the IV-generation step by just looking at the ciphertext blocks. Thus, during the ﬁrst step, we
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do not care about ﬁnding the ﬁrst forgery but only about the collision during FIV as shown in
Algorithm 22. This attacks works also for NAE schemes that consider the associated data ADi only
as input to FT . In such a situation, A would leave ADi constant (or empty when considering FIV )
and would vary only Ni to ﬁnd a collision within FIV . If the number of queries for ﬁnding a collision
during the processing of the associated data is given by t1, an adversary requires j · t1 queries in
average to obtain 2 · j forgeries. Clearly, this attack is weaker than that in the nonce-misuse setting
above, but still reduces the number of queries for ﬁnding j forgeries from j · t1 to 1/2 · (j · t1).
12.2.2 Security Analysis
For all NAE schemes which belong to C0, there exists a straight-forward argument that they are
insecure in the nonce-ignoring setting. A j-IV-CA, as deﬁned in Algorithm 21, requires an adversary
A to choose j pair-wise distinct messages M1, . . . ,Mj . Beforehand, we assume A has found the ﬁrst
forgery for two distinct pairs (ADi, Ni) and (ADk, Nk) (Lines 3-9 of Algorithm 21) using t1 queries.
Therefore, the j-IV-CA adversary A queries t1 distinct pairs (ADi, Ni) 6= (ADk, Nk), together
with a ﬁxed message M , until an internal collision leads to the case Ti = Tk. Since the event of
that very ﬁrst collision is independent from the message, a chaining value, and/or the ciphertext
(requirement for an NAE scheme to be placed in C0), we can always choose a new message and
still can ensure the internal collision for the pairs (ADi, Ni) and (ADk, Nk). Then, A only has to
query (ADi, Ni,Mℓ) for a fresh message Mℓ to the encryption oracle and receives (C ′ℓ, T
′
ℓ), where it
is trivial to see that the pair (C ′ℓ, T
′
ℓ) will also be valid for (ADk, Nk,Mℓ). A then only has to repeat
this process for j pairwise distinct messages Mℓ.
In the case of a nonce-respecting adversary (see Algorithm 22), an internal collision of the pro-
cessing of (ADi and) Ni is detected by observing colliding ciphertext blocks (see Line 9). Since the
attack requires an internal collision within the IV-generation step and the nonce Ni must not directly
inﬂuence the tag-generation step FT , the nonce Ni must be given as input to FIV , but not to FT . The
associated data ADi can be given as input to FIV , FT , or both. Therefore, the attack described in Al-
gorithm 22 is applicable to all schemes belonging to the subset {(11∗∗∗∗00), (11∗∗∗∗00), (01∗∗∗∗10)}
of C0.
All remaining 74 classes in the set C1 provide resistance to j-IV-CAs from a theoretical point of
view, i.e., with regard to our generalized AE scheme as shown in Figure 12.1.
C1 = {(01 ∗ 0011∗), (01 ∗ 0101∗), (01 ∗ 0111∗), (01 ∗ 1001∗), (01 ∗ 1011∗),
(01 ∗ 1101∗), (01 ∗ 1111∗), (1100011∗), (1100101∗).(1100111∗),
(1101001∗), (1101011∗), (1101101∗), (1101111∗), (111 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗)}
However, in practice, their security depends on the speciﬁc instance of FIV and/or FT . In the next
section, we look at concrete instances from the class C1 as well as from C0 when we consider classical
NAE schemes and third-round CAESAR candidates.
12.2.3 Concrete Instances of C1 and C0
The resistance to j-IV-CA of AE schemes from the class C1 is based on the fact that the message,
and/or a chaining value, and/or the ciphertext aﬀect the generation of the IV or the tag, i.e., is
input to FIV and/or FT . However, if we move from our generalized approach to concrete instances
of these classes, i.e., to existing AE schemes whose structure is deﬁned by a class in C1, we will
see that some of those classes do not provide resistance to j-IV-CAs. However, AE schemes whose
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Scheme Class NI NR Scheme Class NI NR
Third-Round CAESAR Candidates (C0) Third-Round CAESAR Candidates (C1)
ACORN (11011000) – – AEGIS (11011010) – ◦
AES-OTR (ser.) (11001100) – – AES-OTR (par.) (01001110) – –
Ascon (11010100) – ◦ AEZv4 (11011011) – –
COLM (11011000) – – CLOC (11010101) – •
JAMBU (11011000) – – Deoxys-I (01011001) – •
Ketje (11010000) – ◦ Deoxys-II (01011001) – •
NORX (11010100) – ◦ Keyak (01011010) – ◦
Classical AE Schemes (C1) MORUS (11011010) – ◦
CCM (01011011) – • NR-NORX (11110100) ◦ •
CWC (01010110) – – OCB (01001010) – –
EAX (01000111) – • SILC (11010101) – •
GCM (01000111) – – Tiaoxin (11011010) – ◦
Table 12.5: j-IV-CA-Resistance of the third-round CAESAR candidates and considered classical AE
schemes, in the nonce-ignoring (NI) and the nonce-respecting (NR) setting. ’•’ indicates resistance, ’◦’
vulnerability under certain requirements, and ’–’ vulnerability. AES-OTR (ser.) means the serial and (par.)
the parallel mode.
classes belong to C0 are vulnerable or at most semi-resistant to j-IV-CAs in both the NI and the NR
setting. In Table 12.5, we give an overview of the resistance the considered AE schemes to j-IV-CAs.
We also provide a brief discussion for those cases that are not trivially observable in the following.
In addition to the generic j-IV-CAs in this section, we recall stronger multi-forgery attacks on OCB,
AES-OTR, and COLM in Section 12.3.
AEGIS, MORUS, and Tiaoxin. These schemes are semi-resistant to j-IV-CAs in the nonce-
respecting setting.2 This stems from the fact that they employ very wide states, which are initialized
by nonce and associated data, and which are more than twice as large as the ﬁnal ciphertext stretch;
therefore, the search for state collisions is at best a task of sophisticated cryptanalysis, and at worst
by magnitudes less eﬃcient than the trivial search by querying many forgery attempts. As a side
eﬀect, the search for state collisions is restricted to associated data and messages of equal lengths
since their lengths are used in FT (for that reason, we set x6 = 1).
CWC and GCM. In the nonce-ignoring setting, forgeries for CWC and GCM can be obtained
with a few queries. The tag-generation procedures of both modes employ a Carter-Wegman MAC
consisting of XORing the encrypted nonce with an encrypted hash of associated data and ciphertext.
The employed hash are polynomial hashes in both cases, which is well-known to lead to a variety
of forgeries after a few queries when nonces are repeated.
In the nonce-respecting setting, both CWC and GCM possess security proofs that show that
they provide forgery resistance up to the birthday bound (Iwata et al. [142] invalidated those for
GCM and presented revised bounds which still are bound by the birthday paradox). However,
a series of works from the past ﬁve years [233, 218, 2] illustrated that the algebraic structure of
polynomial hashing may allow to retrieve the hashing key from forgery polynomials with many
2None of the designers of the corresponding schemes claim any security in the nonce-ignoring setting.
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roots. The most recent work to date by Abdelraheem et al. [2] proposes universal forgery attacks
that work on a weak key set. Thus, a nonce-respecting adversary could ﬁnd the hash key and possess
the power to derive universal forgeries for those schemes, even with signiﬁcantly less time than our
nonce-respecting attack.
AES-OTR and OCB. In the nonce-ignoring setting, these schemes are trivially insecure, as has
been clearly stated by their respective authors. We consider OCB as an example, a similar attack
can be performed on AES-OTR if nonces are reused. A nonce-ignoring adversary simply performs
the following steps:
1. Choose (A,N,M) such that M consists of at least three blocks: M = (M1,M2, . . .), and ask
for their authenticated ciphertext (C1, C2, . . . , T ).
2. Choose ∆ 6= 0n, and deriveM ′1 =M1⊕∆ andM ′2 =M2⊕∆. ForM ′ =M ′1,M ′2 andM ′i =Mi,
for i ≥ 3, ask for the authenticated ciphertext (C ′1, C ′2, . . . , T ) that corresponds to (A,N,M ′).
3. Given the authenticated ciphertext (C ′′, T ′′) for any further message (A, N , M ′′) with M ′′ =
(M1,M2, . . .), the adversary can forge the ciphertext by replacing (C ′′1 , C
′′
2 ) = (C1, C2) with
(C ′1, C
′
2).
Therefore, the complexities for j forgeries under nonce-ignoring adversaries are only t1 (and not
t1 + j, see Table 12.1). Because of their structure, there exist nonce-respecting forgery attacks on
AES-OTR and OCB that are stronger than our generic j-IV-CA (see Section 12.3).
AEZv4. Since AEZv4 does not separate the domains of (ADi, Ni) for IV and tag generation,
our j-IV-CAs work out-of-the box here. More detailed, nonce and associated data are parsed into a
string T1, . . . , Tt of n-bit strings Ti, and simply hashed in a PHASH-like manner inside AEZ-hash:
∆←⊕ti=1Ei+2,1K (Ti), where E denotes a variant of four-round AES. The adversary can simply ask
for the encryption of approximately 264 tuples (Ai, Ni,M) for ﬁxed M . Obtaining a collision for
this hash (requiring birthday-bound complexity) can be easily detected when the message is kept
constant over all queries. Given such a hash collision for (Ai, Ni) and (Ak, Nk), the adversary can
directly construct subsequent forgeries by asking for the encryption of (Ai, Ni,M ′) and the same
ciphertext will be valid for (Ak, Nk,M ′) for arbitrary M ′.
Deoxys. Deoxys-I, i.e., the nonce-requiring variant, possesses a similar structure as OCB. Hence,
there are trivial multi-forgery attacks with few queries if nonces repeat:
1. Choose (A,N,M) arbitrarily and ask for (C, T ).
2. Choose A′ 6= A, leave N and M constant, and ask for C ′ = (C, T ′). Since the tag is computed
by the XOR of Hash(A) with the encrypted checksum under the nonce as tweak, the adversary
sees the diﬀerence in the hash outputs in the tags: Hash(A)⊕Hash(A′) = T ⊕ T ′.
3. Choose (A,N ′,M ′) and ask for (C ′′, T ′′). It instantly follows that for (A′, N ′,M ′), (C ′′, T ′′′ =
T ⊕ T ′ ⊕ T ′′) will be valid.
However, in the nonce-respecting setting, the use of a real tweakable block cipher that employs the
nonce in tweak (instead of the XEX construction as in AES-OTR and OCB) prevents the attacks
in Section 12.3; the tag generation seems surprisingly strong in the sense that an adversary can not
detect collisions between two associated data since the hash is XORed with an output of a fresh
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Scheme Type Attack Time Data Memory Succ.
AES-OTRv3.1 par. ADP NR AUF 2n/2 2n/2 2n/2 1.0
AES-OTRv3.1 ser. ADP NR AUF 2n/2 2n/2 2n/2 1.0
AES-OTRv3.1 ser. ADP NI AUF 2n/2 2n/2 2n/2 1.0
COLMv1 NI AUF 2n/2 2n/2 2n/2 1.0
OCBv3 NR AUF 2n/2 2n/2 2n/2 1.0
Table 12.6: Stronger forgery attacks on NAE schemes. NR/NI = nonce-respecting/nonce-ignoring; AUF
= almost universal forgery; Succ. = success probability; ADP = Associated Data Processing.
block cipher (because of the nonce is used as tweak) for every query. Therefore, we indicate that
Deoxys-I provides resistance in the nonce-respecting setting.
Deoxys-II is a two-pass mode, i.e., the message is processed twice (1) once for the encryption
process and (2) for the authentication process. In the nonce-ignoring setting, an adversary can
simply ﬁx Ni and vary ADi for ﬁnding a collision for Auth, which renders the scheme vulnerable
to j-IV-CAs. Therefore, that kind of two-pass scheme (in comparison to SIV, where the message is
used as input to FIV ), does not implicitly provide resistance to j-IV-CAs.
NORX. The authors of NORX presented a nonce-misuse-resistant version of their scheme in
Appendix D of [32]. NR-NORX follows the MAC-then-Encrypt paradigm, which yields a two-pass
scheme similar to SIV. Therefore, NR-NORX provides at the least resistance to j-IV-CAs in the
NR setting, which renders it stronger than NORX. However, this security comes at the cost of being
oﬀ-line and two-pass.
CCM, EAX, CLOC, and SILC. The resistance to j-IV-CAs in the nonce-respecting setting
provided by CCM, EAX, CLOC, and SILC stems from similar reasons as for Deoxys-II; the tag
is generated by the XOR of the MAC of the nonce with the MAC of the ciphertext and the MAC
of the associated data. Hence, collisions in ciphertext or header can not be easily detected since the
MAC of a fresh nonce is XORed to it.
12.3 Stronger Forgery Attacks
This section summarizes existing attacks on third-round CAESAR candidates and classical AE
schemes that yield multiple forgeries. This can be induced by the recovery of, e.g., a masking key
or authentication key after a collision. While the complexity of the attacks are beyond the proved
security bounds and therefore do not invalidate the according proofs, they can be considered as
undesirable properties that should be avoided in recommendations by the community or even in
future standards. See Table 12.6 for the results that are discussed in this section.
12.3.1 OCB
Ferguson [92] showed collision attacks on OCBv1, which allowed to recover the masking key L from
a collision of the sums of input and output of two blocks Mi ⊕ Ci = Mj ⊕ Cj . Thereupon, the
recovered L allows the construction of many selective forgeries out of a single long message. To
address the length restriction of messages in OCBv1, Ferguson also derived attacks from collisions
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PSfrag replacements
M1 M2 M3 M4
C1 C2 C3 C4L
L 2L
3L 2 · 3L
EK
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τ,N Σ
T
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L∗
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Figure 12.2: Simplified schematic illustration of the encryption process in AES-OTRv3.1 (parallel). The
final two message blocks Mm−1 and Mm are treated differently; Σ =
⊕m/2
i=1
M2i, L
∗ = 2m−1 · L, and Auth
denotes the result of processing the associated data.
among diﬀerent messages, which also resulted in selective forgeries. The attacks by Ferguson still
hold in similar form also for OCBv3, as pointed out by Sun, Wang, and Zhang [251]. In the following,
we recall the details brieﬂy.
For versions v1 and v3 of OCB, the designers used Gray codes for masking the block-cipher in-
puts. The mask for the i-th message/ciphertext block is given by Zi := γi ·L⊕R, where L← EK(0n),
R ← EK(N ⊕ L), and γi represents the integer i in the canonical Gray code. The multiplications
are in GF(2n) with primitive polynomial x128 + x7 + x2 + x + 1.
1. Choose A and N arbitrarily, and choose a long query M = (M1, . . . ,Mm), such that for all
k ∈ {1, ⌊m/4⌋}, it holds that M4k ⊕M4k+1 ⊕M4k+2 ⊕M4k+3 = 0n. Ask for its encryption
C = (C1, . . . , Cm) and T .
2. If it holds, for any pair i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, i 6= j, that Mi ⊕ Ci = Mj ⊕ Cj , then it holds with
probability 0.5 that this collision is the result of colliding cipher inputs. Then, we can recover
L by L← (Mi ⊕Mj) · (γi ⊕ γj)−1.
3. For any index d, change C ′k ← Cd ⊕ (γi ⊕ γk) · L for k = 4, . . . , 7. Leave other ciphertext
blocks, T , A, and N unchanged. The so-modiﬁed ciphertext C ′ is still valid and will yield
M ′4⊕M ′5⊕M ′6⊕M ′7 = 0n, which also held for the original message. Hence, the tag T remains
valid also for the modiﬁed ciphertext.
12.3.2 AES-OTR
Similar collision attacks as for OCB can be applied to AES-OTR. As a reaction to Bost and
Sanders’ [234] polynomial attacks on the v2 version of AES-OTR, Minematsu updated the tweak
usage in v3 of AES-OTR to use the masking key L from encrypting N . We describe two attacks
on AES-OTR v3.1 with birthday-bound complexity of 2n/2 that recover L: an attack with a single,
long message, and an attack with multiple messages.
Single-Message Attack. The ﬁrst attack works as follows:
1. Choose A and N arbitrarily, and choose a long query M = (M1, . . . ,Mm) for even m such
that all even blocks are equal, i.e. M2 = M4 = . . . = M2i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m/2 − 1}, and
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random pair-wise distinct odd blocksM2i−1. For simplicity, choose arbitrary full blocksMm−1
and Mm. Ask for its encryption C = (C1, . . . , Cm) and T .
2. If for any pair i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m/2− 1}, it holds that C2i−1 = C2j−1, it follows from M2i =M2j
and from the fact that EK(·) is a permutation that
M2i−1 ⊕ 2i−1L =M2j−1 ⊕ 2j−1L, and hence,
L = (M2i−1 ⊕M2j−1) · (2i−1 ⊕ 2j−1)−1.
3. For any pair of indices x, y ∈ {1, . . . ,m/2 − 1}, derive ∆ ← 3 · (2x−1 ⊕ 2y−1) · L and ∇ ←
(2x−1 ⊕ 2y−1) · L, and compute
C ′2x−1 ← C2y−1 ⊕∆, C ′2x ← C2y ⊕∇,
C ′2y−1 ← C2x−1 ⊕∆, and C ′2y ← C2x ⊕∇.
Leave other ciphertext blocks, T , A, and N unchanged. The so-modiﬁed ciphertext C ′ is
still valid and will yield M ′2x−1 = M2y−1 ⊕ ∇, M ′2x = M2y ⊕ ∆, M ′2y−1 = M2x−1 ⊕ ∇, and
M ′2y =M2x ⊕∆.
Since the tag generation uses the sum of the even-indexed message blocks,
Σ =
m/2⊕
i=1
M2i,
it holds that Σ′ = Σ since M ′2x ⊕M ′2y =M2y ⊕M2x.
Multi-Message Nonce-Respecting Attack. A variant of Ferguson’s collision attack with mul-
tiple messages on OCB may also be possible for AES-OTR; however, it would allow to recover the
relation of ∆ = 2i−1L⊕2j−1L. For OCB, Ferguson could inject diﬀerences of (4⊕5⊕6⊕7)∆ which
cancel out in GF(2n). Since AES-OTR employs doublings instead, this would mean, one would
obtain (2i⊕ 2j ⊕ 2k . . .)∆ when swapping double-blocks from between the colliding messages. Thus,
Ferguson’s collision attack seems not directly applicable to AES-OTR; at least, we could not ﬁnd a
straight-forward way to cancel values. However, we found two attacks with collision among diﬀerent
messages for the serial-ADP version of AES-OTR.
For the serial version, we can derive a multi-message nonce-respecting collision attack. For this
version, the masking key is computed from L ← (EK(τ,N) ⊕ Auth) · 2. Leaving the (assumed
constant) parameter τ aside, it is easy to see that two values of L can collide at birthday bound.
1. Choose an integer m ≥ 4, and ﬁx arbitrary values M,Mm−1 ∈ {0, 1}n.
2. For i = 1..q, choose pair-wise distinct random pairs of associated data and nonce (Ai, N i)
such that the nonces N i are all distinct. Choose M2j−1, for j = 1, . . . ,m/2− 1 randomly. Ask
for the authenticated encryption of (Ai, N i,M i), with
M i = (M i1,M,M
i
3,M, . . . ,Mm−1,M)
and store (Ai, N i, Ci, T i) as well as the odd-indexed blocks of M i in a table L.
3. If, for any indices i 6= j, it holds that Cim = Cjm, then it must follow from M im−1 =M jm−1 and
M im = M
j
m that the masking keys for both messages L
i and Lj must be identical. It follows
furthermore from the tag generation of AES-OTR that the tags of both messages M i and
M j are identical.
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4. Denote t← (m/2)−1. Leaving the ﬁnal double-block (M im−1,M im) aside that served for detect-
ing the collision of the masking keys, we have t double blocks (Ci2k−i, C
i
2k) and (C
j
2k−i, C
j
2k),
for k = 1, . . . ,m/2− 1, in our two involved ciphertexts that can be swapped across messages.
Since both yield M i2k = M
j
2k = M after decryption, the swaps do not change the tag. As-
suming M i2k−1 6=M j2k−1 for all k = 1, . . . ,m/2− 1, which holds with high probability, we can
create in total 2 · 2t diﬀerent authenticated ciphertexts by exhaustive combination of double
blocks with either (Ai, N i) or (Aj , N j). Note that we already used two of those combinations
for ﬁnding the collision.
Multi-Message Nonce-Ignoring Attack. Lu [172] published almost-universal forgery attacks
on AES-COPA, and Marble. They can be also translated into nonce-ignoring attacks on AES-
OTRv3.1. We consider the version with serial ADP since the speciﬁcation claims that its “security
[. . . ] holds as far as a pair of AD and nonce (A,N) is unique for all encryption queries, for privacy
and authenticity notions”. Lu proposed attacks with constant associated data, requiring at best
about 2124 queries and time, at about 2120.6 bytes and a success probability of approximately 0.32.
Moreover, he proposed an attack with 265 queries and time. Both recover the masking key L. We
transform the latter with birthday-bound complexity to an attack on AES-OTR that also recovers
L. The attack works as follows:
1. Fix any message M and nonce N .
2. For i = 1, . . . , 2n/2, choose a single-block associated data Ai of length < n bits, s. t. all Ai are
pair-wise distinct. Ask for the encryption of (Ai, N,M) to Ci, T and store them into a table.
3. For j = 1, . . . 2n/2, choose a single-block associated data data A′j of length n bits. If there
exist i, j with Ai = A′j , then, we can recover the associated-data masking key Q ← EK(0n)
from
Ai ⊕ 2Q← A′j ⊕ 4Q and thus Q← (Ai ⊕A′j) · (2⊕ 4)−1.
Though, it suﬃces to compute Ai ⊕A′j ← 2Q⊕ 4Q.
4. In the following, for each of the 2n/2 stored tuples (Ai, N,Ci, T i) with partial Ai, derive the
padded n-bit value A′i ← (Ai ‖ 10∗) ⊕ (2Q ⊕ 4Q). All ciphertexts (A′i, N,Ci, T i) are valid
forgeries.
12.3.3 COLM
The multi-message nonce-ignoring attack by Lu can also be applied in similar form to COLMv1.
Here, we can recover ﬁrst the masking key L, which is also used for encryption and tag generation.
Using the notation from the attack description on AES-OTR, it holds for COLMv1 that we obtain
Ai ⊕ 3 · 2 · 7 · L = A′i ⊕ 3 · 2 · L and thus L = (Ai ⊕A′j) · 7−1.
For each of the 2n/2 stored tuples (Ai, N,Ci, T i) with partial Ai, derive the padded n-bit value
A′
i ← (Ai ‖ 10∗)⊕ (3 · 2 · 7 · L⊕ 3 · 2 · L). Again, all ciphertexts (A′i, N,Ci, T i) are valid forgeries.
However, the knowledge of L allows almost universal forgeries.
There are various ways to obtain a vast amount of more forgeries. For instance, choose some N ′,
M ′ and a long associated data A′ = (A1, . . . , Aa), with A1 = A2 = . . . = Aa, such that (N ′, A′,M ′)
has not been queried before. Ask for its corresponding encryption (C ′, T ′). From A1 = A2 = . . . = Aa
12.4. COUNTERMEASURES TO j-IV-COLLISION ATTACKS 135
follows that the masked inputs to the block cipher, AAi ← Ai ⊕ 2i · 3 · L, are pair-wise distinct.
Since we know L, we can modify the blocks A′i to obtain a permutation of the a values AAi. Since
there exist a! such permutations, we obtain a!− 1 forgeries from a single encryption query.
12.4 Countermeasures to j-IV-Collision Attacks
This section brieﬂy describes two possible approaches for providing resistance to j-IV-CAs in the
nonce-respecting (NR) as well as in the nonce-ignoring (NI) setting.
Independence of FIV and FT . For realizing that approach, the pair (ADi, Ni) has to be pro-
cessed twice. Let FIV (ADi, Ni, ∗) be the IV-generation step of an NAE scheme processing the tuple
(ADi, Ni, ∗), where ’∗’ denotes that FIV can optionally process the messageM . Usually, it is proven
that FIV behaves like a PRF. Further, let FT (∗, ∗, ∗, ADi, Ni) be the tag-generation step of an AE
scheme processing the tuple (∗, ∗, ∗, ADi, Ni), where the ﬁrst three inputs can be the chaining value
CV , the message M , and/or the ciphertext C3, and there exists a proof showing that FT also be-
haves like a PRF. Hence, the corresponding scheme would have the class (11∗∗∗∗11) which belongs
to C1. If one can guarantee independence between FIV and FT , we can say that the outputs of
FIV (ADi, Ni, ∗) and FT (∗, ∗, ∗, ADi, Ni) are independent random values. Based on this assumption,
a simple collision of the form FIV (ADi, Ni, ∗) = FIV (ADk, Nk, ∗) (as required by the j-IV-CA) does
not suﬃce to produce a forgery since it is highly likely that FT (ADi, Ni, ∗) 6= FT (∗, ∗, ∗, ADk, Nk)
and vice versa. Therefore, this two-pass processing realizes a domain separation between the IV-
generation and the tag-generation step, providing resistance to j-IV-CAs. One way to achieve that
goal can be to invoke the same PRF twice (for FIV and FT ) but always guarantee distinct inputs,
e.g., FIV (ADi, Ni, ∗, 1) and FT (∗, ∗, ∗, ADi, Ni, 2). Another approach would be to use two indepen-
dent functions.
Wide-State IV. A second approach requires a PRF-processing of the associated data FIV which
produces a wide-state output τ ← FIV (ADi, Ni) with |τ | > n bit. For example, for |τ | = 2n, a pair
(ADi, Ni) would be processed to two independent n-bit values τ1 and τ2. Then, one could use τ1 as
initialization vector to the encryption step and τ2 as initialization vector to the tag-generation step.
Therefore, one can always guarantee domain separation between encryption and tag generation,
while remaining a one-pass AE scheme. One possible instantiation for such a MAC (which can be
utilized for the processing of the associated data) is PMAC2x [171].
12.5 Summary
In this chapter, we pursued on the idea of multi-forgery attacks ﬁrst described by Ferguson in
2002 and went on with introducing the notion j-INT-CTXT. We introduced a classiﬁcation of NAE
schemes depending of the usage of their inputs to the initialization, encryption, and authentication
process, and categorize them regarding to that classiﬁcation. To allow a systematic analysis of the
reforgeability of NAE schemes, we introduced the j-IV-Collision Attack, providing us with expected
upper bounds on the hardness of further forgeries. During our analysis, we made the following
observations:
3Note that at least one of the three inputs must be given since otherwise, the tag would be independent from the
message, which would make the scheme trivially insecure.
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• None of the considered NAE schemes provides full resistance to j-IV-CAs in the nonce-ignoring
as well as in the nonce-respecting setting.
• ACORN, AES-OTR (serial), Ascon, COLM, JAMBU, Ketje, and NORX belong to the
class C0, rendering them implicitly vulnerable or at most semi-resistant to j-IV-CAs.
• AEGIS, Ascon, Ketje, Keyak, MORUS, NORX, NR-NORX, and Tiaoxin are semi-
resistant to j-IV-CAs in the nonce-respecting setting since all of them employ a wide state.
• NR-NORX is also semi-resistant to j-IV-CAs in the nonce-ignoring setting.
• Full resistance in the nonce-respecting setting is only satisﬁed by CCM, CLOC, Deoxys-I,
Deoxys-II, EAX, NR-NORX, and SILC.
Note that the wide-state property has no impact on the applicability of a j-IV-CA itself, but it sig-
niﬁcantly increases the necessary computational eﬀort for the internal collision. 4 Finally, we brieﬂy
proposed two alternative approaches which would render an NAE scheme resistant to j-IV-CAs in
the nonce-respecting as well as the nonce-ignoring setting.
4For example, if the internal state is of size 2n (wide state) instead of n, a generic collision can be found in 2n
instead of 2n/2.
Part V
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Conclusion
The scientist is not a person who gives the right
answers, he’s one who asks the right questions.
Claude Lévi-Strauss
In this chapter, we ﬁrst summarize the achievements obtained during this thesis and second, discuss
possible future works.
13.1 Summary
Block-Cipher-Based Compression Functions. Block-cipher-based compression functions were
brought forward ﬁrst by Rabin [220] back in the 1970s and experienced a strong development of
single- and double-block-length compression functions, e.g., [217, 232, 247, 185, 96, 133]. In Part II,
we introduced Counter-bDM, the ﬁrst provably secure family of MBL compression functions,
which, in contrast to the above, allows arbitrary large outputs. Counter-bDM consists of a simple
and neat design and is accompanied by a thorough security analysis. Furthermore, to avoid multiple
calls to the key schedule of the underlying block cipher, we realized the demand for independent and
distinct block-cipher calls within one invocation of the compression function by always guaranteeing
distinct plaintext inputs.
Password Hashing. Our work in the ﬁeld of password hashing in Part III was triggered by
showing that the ﬁrst modern Password Scrambler (PS) scrypt [211] is vulnerable to three types
of Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs), i.e., Cache-Timing Attacks (CTAs), Garbage-Collector Attacks
(GCAs), and Weak Garbage-Collector Attacks (WGCAs), where the two latter were introduced
by us. Thereupon, we came up with a list of (functional, security, and general) properties that
should be satisﬁed by modern password scramblers, e.g., memory hardness, simplicity, SR, CIUs,
and resistance to SCAs The ﬁrst design fulﬁlling all the required properties was Catena, which we
introduced in 2013 and which had a high impact on the requirements stated by the Password Hashing
Competition (PHC) [31]. Catena describes a highly ﬂexible Password-Scrambling Framework for
which we provide several instances suitable for a variety of applications. We provided a thorough
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security analysis of Catena – including, e.g., preimage security, PRF security, and resistance to
SCAs (for some instances) – ensuring that Catena can be used without any concerns.
Finally, we compared all submissions to the PHC that were not withdrawn (and scrypt) by the
means of the properties mentioned above, and accompanied that comparison by a discussion about
the resistance to GCAs and WGCAs.
Authenticated Encryption. In Part IV, we focused on the integrity of Nonce-Based Authen-
ticated Encryptions (NAEs). More detailed, we considered the third-round submissions to the
CAESAR competition as well as classical AE schemes (CWC [158], CCM [88], EAX [42], and
GCM [180]) in terms of j-INT-CTXT security – a notion which we introduced during our work. It
refers to an adversary attempting to obtain j forgeries based on a single given forgery. For a system-
atic analysis, we ﬁrst provided a generic AE scheme and introduced a classiﬁcation of the considered
NAE schemes accordingly. Next, we introduced the j-IV-Collision Attack (j-IV-CA) providing us
with expected upper bounds regarding to the notion j-INT-CTXT. We have done our analysis in
the nonce-ignoring as well as in the nonce-respecting setting and we conducted that in the former,
none of the considered NAE schemes provide full resistance, whereas some of them provide semi-
resistance based on a wide state. Finally, we outlined two approaches for designing an AE scheme
that would provide resistance to j-IV-CAs.
13.2 Future Work
Even though we proposed a block-cipher-based compression function allowing for arbitrary large
outputs, there is still room left for improvement:
• Is it possible to provide a provably secure MBL hash function with b · n bits output size that is
not tied to a block cipher from Block(bn, n)?
The research of password hashing has signiﬁcantly evolved during the last years. Apart from key
stretching, and memory hardness, Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) have come to the fore and motivated
many well-designed modern password scramblers. Nevertheless, there still exist many tasks and
questions that arose during our work on Catena:
• A verification of our theoretical Cache-Timing Attacks (CTAs), Garbage-Collector Attacks
(GCAs), and Weak Garbage-Collector Attacks (WGCAs) on scrypt and other memory-hard
password scramblers would require a practical implementation.
• Besides GCAs, WGCAs, TMTOs, and SCAs, are there other possible attack vectors on modern
password scramblers?
• In [170], it is shown that a DBG (from which we use a slight adapted version in our instances
Catena-Butterfly and Catena-Mydasfly) is a superconcentrator. Moreover, it is the
basis for the DBGgλ as used in our instances Catena-Butterfly and Catena-Mydasfly,
providing λ-Memory Hardness (LMH). Since the depth of a DBGgλ depends on the parameter
g (memory), we are interested whether there exist superconcentrators with a fixed depth, thus,
providing LMH while maintaining an efficient and scalable graph-based PS.
• Is it possible to design a sequential memory-hard password scrambler that also satisfies resis-
tance to Cache-Timing Attacks (CTAs)?
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• Regarding the precomputation attack [55] on different instances of Fλ: could an adversary
obtain a significant lower penalty when considering an optimal distribution of all λ · 22g/3
sampling points over the whole graph.
• Do TMTO attacks similar to that of Biryukov and Khovratovich [55] exist that are optimized
for other instances of Fλ, namely GRGℓ
g
λ?
With our work on reforgeability of NAE schemes, we introduced a new notion of security when
considering the integrity of such schemes. We also presented two possible approaches that provide
resistance to j-IV-CAs as introduced in Part IV.
• Is it possible to design a provable secure NAE scheme that provides resistance to j-IV-CAs in
both the nonce-ignoring as well as the nonce-respecting setting?.

We appeal, as human beings, to human beings: Remember your
humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies
open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the
risk of universal death.
Russel-Einstein Manifesto
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